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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the migration processes of Kazakhs from Mongolia to 
Kazakhstan between 1990-2011. Since 1990, when Kazakhstan gained sovereignty from 
the Soviet Union, approximately half of the 120,000 Kazakhs who lived in Mongolia 
migrated to Kazakhstan through a state-supported process of ethnic repatriation. Over 
twenty years that the repatriation program has been in place, Kazakhstan’s attempts to 
claim its current territory as the homeland of all Kazakhs and to construct Kazakhs living 
abroad as its national diaspora have produced some complicated and quite unintended 
effects.  Rather than participating in an orderly process of permanent mass repatriation, 
Mongolian Kazakhs have created a viable cross-border community, continuing to 
maintain social ties and kin relationships on both sides of the border. 
This dissertation is about claims to homeland, belonging, and history in a space 
carved up by state borders and divided by competing political structures, economic 
systems, and unequal regional power relations.  At the most basic level, it is about how 
people relate people to places, through ideas and practices of mobility and migration, 
historical narratives built around sacred places and ancestral genealogies, and categories 
of belonging or exclusion based on language, religion, and ways of life. A central aim of 
my dissertation is to show how people’s lives can be organized around principles of 
seasonal migration, pilgrimage, kinship, and ancestry, as much as claims to citizenship in 
a nation-state. Mongolian Kazakhs articulate their ideas of homeland and belonging 
through appeals to ancestries, not polities, enveloping state-sponsored notions of 
‘repatriation’ into a deep history of ancestral movements and cyclical seasonal 
migrations. This is predicated upon the creation and on-going maintenance of reciprocal 
 xi 
relationships of care among the land, the ancestors, and their descendants. For Kazakhs in 
Kazakhstan and Mongolia, such cyclical relationships to ancestries and movement 
represent very powerful, albeit not always overtly political forms of belonging. 
Ultimately, I argue for the actual possibility of alternative worldviews in which the 
nation-state, with its attending conceptions of history, relatedness, and belonging, has 
become but one aspect of people’s experiences of creating a compelling and meaningful 
way of life. 
 
 1 
Chapter One 
Introduction: Altai, Mongolia, Kazakhstan 
 
 
What the map cuts up, the story cuts across. 
(De Certeau, Spatial Stories: 129) 
Oskemen/Ust’-Kamenogorsk: at the borders of four countries 
In July 2009, after almost two years of research with Mongolian Kazakh oralmandar (pl. 
returnees/repatriates) in Kazakhstan, I was finally on my way to visit Mongolia. Summer is the 
busiest season for visits, and, from May to early September, one can see caravans of cars and 
minibuses traveling regularly between Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Since 1990, when Kazakhstan 
gained sovereignty from the Soviet Union, approximately half of the 120,000 Kazakhs who lived 
in Mongolia migrated to Kazakhstan through a state-supported process of ethnic repatriation. 
Over twenty years that the repatriation program has been in place (1991 -2011), Kazakhstan’s 
attempts to claim its current territory as the homeland of all Kazakhs and to construct Kazakhs 
living abroad as its national diaspora have produced some complicated and quite unintended 
effects.  Rather than participating in an orderly process of permanent mass repatriation, 
Mongolian Kazakhs have created a viable cross-border community, continuing to maintain social 
ties and kin relationships on both sides of the border. Kazakhs from Mongolia travel to 
Kazakhstan to visit friends and relatives, as well as to do business. Those who now live in 
Kazakhstan go back to Mongolia to reconnect with living relatives and their ancestors buried 
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there, to find suitable marriage partners, to attend life cycle ceremonies, to participate in 
commemoration feasts, and to visit graves.  
Unfortunately, because I was not able to acquire a Russian travel visa, I could not 
accompany my Mongolian Kazakh friends, who were traveling by car from the city of Almaty in 
Southeastern Kazakhstan, passing through Russia, and then finally crossing the border into 
Western Mongolia.  Although Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, and Russia all meet in the 
mountainous region called Altai, Kazakhstan and Mongolia do not share a border. A seventy-
kilometer wide strip of Russian territory separates Kazakhstan and Mongolia and going through 
Russian border checkpoints requires a detour of several hundred kilometers (see Barcus and 
Werner 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1:  Political borders of Inner Asia.  
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This land route through Russia was the primary way that Mongolian Kazakhs traveled to 
Kazakhstan at the beginning of their migration from the Bayan Ulgii Region in Western 
Mongolia. At their first border crossing as they left Mongolia, Mongolian Kazakh repatriates 
were met by Russian border checkpoint guards and customs officials before they could enter 
their “ancestral homeland” of Kazakhstan. In the early 1990s, many families brought their 
animals with them, some taking as many as several hundred heads of sheep and horses, the 
bloodlife of Mongolian Kazakh pastoral economy. Russian quarantine and border services did 
not allow the animals through and many were abandoned or slaughtered at the border (see 
Doszhanov 2005). Fifteen years later, several Mongolian Kazakhs I interviewed recounted to me 
the loss of their animals, yurts, and other possessions at the border crossing.  The abandonment 
of their animals, their mobile homes, and other necessities of pastoral livelihood at the Russian 
border was the moment at which they began to realize that their semi-nomadic way of life in 
Mongolia might no longer be possible in Kazakhstan.  
A second, much more expensive and time-consuming route to Kazakhstan, involved 
traveling fifteen hundred kilometers over unpaved roads eastward across Mongolia to the capital 
city of Ulaanbaatar, taking a train from Ulaanbaatar to Beijing, and then flying from Beijing to 
Almaty. In 1998, with great demand for easier travel to Kazakhstan, where half of Mongolian 
Kazakhs now live, Kazakhstani SCAT Airlines began to offer weekly flights between the Bayan 
Ulgii Region in Mongolia and the city of Oskemen near the Kazakhstani-Russian border. This is 
a much easier way to go between Kazakhstan and Mongolia as it does not require going through 
multiple border and customs checkpoints, and during the summer months, the weekly flights sell 
out well in advance.   
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 Figure 2: Bayan Ulgii Kazakh Autonomous Region in Western Mongolia.  
 
So, when planning my trip to Mongolia in July 2009, without a Russian transit visa I had 
no other option but to take a train from my fieldwork site in the Almaty region to Oskemen, 
where I spent a day exploring the city while I waited for the weekly SCAT flight to Mongolia. It 
seemed to me that through its geographical location, its history, architecture and its 
demographics, Oskemen was emblematic of the tumultuous transformations of the Altai region: 
the Russian colonial expansion into Northern Asia since the 17th century, Soviet formations of 
the Kazakh nation, and the post-Soviet processes of nation-state building.  
Currently, a sleepy looking provincial city of about 300,000, Oskemen, formerly known 
as Ust’-Kamenogorsk, was established as a Russian fort and trading post in 1720, at the 
confluence of the Irtysh and Ulba rivers, in the heart of the Altai region.  At that time, it was the 
Southernmost fort in Russia’s line of military fortifications that had been steadily progressing 
eastward since the early 17th century.  As the Russians discovered, the mountains of Altai were 
Bayan Ulgii 
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rich in mineral resources, including copper, iron, coal, precious stones, and gold. The name 
Rudnyi Altai (Мining Altai), which the Russians gave to the area, reflects the Russian Empire’s 
primary motivation for expanding its control over the region. It is also telling that the first maps 
of the Altai region produced by the Russian government were geodesic maps that showed 
topographic measurements and rich natural deposits (see Rozen 1998).  
Russian military personnel and gold miners were the city’s first inhabitants. However, 
following the emancipation of serfs in 1865, the Russian government opened the Altai district for 
free migration and settlement from European Russia. After the declaration of the Settlement Act, 
hundreds of thousands of these newly freed Russian peasants settled in Altai, Eastern Siberia and 
the Kazakh steppes. In 1897, the population census showed that 84 percent of Ust’-Kamenogorsk 
was ethnic Russian (Gentile 2004). 
During Soviet times, Ust’-Kamenogorsk grew into an important center of uranium 
mining closely connected to the nuclear industry. Like other cities in the Soviet Union that were 
connected to secret or strategically important military and industrial research, it was a “closed 
city.” Population movement in and out of the city was strictly controlled and workers were 
brought in from other parts of the Soviet Union. Due to this non-Kazakh immigration, by 1959, 
the percentage of Kazakhs in the city dropped to just 4 percent (Gentile 2004; Gentile and 
Tammaru 2006). In the 1990s, mass outmigration of Russians from Kazakhstan, as well as 
immigration of mostly Kazakh rural populations into the city, tipped the demographic balance in 
favor of Kazakh ethnicity for the first time in the city’s existence. Nevertheless, despite its new 
Kazakh name of Oskemen, the city itself and the Eastern Kazakhstan region as a whole, remain 
largely Russian and Russophone spaces, making them difficult to navigate for Kazakhs from 
Mongolia who do not speak Russian.  
 6 
That night, while flipping through Kazakhstani local TV channels in my hotel room, I 
paused on a program that featured a round table discussion with a panel of scholarly experts. The 
moderator announced that the topic of that night’s discussion was “Kazakh history,” and 
acknowledged running into an immediate problem: “Is it Kazakh history or Kazakhstani 
history?” he asked his panel of participants and added:  “Is the history of Kazakhstan the history 
of Kazakhs?" The two historians on the panel nodded and both said “yes” at the same time. 
However, another guest, disagreed:  
This is not about Kazakh or Kazakhstani or any such ‘national idea’. What this is really 
about is the idea of homeland [Rus. rodina].  In our school textbooks, we have this subject, 
‘History of Homeland’ [Istoriia Rodiny]. I consider the USSR to be my homeland. But, in 
parenthesis, they put, ‘History of RK’ [Republic of Kazakhstan]. So this means that they have 
limited us by these parenthesis to the last 18 years. 
One of the historians shook his head and responded: “But, we have to remember that, 
throughout our history, Kazakhs have always been squeezed between the [Russian] bear and the 
[Chinese] dragon.”  
At the end of the program, members of the live studio audience were given a chance to 
comment or ask a question; a middle-aged Kazakh woman took to the microphone and stated:  
If I want to talk to my son about history [tarix], I have to tell him about the history 
of his ancestors. But I really only know about my parents. Maybe I know the 
names of my seven ancestors, but I do not know anything else about them. We 
need to study the history of our lineage [ru] and our tribe [taipa]. Kazakhs say that 
those who do not know their seven ancestors are 'zhetisiz'. But those who do not 
know their history are also zhetisiz. 
The word zhetisiz, literally “sevenless,” carries great moral weight in Kazakh and can be used as 
a powerful form of shaming. Its root comes from zheti ata (seven forefathers), which refers to the 
 7 
practice of reciting the names of one’s seven patrilineal ancestors. The knowledge and ability to 
recite one’s zheti ata is a cultural ideal and final proof of being Kazakh. As the mark of true 
Kazakhness (Kazakhshylykh), it could serve to separate authentic “pure” Kazakhs who have 
preserved the knowledge and significance of their genealogies from those who, by forgetting 
their history and culture, become “ancestorless,” zhetisiz, as the woman from the audience 
expressed it. She seems to have solved the problem of “homeland” and history that troubled the 
expert panel: “our history” that is important to pass on to her son, is the history of his ancestors, 
“the history of our ru and our taipa.” In these exchanges, the scholars and audience members 
articulated contesting conceptions of homeland and the deep significance of historically and 
territorially based claims for the Kazakh nation and its newly independent state.  Furthermore, 
the idea that those who are ignorant of their history are “orphaned,” just like people without 
knowledge of their ancestors, demonstrates the intertwining of two different ways of 
remembering and articulating history and belonging: one shaped by practices of ancestral 
veneration and genealogically based understandings of descent and group identification and the 
other centered on ethno-national claims to territory delineated by the nation-state paradigm.  
This dissertation is about claims to homeland, belonging, and history in a space carved up 
by state borders and divided by competing political structures, economic systems, and unequal 
regional power relations.  At the most basic level, it is about how people relate people to places, 
through ideas and practices of mobility and migration, historical narratives built around sacred 
places and ancestral genealogies, and categories of belonging or exclusion based on language, 
religion, and ways of life. A central aim of my dissertation is to show how people’s lives can be 
organized around principles of seasonal migration, pilgrimage, kinship, and ancestry, as much as 
claims to citizenship in a nation-state. Ultimately, I argue for the actual possibility of alternative 
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worldviews in which the nation-state, with its attending conceptions of history, relatedness, and 
belonging, has become but one aspect of people’s experiences of creating a compelling and 
meaningful way of life.  
I further explore the ways in which Kazakhs in Kazakhstan and Mongolia are ultimately 
able to construct claims to different versions of histories, where the boundaries of their cultural 
worlds do not correspond to the political borders of the nation-state. These sometimes 
complementary but often competing notions of Kazakh cultural identity are tied to complex 
negotiations of political citizenship, economic potential, and physical and spiritual health. Many 
Mongolian Kazakhs articulate their ideas of homeland and belonging through appeals to 
ancestries, not polities, enveloping state-sponsored notions of ‘repatriation’ into a deep history of 
ancestral movements and cyclical seasonal migrations. This is predicated upon the creation and 
on-going maintenance of reciprocal relationships of care among the land, the ancestors, and their 
descendants. For Kazakhs in Kazakhstan and Mongolia, such cyclical relationships to ancestries 
and movement represent very powerful, albeit not always overtly political forms of belonging.  
Homelands 
Over much of the twentieth century, Kazakhs in Mongolia typically located their 
ancestral homeland across the Altai Mountains in Xinjiang, the area which is now the western 
territory of China (Diener 2009; Werner and Barcus 2010).  Their notions of homeland were 
situated around seasonal pastures and ancestral migration routes that crisscrossed the 
mountainous Altai region in Western Mongolia and Xinjiang. However in 1991, after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was established as an independent nation-state and 
began to generate territorially-based ideologies of its own political and ethnic genesis. By 
locating the ancestral homeland within the boundaries of the contemporary state, Kazakhstan has 
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actively sought a particular national legitimation, attempting to "root" Kazakh history and culture 
within the territory of the nation-state. Through its policy of “ethnic repatriation,” the 
Kazakhstani government has also attempted to reach beyond the borders of the nation-state to 
"capture" the Kazakh diaspora abroad as part of its nationalizing project. Since 1990, almost one 
million Kazakhs living in Mongolia, China, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Iran and other countries 
have followed the call of Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev to return to the "land of their 
ancestors,” which most of them have never seen before. 
A week after arriving in Bayan Ulgii Kazakh Autonomous Region in Western Mongolia, 
I visited the home of Maqsat-agha1 whose relatives I knew in Kazakhstan. Like many other 
Kazakhs from Bayan Ulgii, he moved to Kazakhstan with his family in 1992, under a five-year 
labor contract, and then returned to Mongolia when the contract expired in 1997. As his children 
came in, he introduced them to me: “This is my Kazakhstan bala (son/child), born in 
Kazakhstan,” then pointing to his daughter, “My Mongol kyzy (daughter), born here.” Then I 
asked him a question that I asked many others in Bayan Ulgii that summer: “Where do you see 
your children living when they grow up?” And like many, he answered immediately and 
emphatically: “In Kazakhstan. Because here there are no jobs and no future for them.” He added: 
“I will not go back to Kazakhstan, but when my children get older and finish school, I will send 
them to a university to get education in Kazakhstan.”  
I continued: “What do you see as your homeland?” When I asked the question, I used the 
word otan for “homeland,” which in the Kazakh language carries official, formal connotation, 
                                                 
1 Kin terms, such as "uncle" (agha) or "grandmother" (apa), are polite forms of address and the use of personal 
names, especially for elders, in-laws, and (for women) male relatives, is generally considered extremely rude. Many Kazakh 
women, especially those from Mongolia and China, follow the custom of never uttering the names of any of their husbands' 
male relatives. As many Kazakh names refer to common household objects, plants, or animals, this prohibition extends to any 
use of that word by the women of the household.  
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usually rendered in Russian as Otchizna or Fatherland. For example, in official documentation 
and government speeches aimed at diasporic Kazakhs, Kazakhstan is referred to with the term 
‘tarikhi otan’ in Kazakh or ‘istoricheskaia rodina’ in Russian, meaning ‘historic homeland.” 
Mongolian Kazakhs also occasionally used “historic homeland” when talking about Kazakhstan, 
but the terms that I heard them use most often were ‘atameken’ (‘ancestral homeland,’ literally 
‘land of the forefathers’) and ‘atazhurt’ (literally, ‘ancestral pasture’). The root “ata” in 
atameken and atazhurt means forefathers or ancestors and it is this ancestral, genealogical 
connection to the country of Kazakhstan that is emphasized by many Kazakhs in Mongolia.   
So, when I asked, “What do you see as your otan?” Maqsat-agha answered: “My tughan 
zher (land of birth) is Mongolia, but Kazakhstan is my atameken (ancestral homeland).” “So, 
does that mean you have two otan?”  I asked. “No!” he raised his voice, seemingly exasperated 
by my lack of understanding. “I have citizenship in Mongolia, so my otan is Mongolia. If I had 
Kazakhstani citizenship, it would be Kazakhstan. But Kazakhstan is my atameken.”  
The variety of terms that Mongolian Kazakhs used in speaking about Kazakhstan and 
Mongolia reflect the different ways in which claims to belonging and connections to place and 
ancestry are articulated and negotiated by them. In answering my question, Maqsat-agha took 
into account citizenship, ancestry, and place of birth as available forms of claims to identification 
and political membership. To complicate the situation even further, I continued with my 
questions:  “In your opinion, what is the biggest difference in [Bayan] Ulgii between before and 
now?” He answered: “Before in Soviet times, we were close to Russia, learned Russian, were 
friends with Russia. Now we are no longer close to Russia. We are now close to China. All our 
goods, all our trade is now with China. So, that is the big difference.” 
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the borders between Mongolia and Kazakhstan 
and China, which were almost impermeable for most of the 20th century, were now open to the 
flows of information, goods, and possibilities of travel.  In the early 1990s, the mass migration of 
thousands of Kazakhs from Mongolia was part of the larger regional processes of mass 
population movements following the dissolution of the USSR. Many of these migration 
processes have been framed as “ethnic repatriation,” or, as Brubaker (1998:1048) has called 
them, migrations of “ethnic unmixing” in the aftermath of imperial collapse. The examples often 
cited in post-Soviet migration literature include the emigration of roughly 2 million Soviet 
Germans (Aussiedler) to Germany and the 2.3 million Russians who left Central Asia in the first 
decade of independence (Brubaker 1995; Kosmarskaya 2006; King and Melvin 2000; 
Sadovskaya 2001).  
 In this context, I do not ignore the extensive literature on nation-state in the former 
Soviet Union, but I do wish to de-center “the nation-state” as the sole focus of analysis.  Many 
scholars working in Inner Asia are taking seriously the way that people themselves are 
organizing their sense of “inhabitation” and belonging. Alexander Diener (2005, 2007, 2009) has 
argued compellingly for the need to rethink the categories of national identification, ideas of 
diaspora, and conceptions of homeland in relation to Mongolian Kazakh histories and 
migrations. Jennifer Post (2007) describes how Kazakhs in Bayan Ulgii region use musical 
production and performance to maintain their local distinctiveness in response to the 
nationalizing efforts of both Mongolia and Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, Saulesh Yessenova 
(2005) presents an excellent description of the way rural migrants draw on the culturally specific 
strategy of shezhire (ancestry/genealogy) as a way of narrating their sense of connectedness in 
the face of urban exclusion.   As I also show, frameworks of interpretation in Inner Asia cannot 
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be limited to the ‘here and now’ of the nation-state and its attempts to control conceptions of 
territory, history, and civil identity. 
The very concept of the nation-state is predicated on modernist colonial imaginaries of 
time and space as linearly organized and measurable quantities, which can be demarcated and 
dominated (cf Fabian 1983; Ingold 2000; Kirby 2009).  Through the project of emplacing 
peoples into particular times and spaces, Kazakhstan itself intentionally imparts what Liisa 
Malkki calls a “sedentarist metaphysic” (1992: 32) to its citizenry as a model of belonging: all 
Kazakhs belong on the territory of Kazakhstan and those who are outside its borders are in a 
state of “unnatural” and “uprooted” diasporic existence.  
In explicit contrast to such linear notions of space and time, I argue that rootedness and 
movement are not antithetical but rather co-present in the experience of a Kazakh homeland as a 
cyclical inhabitation of landscape and ancestry. Nevertheless, like many other studies of return 
migration and transmigration, such as those by Takeyuki Tsuda (2003), Mariko Tamanoi (2003), 
and Keiko Yamanaka (1996) in Japan; Linda Basch et al. (1994) in the Caribbean and 
Philippines, and Liisa Malkki (1995) in Africa, I also suggest that processes of globalization are 
not necessarily erasing national identity but are, in many cases, catalyzing new conceptions of 
ethnic and national identification and re-conceptions of homeland. In the period of independence, 
as a result of Kazakhstan’s nationalizing practices within its borders and its symbolic and 
practical claims to the diaspora abroad, Kazakhs residing in various regions of Inner Asia have 
been brought into conversation about what it means to have a Kazakh cultural identity.  Brought 
actively into contact with each other through media and long-distance communication, as well as 
travel, Kazakhs perceived as belonging to different groups or living in different places have also 
become comparative and contrastive points of reference for one another within and across their 
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own communities. While Kazakhstan frequently looms large as a point of reference in discursive 
negotiations of Mongolian Kazakh identifications, Kazakhstani Kazakhs also frequently evoke 
Mongolian Kazakhs and other returnees in their discussions about national belonging, political 
membership and cultural inclusion and exclusion. 
In his discussion of alternative models of history and national belonging, Andrew 
Shryock (2004:13, drawing on Said 1978) argues that ethnographers’ engagement with 
alternative models of belonging runs the real risk of being read simply as romanticization, or 
“attempts to deny coevalness” (see also Fabian 1983).   He notes that there has been a continued 
resistance towards relations of time and space outside of expected frameworks, noting: “The idea 
that other time and spaces might coexist with, or circulate within, European and American 
models – that people might strive constantly, and sometimes with success, to maintain these 
Other times and spaces as part of their own modernizing projects – is seldom taken up as a 
possibility” (ibid.) By examining practices of migration in terms of particular if often divergent 
visions of ancestral past and national belonging, I show how Kazakhs in Kazakhstan and 
Mongolia imagine and inhabit a wide range of the possible understandings (cultural, ethnic, 
national) and social implications of the categories of belonging and political membership.  
Rootedness as Movement / Movement as Rootedness 
In Kazakhstan, whenever I brought up the topic of my research, oralman and return 
migration was a subject that invariably elicited spirited conversations, passionate debates, and 
often heated disagreements among locals in Kazakhstan, whether they were ethnically Kazakh, 
Russian, or anyone else. Since the very beginning, the official rhetoric of welcoming co-ethnics 
home has been fraught with ambiguities and controversies and the “oralman” phenomenon has 
created divisions even among Kazakhstani Kazakhs. For many people involved in repatriation 
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efforts in the newly independent Kazakhstan, the in-gathering of the Kazakh diaspora 
represented a redress of past historic wrongs of the colonial Russian and Soviet past, as well as 
the future hope of the Kazakh nation. However, the other, sharply dissenting position, shared by 
many Kazakhstani Kazakhs as well as Russians, is that Kazakhs living in Mongolia or China are 
descendants of those wealthy "traitors" who fled Soviet oppression while their own ancestors 
have stayed and suffered. In this view, excluded from the shared history of Soviet suffering, the 
Kazakhstani state owes these Kazakhs nothing. Rather, these returnees are seen as a drain on the 
country’s already overstretched resources available to its more deserving and more "genuine" 
citizens. Nonetheless, both positions continue to share an assumption of the unambiguous 
definition of Kazakhstan as ancestral homeland for all Kazakhs and their current migrations as 
“diasporic return.” 
In this context, Mongolian Kazakhs hold a very special place in the national imaginary. A 
widespread perception in Kazakhstan is that the returnees from Mongolia are the poorest, most 
backward, as well as the purest and most traditional of all Kazakhs. This view was exemplified 
very early on when at the first official World Counsel of Kazakhs in 1992, President Nazarbayev 
officially acknowledged the Kazakh community in Mongolia as having enabled “the retention of 
traditional Kazak culture and language to a far greater degree than any other Kazak community 
in the world, including that of the former Kazak SSR.” (quoted in Deiner 2003:210). As in other 
contexts that feature discourses of cultural loss, there seem to be tensions between notions of 
“civilization”” or “modernity” and cultural “authenticity” (Lemon 2000:12).  The symbolic 
resources of authenticity and legitimacy Mongolian Kazakh returnees in Kazakhstan can draw 
upon simultaneously serve as hindrances to their claims of membership in the modern state: 
while being an important part of the conception of the Kazakh nation, in practice, their belonging 
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in the national community is questioned in everyday forms of social interaction (see also Smith 
2003; Tsuda 2009; Lubkemann 2003). For example, a newspaper article in a popular tabloid 
Express K (May 22, 2004) "The Long Road Home," (Dolgaia doroga k domu) describes the 
"typical predicaments" of Kazakh oralman:   
There has appeared in Kazakhstan a new category of people who cannot be 
included either among locals or strangers. These are oralman. On the one hand, 
arriving into the country, they receive citizenship and become 'our own.' On the 
other, it is told about them that, in the houses given to them by the state, oralman 
'out of habit' keep animals, and themselves prefer to live in yurts. Or that they 
generally do not have a roof over their head and increase the ranks of the 
unemployed… What are oralman looking for in Kazakhstan and what does 
Kazakhstan expect from them?  
Many people who move to Kazakhstan as adults express their continued attachment to 
Mongolia, even as they acknowledge that their children and grandchildren are coming to 
increasingly identify with Kazakhstan as their home. As they hotly contest the oralman label and 
all the forms of stigmatized differentiation it currently implies in Kazakhstan, they are compelled 
to continuously recreate their sense of belonging and press their claims to entitlement in the state 
through counter-narrative strategies of their own. These strategies seek to subvert the different 
claims of disconnections with Kazakhstan suggested by the returnee label by emphasizing 
alternate conceptions of Kazakh history and definitions of homeland. Rather than seeing 
themselves in diasporic terms, implying a sense of displacement and disconnect from their 
homeland, they simultaneously evoke both ancestral rootedness and mobility as fundamental to a 
sense of “belonging” to the land and to a shared ancestry.  
For example, one elderly Mongolian Kazakh man now living in Kazakhstan framed the 
story of his life in the culturally familiar narrative form of zheti ata, that is, reciting the names of 
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the seven generations of his patrilineal ancestors and naming and describing specific places and 
landmarks that marked their migration routes and seasonal pastures:  
We lived on the land of our ancestors, where they have been since ancient times, 
more than 700 years ago, on the Altai, at the Baiintau [mountain]. Over there, 
there is a small place called Daiyn, located by the lake Syrgemdy and the rivers 
Kobda and Sarsumbe, where lived the grandfather of my father, Kuzdei. Our 
ancestors wintered on the southern slope of those mountains, later those territories 
became Chinese, and in the summer they rode out to the summer pastures at the 
northern slopes, which now belong to Mongolia. I, in a sense, do not consider 
myself oralman who returned to his homeland, in Kazakhstan, in so far as we 
lived on the lands of our ancestors. My ancestors, whose names I know up to the 
seventh generation, were well-known people. My great-grandfathers in the fifth 
generation, Mami and Beis, were judges (bii). My great-grandfather Baidaly built 
a medreseh (school) near a Buddhist monastery, where Kazakh children were 
taught. 
By framing his story in this way, he ascertained that his ancestors have lived in western 
Mongolia for the past 700 years and so he should not be called an oralman, literally, a returnee, a 
label he and many other Mongolian Kazakhs greatly resented. It allowed him to question the 
conflation of Kazakh homeland with the current political borders of Kazakhstan and to dismiss 
an accusation frequently expressed by other locals that Kazakhs from other countries abandoned 
their ancestral homeland in times of need and are now returning only in search of economic 
prosperity and an easy life.  
His story, like many others told by Kazakhs across the Altai, connect current populations 
with ancestral names and places through narrating histories of movement that often ignore and 
sometimes pointedly challenge the political configurations of the current state borders. For many 
people in Kazakhstan, the fact that some Mongolian Kazakhs return to Mongolia, that many 
move between Mongolia and Kazakhstan several times, and that some also retain both 
Mongolian and Kazakhstani passports, serves as a further proof of their disloyalty and their 
duplicitous character. People frequently cite numerous newspaper articles or locally circulating 
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stories in which Mongolian Kazakhs are represented not only as unfairly benefiting from the 
government assistance for return migrants often unavailable to locals, but also as collecting the 
money and then leaving for Mongolia. Mongolian Kazakhs, on the other hand, make sense of 
such processes in the context of Kazakh history as that of dwelling through moving.  The term 
koshi kong (usually glossed as migration or movement) is used by Kazakhs in Mongolia and in 
Kazakhstan to describe both the cyclical movements of Kazakh nomadic households along the 
regular routes between seasonal pastures and the current processes of cross-border migration to 
Kazakhstan. 
Altai: “the golden cradle” 
Proud Altai, High-reaching Altai, Many-peaked Altai, 
Blessed with wealth of sheep, beloved, endless steppe Altai 
Soul wrenching cry of the multitude of people,  
Blood spilled in countless battles,  
Wounded through with a sword Altai. 
(taken from “Spatious Land Beneath the Skies,” Zuqai Sharbaqynuly 2008) 
 
The majority of Kazakhs in Mongolia live in Bayan Ulgii, the westernmost province 
(aimaq), where they constitute almost 90% of the population. Bayan Ulgii was established as a 
Kazakh semi-autonomous province in 1940 and Kazakhs are granted a degree of cultural and 
political autonomy there, with schools, businesses, and government administration operating 
largely in the Kazakh language. Describing Mongolian Kazakh community in Bayan Ulgii and 
the neighboring Khovd aimaq, Werner and Barcus (2009:51) state that “geographically and 
politically, Bayan-Ulgii and Khovd are remote provinces within a remote country.” The Altai 
Mountains cut across the western provinces of Mongolia and contribute to the region's 
geographical remoteness. Additionally, the establishment of strictly enforced border controls 
between Mongolia and Soviet Union and China in the 1930s made it impossible for Mongolian 
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Kazakhs to maintain ties with relatives on the other side of the Altai Mountains in China, 
Kazakhstan, and Russian Altai.  
Despite its current remoteness and isolation on the geopolitical “fringes” of the world 
powers, squeezed “between the [Russian] bear and the [Chinese] dragon,” as the historian on TV 
described it, Altai is central to Kazakh conception of their history and belonging.  Mongolian 
Kazakhs refer to Altai as altyn besik (golden cradle) and atazhurt (“ancestral land”), because, as 
one Mongolian Kazakh man explained: “it the center for all Kazakhs, out of which people moved 
out to other jailau (winter pastures) and kystau (summer pastures).” As the “ancestral homeland” 
of Kazakhs and the "primordial" homeland of all Turkic tribes, Altai is central to the Mongolian 
Kazakh idea of who they are, where they have come from, and where they currently belong. As 
many Mongolian Kazakhs assert that "Altai" rather than the current state of Kazakhstan is their 
true ancestral homeland, it serves as a way to articulate alternate histories and forms of belonging 
that challenge the nation-state framework.  
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Figure 3:   Mahmud Kashgari's world map (1072-1074) 
 
The first known map of the areas inhabited by Turkic people is in Mahmud Kashgari's 
11th century Diwan Luyat at-Turk (Compendium of the Turkic dialects). It is a 
"Turkocentric" world map, oriented with east on top, centered on the ancient city of Balasagun in 
what is now Kyrgyzstan, Kashgari’s birthplace. It shows the Caspian Sea to the north, and Iraq, 
Azerbaijan, Yemen and Egypt to the west, China and Japan to the east, Hindustan, Kashmir, Gog 
and Magog to the south. Kashgari’s cartographic depiction puts Altai at the center and 
incorporates the Turks into larger Islamic genealogies and histories. The red mark on the south 
side of the map identifies the location of the "footprint of Adam," Jebel Serandib (Adam's Peak), 
on the island of Ceylon, to which Adam was exiled after Paradise. Gog and Magog represent an 
apocalyptic evil power, walled off from the world by a range of mountains. 
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While Altai is seen by Kazakhs as their ancestral heartland, for Russians, from the 
seventeenth century on, Siberia and the Altai Mountains to the east of it have represented the 
ever expanding frontier of the Russian homeland. Scholars of medieval Eurasia argue that, 
before the seventeenth century, the rulers of European and Asian states did not conceive of their 
domains as clearly delimited by territorial boundaries (Perdue 1987; Kivelson 2006; Millward 
1998; Brauer 1995). As Mahmoud Kashagari’s map also illustrates, rather than firmly delineated 
borders, domains were depicted in cartographic images and travel accounts as consisting of 
political cores gradually transitioning into peripheries with diminishing zones of control (Brauer 
ibid: 28-30).  As Perdue (1987:265) argues: “The Muscovites of the seventeenth century, 
unconcerned with precise definition of their eastern border, saw themselves as part of neither 
Europe nor Asia. After Peter the Great's victory over Sweden in 1721, Russians replaced the 
image of themselves as a tsardom (tsartsvie) with the grander ambition of an empire (imperia) 
comparable to those of western Europe.” Such Imperial spatial imagination needed sharp 
distinction between the homeland and the colony, but Russia, unlike England, Spain, or the 
Netherlands, had no large body of water separating it from the colonial periphery. In the 1730s, 
the Ural Mountains began to be depicted as the geographical border between Europe and Asia 
and as a civilizational boundary between the Russian Imperial core and its Asiatic colonies 
(ibid.)   
As Purdue (ibid.) and Kivelson (2006) argue, the hardening of space and territorial 
boundaries in this crucial period (the late 16th -17th century)   was also connected to changing 
patterns of control over the mobility and immobility of the population in the empire: 
“Establishment of serfdom and increased immobility in the heartland and colonial expansion and 
increased mobility in the borderlands are mutually connected” (Kivelson ibid: 7). Increasing 
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enforcement of serfdom regulations dramatically restricted mobility in the Muscovy (Russian)  
heartland at the same time as Russian authorities needed to people the expanses of the Eurasian 
steppe and secure their defensive lines: 
Constantly requiring more Russian peasants and soldiers to feed and man its 
fortress outposts, the regime had to undermine its own commitment to the stable 
immobility of serfdom and encourage, covertly or overtly, the resettlement of 
Russians along the imperial frontier. At the same time, hungering for furs and 
tribute from the conquered Siberian people, the authorities attempted to recreate 
the ordered, registered immobility of the heartlands among the nomadic peoples 
of taiga, tundra, and the steppe. (ibid.) 
The interconnectedness of the use and meaning of space are also highlighted by Rozen 
(1998) as he examines the cartographic history of Russian imperial expansion into Altai. When 
Russians first crossed the Ural Mountains into Siberia, Altai, and later the nomadic (Khypchak) 
steppe, their reasons were mainly military security and natural resources. As mines and smelting 
factories in the Altai region multiplied, so did the construction of more military forts and 
increase in Cossack garrisons to protect them from nomadic raids. The Cossacks called these 
defensive lines "The Bitter Line" (Gor'kaia Liniia), supposedly because of the salty taste of 
water found in the Altaian and South Siberian lakes. For Kazakhs, “The Bitter Line” has come to 
signify the beginning of the end of their pastoral nomadic lifestyle in the region, hemmed in by 
blocking of migration routes and confiscation of land for Russian fortifications and Cossack 
settlements (Martin 2001).  
Abolition of serfdom in 1861 exacerbated the crises of land scarcity and poverty in 
European Russia and the government officially opened Western Siberia and the steppe districts 
to Russian settlement with the Resettlement Act in 1889. All steppe land was proclaimed "state 
land" and therefore "free land" and opened to settlement by Russian and Ukrainian peasants 
arriving on the newly built railroads. Martin (ibid.:70) argues that the Resettlement Act signaled 
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for the first time, the empire’s effort to regulate migration as an intentional policy of the central 
government.  
As scholars of Russian colonialism show, “the assumption that sedentary agriculture 
stood unambiguously above mobile pastoralism on the hierarchy of world civilizations supported 
arguments in favour of organized settlement” (Campbell 2011; see also Martin 2001; Bassin 
1999; Breyfogle 2007). From the very beginning of Russian exploration and settlement, the 
nomadic steppe was described as “empty” and “unpopulated” (bezludnye), with scattered bands 
of primitive nomads wandering around without any attachment to the land or to any particular 
place (Feoktistov 1992; Campbell ibid). The famed Russian poet Alexander Pushkin, on the first 
page of “The History of Pugachev” famously described the area beyond the Ural mountains 
such: “To the left spread out the sad deserts, where migrate the hordes of wild tribes, known to 
us under the name of Kirgiz-Kaisak [Kazakh].”  
The long history and continuing significance of such claims for Russian nationalists is 
also articulated in the pamphlet “Russians, Kazakhs, and Altai,” published by the Russian 
separatist movement Lad, which was active in the North of Kazakhstan in the early 1990s and 
promoted the unification of the region with Russia: 
And, probably, I will not reveal any new truths, if I say that, as it was in the past 
centuries, and so it is now, and so it will be in the future, that empty lands, 
uncultivated, not used for their purpose, always and everywhere have been taken 
away and will be taken away from bad masters. (Feoktistov 1992: 7)   
Stuart Kirsch (2001) notes that “indigenous claims about ‘culture loss’ pose a problem 
for contemporary definitions of culture as a process that continually undergoes change rather 
than something which can be damaged or lost” (169). He argues that “it is possible to speak of 
loss in relation to the notion of kinship and belonging rather than possession” (ibid). The idea of 
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profound cultural loss is often remarked upon by outside observers, such as other (post)Soviets, 
Central Asians and Westerners. In literature, Kazakhs are often cited as “the most Russified of 
all Soviet nationalities” (see Dave 2004). It echoes the long-standing tropes of emptiness and 
absence that I described above. Indeed, it seems that Kazakhstan is often described by what it is 
not, what it seems to lack, rather than what it is. For example:  Kazakhs are not “real Muslims,” 
lacking the “devotion” or “fanaticism”, as well as the religious knowledge, of its other Muslim 
neighbors. Discussions of short history of “islamization” among nomads and assertions that 
Kazakhs did not become Muslim until the 18th or 19th century are often reiterated in scholarly 
literature, although this view has been completely rebuffed by some prominent Central Asian 
historians, such as Devin DeWeese (1994; c.f. Khalid 2007). Moreover, others argue, Kazakhs 
are not really “Central Asian” and Kazakhstan itself is not part of Central Asia, either 
geographically or culturally. For example, in Soviet literature, the region was usually referred to 
as “Kazakhstan and Central Asia.” It is described as straddling Europe and Asia in a 
geographically “liminal” state of being: neither quite here nor there. For those in search of local 
“color,” Kazakhstan does not look or feel like “Central Asia” it seems to lack “history,” in a 
tangible, visual way. There are no architectural wonders of great Muslim cities, mosques, and 
mausoleums to draw tourists, like in neighboring Uzbekistan. Kazakhstani cities and towns 
present to a casual visitor a non-descript gray exterior of most provincial Soviet and Russian 
cities. Kazakh women, especially if one spends time in cities, mostly lack the colorful 
headscarves and recognizably “non-Western” clothing of Uzbek or Tajik women. Kazakh 
clothing, such coats (shapan), hats, dresses, and headscarves, usually appear at self-consciously 
“traditional” weddings and celebrations. So, in a heated discussion I once had with an American 
friend, who spent several years living in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, she emphatically stated that 
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there is no such thing as "Kazakh culture": "Everyone says that in the south [of Kazakhstan] it is 
Uzbek culture, in the North it is Russian, but where is Kazakh?" 
Altai as Russian Shambhala 
While it has been a rich source of natural resources, exploited and strip-mined by colonial 
powers since the 1600s, Altai has also been described as a “center of spiritual energy,” “the navel 
of the Earth,” and the mystical “Shambhala” by a long list of Russian and European spiritual 
seekers and more recent New Age devotees.  Painter and essayist Choros-Gurkin, famous for his 
depictions of the Altai Mountains, described it thus:  
For pagan Altaians, Altai is Living Spirit, generous and rich, a giant. His hand is 
open to all, his riches are unlimited, his beauty and grandeur are splendid and 
fabulous. He is the living nourishing father for a myriad of people, a myriad of 
animals and birds. He is fabulously gorgeous in his colorful clothing of forests, 
flowers, and herbs. Mists, his transparent thoughts, run to all other lands of the 
world. The alpine lakes are his eyes, gazing at the universe. The waterfalls and 
rivers are his speech and songs about life, about the beauty of the earth and 
mountains. His living spirit and power are rich, they permeate everywhere and 
rule everything. (Pismo G.I. Choros-Gurkina, 2006: 45) 
Perhaps the most famous explorer of Altai was Nicholas Roerich: traveler, painter, writer, 
theosophist and devotee of Madam Blavatskaya, and possibly an American spy. (“Journey to the 
East” by Herman Hesse might have been inspired by Roerich and his search for the mystical 
Shambhala.) Roerich traveled to Altai in 1926, accompanied by his wife and son, on an 
expedition that took them from India to Eastern Turkestan, Mongolia, and Tibet. In his travel 
diaries, published as Altai-Himalaya in 1929, Roerich called Altai “the source of all humanity,” 
“the cradle of the world” and “the source of all wisdom.” As McCannon (2002: 169) argues: 
Roerich was concerned above all with searching in the Himalayas and the Altai 
for the real-life location of the land of Shambhala, fabled in Buddhist mythology. 
Accordingly, Roerich tied his views of the Altai’s role in the ethnic and linguistic 
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history of Eurasia tightly to his belief that Central Asia and the Himalayas were 
peopled with descendants of the original inhabitants of Shambhala. Moreover, 
Roerich sprinkled his writings on these matters with references to Atlantis, the 
lost continent of Lemuria, and the root races spoken of in the Theosophical tracts 
of Madame Helena Blavatsky.  
Like the mythical Shambhala, Altai is often described as outside of normal space and 
time: eternal, unchanging, hidden, mysterious, and inscrutable, like its mountains and the people 
who live there. In Altai in the Mirror of Myth (1992: 1), the Russian anthropologist Sagalayev 
criticizes such long standing images of Altai, as he reinforces the exact same tropes: 
Altai is sick. It has been sick for a long time. Long before the year of 1917, the 
ailments that are now crippling it have become apparent. Are you admiring 
the radiant trident of the Belukha [mountaintop]? Look below. Have you seen 
those destitute villages, lopsided sheds, impassible roads, cut down pines? 
Have you felt this hostility to newcomers, (to simply strangers!) suspicion, and 
reticence? Have you not seen (by accident), how a horse rider (angrily) lashes the 
horse, sending it into a wild gallop - just so they both would become exhausted? 
Children, not fully knowing their own language? Here, people rarely think about 
the future and live as if in an eternally lasting today. The people have dropped out 
of the rhythm of time and space. They are tired of the game, the rules of which are 
incomprehensible to them and its goal unknown. They are worn out by the sense 
of the accidental nature of their existence. (emphasis in the original.) 
Similar depictions of Altai as “a gem of pristine nature” and unspoiled "indigenous 
spirituality," also echo through UNESCO’s designation of “The Golden Mountains of Altai” as a 
world heritage site in 2003. Nevertheless, despite such idyllic descriptions of natural and cultural 
pristineness, pastoral communities all around the Altai region are currently facing particularly 
severe ecological consequences of global warming, degradation of viable pasturelands, and 
increasing economic marginalization of their way of life.   
Eurasianism, ethnoterrritoriality, and the Kazakhstani Snow Leopard 
As I argue above, Mongolian Kazakh notions of Altai as the ancestral homeland presents 
an alternative to the nation-state model of belonging. However, there also exist other conceptual 
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frameworks that present additional alternatives that envision the region and the Kazakhs within it 
as transcending national and state boundaries. The theory of Eurasianism is one such alternative 
idea adapted by the Kazakhstani government as part of the post-Soviet state-building effort.  
Like the colonial frontiers of other Empires, Russia’s eastern borderlands have been 
conceptualized as a space of encounters and contacts created by interaction. As Breyfogle (2007: 
8) argues: “Those involved in studying, describing, and administering the Russian colonial 
expansion in Central Asia in the 19th century, studied the other colonies and made explicit 
comparisons…by the late 19th century references to the Caucasus as “our Algeria” or Amur river 
as a “Russian Mississippi” were common in official writing, as well as a widespread adaptation 
of borrowed terms such as “pioneer” (pioner), squatter (skvater), and colonization 
(kolonizatsiaya).”  In Russian Eurasianism, this "in-between space" becomes the narrative 
symbol of exchanges and encounters between nature and civilization, settled and nomadic people 
and between East and West. In Russia, Eurasianism as an intellectual movement has a long 
history, intimately connected to the expansion of the Russian Empire and its conception as 
unique in its encompassing of Europe and Asia (Laruelle and Gabowitsch 2008; Hagen 2004).  
Lev Gumilev (1912-1992) was a Soviet historian whose controversial theories of 
ethnogenesis put him at the forefront of the “neo-eurasian” intellectual movement.  Valerii 
Tishkov (1997) characterizes his ideas as “the dominant paradigm" for post-Soviet discourses of 
ethnicity as a bio-social entity. His key works, Ritmy Evrazii (The Rhythms of Eurasia) and 
Etnogenez I Biosfera Zemli (Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of Earth) have also become very 
popular in Kazakhstan. Their ideas were explicitly picked up by President Nazarbayev in his 
rhetoric of Kazakh ethnoterritoriality and the unique place of Kazakhstan as a bridge between 
European and Asian civilization.  As Mark Bassin (2009:893) argues: 
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 Ethnoterritoriality seeks to transform the notion of a primordial ethnic attachment 
to a designated homeland into a political prerogative and a legitimate basis for the 
exercise of power and control over the territory in question, its resources, and its 
inhabitants. If this ethnoterritorial attachment can be represented as organic and 
natural in some sort of quasi-biological sense, then its legitimating potential is 
substantially enhanced... the rodina or homeland is reenvisioned as a transcendent 
category, a veritable sakralnyi landshaft or sacred landscape. In this context, 
Gumilev's teachings about the unique natural-ecological embedded ness of each 
etnos in its respective nurturing landscape fit, in Pal Kolsto's apt expression, like 
"a hand in glove.” 
In Kazakhstan, Gumilev has become “something of a patron scholar-saint,” with his 
books widely republished, a university named after him, and President Nazarbayev’s embrace of 
his ideas as a state ideology for Kazakhstan (Laurelle 2003). In his “Strategy ‘Kazakhstan 2030’” 
(similar to the State of the Union address), President Nazarbayev echoes Gumilev’s description 
of the “Great Steppe” as “the Heartland of Eurasia,” and as a bridge and "liminal" space between 
East and West:  
We are a Eurasian country, possessing our own history and our own future. 
Therefore our model will not be similar to anyone else's. It will absorb into itself 
the achievements of different civilizations. We will face no alternative on this 
score….It will be the Kazakhstani Snow Leopard, with its characteristic elitism, 
independence, intelligence, courage, nobility, bravery, and cunning. The 
Kazakhstani Snow Leopard will possess Western elegance, multiplied by 
advanced level of development, as well as Eastern wisdom and endurance.  
In contrast to such visions of Eurasianist or statist ethnoterritoriality, I next focus on the ways 
that Kazakhs themselves understand their history and assert their belonging in Mongolia.  
Claiming Culture 
Most scholars describe Kazakhs as relatively recent arrivals to Mongolia, with 
documented migration and settlement dating back to the 1860s (Diener 2009; Werner and Barcus 
2010). Nevertheless, many Mongolian Kazakhs assert a much longer, at least millennium old, 
presence in Mongolia and Western China. Reaching back to the times of Chingiz Khan, they 
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claim the “Naiman,” “Kereit” and “Merkit” tribes (taipa) recorded in “The Secret History of the 
Mongols” as their direct Kazakh ancestors. When recounting their own personal or family 
histories, many Mongolian Kazakhs emphasize their strong sense of attachment to Bayan Ulgii 
region as their land of birth (tugan zher) and as part of a larger territory of ancestral movement 
and regular seasonal migration. Significantly, the territory of contemporary Kazakhstan plays no 
role in most people's descriptions of their ancestral and family histories. Mongolian Kazakhs 
narrate the more recent history of the region in terms of the cross-cutting of political borders that 
have fragmented the integrated geographical and social field of Kazakh seasonal movements and 
dispersed kinship networks. Major political events of the 20th century, like the closing of 
international borders between Mongolia and China and the Soviet Union, the tumultuous 
political history of Xinjiang in the 1930s and the ‘40s, and the establishment of the socialist 
government in Mongolia, are narrated as intimate family histories of flight, displacement, 
separation and loss.  
Since the opening of opportunities for communication, personal contact, and cross-border 
travel many people recount stories of emotional family reunions with relatives living in China 
and Kazakhstan and increasing contacts with the ethnic Kazakh community in Turkey. For those 
who do not seek to leave Mongolia, Kazakh language news and entertainment media from 
Kazakhstan and China, use of cell phones and internet to communicate with relatives abroad, and 
growing opportunities for education, short-term travel, and cross border trade, compel them to 
reconsider their place as part of this wider Kazakh world, as they also reassert their 
distinctiveness as Mongolian Kazakhs. Kazakhstan actively attempts to construct Mongolian 
Kazakhs as its national diaspora and to regulate their cross-border movements as an orderly 
process of permanent mass repatriation. But the failure of such explanations to effectively 
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capture the practical actualities of migration processes and people's understanding of them is 
reflected in a question one Mongolian Kazakh man rhetorically posed to me at the end of a long 
interview: “Now I will ask you a question.  If a person who goes to Kazakhstan is an ‘oralman,’ 
what is the term for people who go to Kazakhstan and come back to Mongolia – what do you call 
them?” 
Mongolian Kazakhs assert cultural and linguistic continuity and genealogical kinship 
with other Kazakhs, usually expressed through the notions of common descent and blood ties.  
At the same time, it is very important for many people to highlight and maintain their 
identification as explicitly Mongolian or Kerei Kazakhs, with distinct histories and specific 
genealogies (see Post 2007). Kazakhstani Government programs, such as “Cultural Heritage” 
(Madeni Mura), and organizations like World Association of Kazakhs ('WAK', a quasi-NGO, 
nominally headed by President Nazarbayev) are also meant to reach out to the Kazakh diaspora 
around the world in an effort to collect and preserve Kazakh “traditions and customs” (salt-
dastur) through funding research and publications. However, some Mongolian Kazakhs perceive 
such practices, along with the nationalizing claims often accompanying them, as forms of 
cultural, political, and economic appropriation.  
In the summer of 2009, one man in Ulgii, enthusiastically described to me his search for 
funding in an attempt to start his own nongovernmental organization, with the goal “to collect 
and preserve spiritual heritage of Kazakhs in Mongolia.” Ryzbek-agha began with talking at 
length about the changes the Kazakh community in Bayan Ulgii has undergone since the 
beginning of migration to Kazakhstan 20 years earlier.  Like other Kazakhs in Bayan Ulgii, he 
lamented the loss of many cultural institutions and professionals, artists, and culture workers that 
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were involved in them, such as the entire troupe of the Ulgii Kazakh drama theatre who migrated 
to Kazakhstan en masse in 1992.  
He also expressed regret at what he perceived as an appropriation by outsiders of a 
unique Mongolian Kazakh heritage of traditions, customs, and cultural objects preserved by their 
Kerei ancestors. Ryzbek-agha claimed that numerous researchers from Kazakhstan came to 
Mongolia to collect the treasure trove of authentic Kerei Kazakh traditions preserved by them. 
Although expressing pride in the purity of their traditions, he asserted such appropriation of 
uniquely Kerei Kazakh culture and heritage as stealing:   
Many things in Kazakhstan they take from us, change, and claim as theirs, own 
them for themselves. For example, our songs [kui], taking them and singing them, 
calling them Kazakh folk songs. They are not Kazakh folk songs, they are from 
our own people, they are Kerei songs. 
For him, such assertions of Kerei Kazakh distinctiveness expressed cultural, political, and 
economic claims. He enthusiastically described his proposition for creating a “patent” belonging 
to “Kerei Kazakhs of Bayan Ulgii,” which would ensure their group ownership of different 
traditional cultural objects, such as musical instruments, horse equipment, or traditional Kerei 
Kazakh ornamental patterns.  
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Figure 4: Bayan Ulgii, July 18th 2009. Photograph by the author. 
 
In direct contrast to the Kazakhstani state culturally monopolizing claims, he admonished me:  
Stop talking generally, like it belongs to 20 million Kazakhs, because they forgot 
these traditions. If you are buying something, or taking photos of something, you 
should write under the photo that it is made in Bayan Ulgii.  Do not just say that it 
is generally ‘Kazakh,’ because it is not true. 
Expressing sentiments shared by many Mongolian Kazakhs, Ryzbek-agha demanded the 
acknowledgement of the uniqueness and distinctiveness of Kerei Kazakhs, the purity of their 
traditions and ancestral way of life, as well as their right to claim them as their own and to 
benefit from them. Nevertheless, in his attempt to undermine Kazakhstan’s claims to the Kerei 
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Kazakh culture and history, he seems to appeal to the same statist logic of "patents" and 
ownership of “cultural heritage.”  
Ryzbek-agha also provided his own map of Altai. He ripped out a sheet of notebook 
paper and quickly sketched out an outline of a map. He used the map to literally inscribe people 
onto the land with a flourish of arrows. He began to explain: 
Before, all around Altai was Kazakh land. There were no borders among 
Kazakhs. Then borders were made by Russia and China and Kazakhs got 
separated and forgot their language and culture, because they had no contact with 
each other. They [Kerei Kazakhs] were with Chingiz Khan, mentioned in the 
Secret History. Near Ulaanbaatar, there is a mountain – this was Kerei land, under 
a Kerei Khan named Turul Khan. Kazakhs had no single government, each had 
their own khan. But there, near Ulaanbaatar, that was Kerei land, that is why they 
have so many Kerei stone monuments near Ulaanbaatar. There were Naiman, 
Kerei, Qongrat with Chingiz Khan, all Orta Zhuz [Middle Horde]. This Altai 
mountain area belongs to Kerei and Naiman. It was all land of Orta Zhuz khans. 
Hentii is Chingiz Khan’s land of birth. Before Chingiz Khan, only that was their 
land. Later, Chingiz Khan started fighting with all his neighbors and Kazakhs 
began moving further west, being pushed away.2  
He continued with the detailed description of the westward movement of Kerei Kazakhs 
for the next several hundred years, eventually ending up on what is currently the territory of 
Kazakhstan. He concluded: “And after the Jungars destroyed Chingis Khan, they came back 
again, closer to their own Mongolian land. So they moved all around and came back again.”  
                                                 
2 Among Kazakhs, zhuz correspond to large tribal groupings that are said to be descended from the three sons of 
Alash, the genealogical primal ancestor of all Kazakhs. These genealogical divisions also roughly correspond to 
geographical territories that are considered the ancestral pastures of those ru (lineages). Kazakhs currently living in 
Mongolia, Northern Xinjiang, and Northeastern and central parts of Kazakhstan identify with the Middle Zhuz. The 
ru of the Uly Zhuz (Eldest Zhuz) migrated within the territories of modern Southeastern and southern Kazakhstan, 
parts of Northwestern China and parts of Uzbekistan. Most local Kazakhs in the Almaty region belong to the Eldest 
Zhuz. The Youngest Zhuz has historically occupied the Western part of the country around the Caspian Sea. 
In Kazakhstan, while sedentarization of nomads, formation of villages and collective farms, 
industrialization, urbanization, and great migrations of the Soviet times moved a lot of people around, old divisions 
still roughly correspond to where most Kazakhs live in rural areas and the sense of the social geography of the 
Kazakh nation includes these divisions.  
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Finally, he reflected on the ambiguity of “homeland” and the ambivalence of “return” 
currently facing Mongolian Kazakhs contending with multiple and competing ideas of history 
and belonging:   
Now, this is my opinion. Maybe it is not right but I am only expressing my own 
opinion. Migration [koshi kong] is right. But… But…not all Kazakhs are leaving. 
It is not for all Kazakhs. We are living in our own land, we are moving around in 
our own land. We are moving around in our own land, just as we always used to: 
winter, summer, autumn. It’s just now we are crossing borders. 
In this way, Ryzbek-agha situates contemporary patterns of cross-migration within the historic 
pattern of ancestors, both warriors and nomads.  His stories both identify and explain a historic 
division between Kazakh populations in the east and west.  In the west, at least, all these 
ancestors and their current descendants rightly belong on “their own” land.  In this view, 
movement becomes not uni-directional or exceptional but rather ongoing and cyclical.  
Migration is not a problem to be resolved but a pattern and a deeply held way of life.    
Methodology 
This dissertation draws on twenty months of ethnographic fieldwork among Mongolian 
Kazakh return migrants and local government officials in Kazakhstan between 2006 – 2009, as 
well as a four week research trip to Bayan Ulgii, Mongolia in July-August 2009. I conducted 
nine months of research from December 2006-September 2007 in Shamalghan, a small village 
about thirty miles outside of Almaty, the largest city in Kazakhstan and its former capital. Living 
in Shamalghan, the birth place of Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev, drew my attention to 
questions of genealogy, history and place identification, which later became some of the main 
themes of my research. I returned to Kazakhstan for additional ten months of fieldwork in 
September 2008 - July 2009, when I lived in Uzynaghash, formerly an “urban style village,” 
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which grew into a town of about 25,000 people. More than 300 families from Mongolia and over 
2000 families from other countries, such as Uzbekistan and China, have moved into the area in 
the last ten to fifteen years, replacing thousands of Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans who left 
Kazakhstan at around the same time, resulting in considerable changes to the social and 
economic face of the town.  
The first nine months I spent in the field changed my planned methodological and 
theoretical approaches to the research topic. Initially, I intended to conduct my research at two 
field sites, the town of Kaskelen near Almaty and an industrial town of Rudnyi located in the 
North, near the Russian border. I had hoped this would provide a comparative perspective 
necessary to examine the importance of local state officials and locally situated processes and 
relations in the emergence of new practices of citizenship and national belonging in different 
regions of Kazakhstan. However, during the first several months in the field, I began to realize 
the advantages of staying at the same site for the duration of the research project. It was taking 
me some time to establish relations of mutual understanding and trust with the Mongolian-
Kazakhs and government officials whom I had met. It was only after several months of knowing 
me that people began to talk with me about topics that many found too sensitive or 
uncomfortable to discuss with a stranger and an outsider. These included feelings of frustration 
and disappointment some returnees expressed about their “historic homeland,” about 
complicated and sometime hostile relations between migrants and other locals, and the 
interpretation and implementations of laws and regulations by local officials, which often 
diverged considerably from the official government line.   
In Shamalghan, living with a family of Omirzhan-agha and Nara-apke, my Mongolian 
Kazakh hosts, I was quickly drawn into networks of mutual hospitality and visiting. Aside from 
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interacting with and interviewing Mongolian Kazakhs in their homes, I spent time at the local 
bazaar, where many of them worked. At the bazaar, we chatted and drank tea, regularly visited 
and talked with other villagers, and attended frequent feasts and celebrations given by local 
families, such as during Nauryz (Central Asian New Year), when visiting and gift-giving among 
friends and neighbors was common.  I was able to observe a variety of situations in which 
Kazakhs from Mongolia and other locals interacted with and talked about each other, such as 
while going shopping, visiting a health clinic, or registering a child for school. Even during my 
frequent trips to the city, people sometimes passed the time in a crowded bus talking and making 
jokes about “oralman.”  
It is estimated that out of roughly 60,000-65,000 Mongolian Kazakhs who migrated to 
Kazakhstan since 1991, about 10,000 eventually returned to Mongolia. After two years in 
Kazakhstan, Omirzhan-agha and Nara-apke decided to move back to Mongolia with their two 
children in the summer of 2009. I then spent three months living with a family of a local 
government official in the same village. I maintained friendly relations with three other officials 
in the government administration (akimat), spending whole days in their office, observing and 
talking to them about their work. Thus, I was also able to examine the officials’ perceptions and 
representations of Kazakhs from Mongolia and other countries. I spent the last two months of my 
research in 2007 in the city of Almaty, interviewing scholars, journalists, and NGO workers who 
were involved in working with and speaking for and about return migrants. I also worked in the 
Library of the Academy of Sciences surveying accounts and representations of return migrants in 
Kazakh and Russian-language newspapers dating back to the last seventeen years. This helped 
me to form a fuller picture of their role in the discussions about the nature of national belonging 
and Kazakhstani statehood in mass media. 
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When I returned for ten additional months of fieldwork in 2008-2009, I continued to pay 
attention to the interactions between return migrants and local state officials, but also became 
more interested in tracing ideas and practices of belonging and relatedness through a variety of 
sites and interactions. Through my observations, conversations, and interviews I became aware 
that conceptions and practices of citizenship and national belonging might best be illuminated 
through a focus on ancestral veneration, kinship and hospitality.  
I spent the last month of my research, July - August 2009 in Bayan Ulgii Kazakh 
Autonomous Region in Mongolia. Because of the short period of time I was able to stay in 
Mongolia, I could not observe and participate in the everyday lives of people there as deeply as I 
did in Kazakhstan. However, those four weeks helped me trace various connections that continue 
to bind Mongolian Kazakhs on both sides of the border, as I met and spoke with people who 
decided to remain in Mongolia as well as those who returned to Mongolia after living in 
Kazakhstan for some time. I also became aware of their deep attachment to and sense of 
belonging in Bayan Ulgii region. I realized that genealogy and local history were a common 
passion among Mongolian Kazakhs, as numerous people shared their family histories and recited 
their genealogies for me. I was also gifted many books of poetry and Kazakh history that 
illuminated their deep historical and ancestral connections to Mongolia and the region of Altai as 
a whole. 
While in Kazakhstan, I conducted fieldwork in Kazakh and the Russian language. Since I 
am a native speaker of Russian, a language that remains the lingua franca of the region, I was 
able to engage many people in Kazakhstan in the language in which they are most comfortable. 
Yet, most Kazakhs from Mongolia do not speak Russian, and therefore my research with return 
migrants in Kazakhstan and in Mongolia was almost exclusively in Kazakh – a language I only 
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began to learn in graduate school. My knowledge of both Russian and Kazakh also offered me 
the opportunity to examine mass media and scholarly literature in both Kazakh and Russian, 
which allowed for more comprehensive coverage and comparison across what is often perceived, 
by locals and foreigners alike, as separate linguistic spheres. 
Chapter breakdown 
Chapter one introduces the readers to the economic and political situation in Mongolia in 
the early 1990s and the beginning of mass migration of Kazakhs from Bayan Ulgii to 
Kazakhstan. I situate the recent Mongolian Kazakh migration to Kazakhstan within a regionally 
and historically informed approach that treats mobility and movement not as an aberration but as 
an integral part of the history of the region and Kazakhstan.  
Chapters two and three focus on the settlement of Kazakhs from Mongolia in the Almaty 
region of Kazakhstan, where I conducted fieldwork.  In chapter two, I examine how Kazakhs 
from Mongolia variously map onto, reflect, and challenge currently salient divisions within 
Kazakhstan, such as Russian-speaking vs. Kazakh-speaking, urban vs. rural, modern vs. 
traditional. I analyze the apparent tensions between notions of “modernity” and cultural 
“authenticity” in descriptions of Russification and cultural loss in Kazakhstan. Chapter three 
focuses on genealogies and histories of Kazakhs in the Almaty region and explores their 
connection to local politics and the practices of government institutions. Chapter four highlights 
the significance of kinship and hospitality, seen as the defining characteristics of Kazakhshylykh 
(Kazakhness) and as an essential part of Kazakh “nomadic heritage.” I argue that, more than 
serving simply as cultural idioms or political metaphors, ideas and practices of kinship and 
hospitality significantly shape the negotiations of political and cultural authority, legitimacy, and 
claims to belonging across political borders.  I conclude with the discussion of the concept of 
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iman (morality) as expressed through idioms of Musulmanshylykh (Muslimness) and 
Kazakhshylykh.  These ideas serve as moral sources of authority for understandings of 
governance, power, corruption, and social justice, as they are linked to ideas of patronage, 
reciprocity, hospitality, and gift-giving.
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Chapter Two 
The Beginning of the Great Migration 
This chapter focuses on the beginning of Mongolian Kazakh migration to Kazakhstan in 
1990-1995. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of Kazakhstan as a 
sovereign state in 1991 have had profound effects on reshaping conceptions of diaspora and 
homeland and practices of citizenship and national belonging on both sides of the 
Kazakhstan/Mongolia border.  I focus on how Mongolian Kazakhs describe and explain the 
beginning of mass migration to Kazakhstan and highlight the interaction of economic and 
patriotic reasons that led to widespread support for “repatriation” among Kazakhs in Mongolia 
and in Kazakhstan in the first few years of independence. The people I interviewed explained 
that acute labor needs, collapse of integrated regional infrastructure, new political considerations, 
and heightened feelings of Kazakh national pride in the wake of independence, were all 
inextricably intertwined in the decision “to turn the heads of their horses toward Kazakhstan.”  
I also highlight the important role of the Kazakhstani state in encouraging Kazakh 
repatriation from abroad and promoting the idea of Kazakhstan as the “historic homeland” (Kaz. 
otan tarixi/ Russ. istoricheskaia rodina). At the same time, I show how Mongolian Kazakhs 
emphasize their own agency and decision-making in the face of difficult economic conditions 
and conflicting conceptions of who they were and where they belonged, as these were coming 
from both outside and within their relatively small and tightly knit community in Western 
Mongolia. At the end of the chapter, I examine histories of movement and immobility in the 
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context of spatial practices of the Soviet state as well as post-Soviet economic and social 
transformations in Mongolia and Kazakhstan. 
“The flight of all the people raises a cloud of dust stronger than the winter snowstorm.”3 
I met Saghat-agha4 in the summer of 2007, when I came to interview him in his small, 
one-room house near Almaty. He moved to Kazakhstan from Mongolia in 1992 with his wife 
and four children during the first wave of migration. This is how he described the beginning of 
migration from Mongolia at the time: 
Yes, from every district; oh, if you would have seen that![emph.] The whole 
world - all cars, like in a war, at the Battle of Kursk,5 from morning till dusk - 
dust, the whole world - all dust…[pause]...I used to dream- aah! [shirkin-ai: 
expression conveying a wish for a dream to come true] Someone should make a 
movie about all this. This is now history! Tomorrow it will be history. It was so 
wonderful! Wonderful! The later ones, they came with suitcases like tourists.  
People in Kazakhstan and Mongolia who participated in the repatriation efforts in the 
early 1990s recalled it as a time of excitement, euphoria, and high hopes. In the above quote, 
Saghat-agha uses the word tarix for “history”: “...mynau endi tarix qoi, erteng tarix bolady” (this 
is now history! [emph.], tomorrow it will be history.) Tarix conveys a sense of History as 
universal, significant, worthy of recording. As Saghat-agha says: “Someone should make a 
movie about all this.” This was a momentous time that is now in the past and recalled with 
nostalgia: “The later ones, they came with suitcases like tourists.”  
                                                 
3 From the “Migration Song” qtd. in Deiner (2010). 
4 “Agha” is a Kazakh term meaning "older brother" or "uncle" and is used as a respectful form of address toward 
any older man. 
5 The Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 was one of the most devastating battles of WWII between Soviet and 
German forces. 
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This sense of “making history” and being a part of history is visible in the proliferation of 
video and audio recordings of the “Great Migration” (Uly Kosh), as Mongolian Kazakhs began 
to call the mass migration in the early 1990s. Kazakhstan sent state-sponsored television crews 
and newspaper journalists to Bayan Ulgii to document the migration, usually described in 
glowing terms and accompanied by photographs which have since become iconic: Kazakh elders 
kneeling to kiss the earth as they get off the airplane in Kazakhstan, or smiling repatriates 
shaking President Nazarbayev’s hand.  
 
 
Figure 5: Kazakh repatriates from Afghanistan arriving in Almaty. Source: “Koshi-kong 
tolastamaidy.” Egemen Kazakhstan, 28 January 2011. 
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Many people in Bayan Ulgii have also kept more private records, such as photo albums 
and home videos saved on VHS tapes, which many are now transferring to digital format to 
ensure preservation.6 
And, in another characteristically Kazakh mode of historical narrative, the events and 
emotions of those years were commemorated in numerous poems and songs, the most popular of 
which were quickly picked up and circulated. “Have you heard the Migration Song?” people 
would immediately ask me when we talked about the beginning of migration, and would sing or 
quote from the song. Diener (2010) also reports that the song was very popular in Bayan Ulgii in 
the 1990s and provides the translation: 
The spring storm is rather strong,“movement” called storm even stronger. 
Gurvan Oigor’s vast camp is empty with none of people and livestock remaining after the 
storm of “migration.” 
Sorrow fills people’s hearts being separated from relatives in peaceful time.  
 
Hey our friend Kerei, Naiman, and Uak, 
Why are you leaving Bayan Ulgii? 
 
Though it is hard to leave the motherland where one was born and leave the horse one 
used to ride,  
Accepting the invitation of the country of our origin, we have decided to move away.  
Good bye my country where we have grown up… 
 
Though it is easy to move, it is so hard to be separated.  
Hard to forget pure water and snow-covered peaks.  
So why are we moving, are the movement and myself twins?... 
 
This song is a greeting for our brothers and sisters, 
who left the country for the stranger’s land,  
Who have become homesick. 
 
Brothers and sisters who are to move having prepared their transportation, 
We wish you the best luck in your way. (199-200) 
 
                                                 
6 These are considered more intimate, family records, because people asked me not to quote directly, although 
noone minded me watching the videos, often accompanied by their extensive commentary, and taking general 
notes. 
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The sense of sadness and loss mixed with happiness and hope expressed in the song is 
also reflected in many accounts as well as home videos I watched in Ulgii.7 A compact, closely 
related community of Kazakhs in western Mongolia was dividing, separating. While many 
people left in masse, with whole extended families and villages migrating together, some 
families were separated, as some relatives decided to leave and others to stay behind. In a place 
where neither family names nor postal addresses are used, siblings, parents and children, life-
long friends, and neighbors were separating, often for the first time in their lives.  
Not only were individuals and family affected, but the Kazakh community in Mongolia 
also experienced the unravelling of its social fabric, including the institutions of Kazakh culture 
that had existed there since the 1940s. In the first five years of migration (1990-95), Bayan Ulgii 
lost many professionals, such as doctors, teachers, journalists, and technical specialists, who 
were among the first to leave for Kazakhstan. A Kazakh radio station in Ulgii lost almost all of 
its journalists, a Kazakh language publishing office that operated in Ulgii since the 1950s closed 
down, as did the Kazakh Drama Theater, opened in the 1940s,  after its entire troupe left for 
Kazakhstan. 
In his book about the history of Kazakhs in Mongolia, Chronicle of the Crying Years 
(Zhylaghan zhyldar shezhiresi), Zardykhan Kinayat described the “migration fever” that seized 
people in Bayan Ulgii as “tumbling head over heels” (3). Zoia, a teacher I worked with when I 
visited Bayan Ulgii in 2009, described her reaction upon returning to Ulgii after a two months’ 
absence in the fall of 1991. Zoia was a Russian language teacher at an Ulgii high school, but, as 
the Soviet Union withdrew from Mongolia, she realized that Russian language skills might not 
be as valuable in the future. Old ties and relationships were ending as new ones formed. This was 
                                                 
7 Ulgii is the name of the central town of the Bayan Ulgii region. 
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the end of the old stability, as Kazakhs faced a new, uncertain future full of challenges and 
opportunities. Going to Kazakhstan was one opportunity among other possibilities—one that was 
compelling to many.  
 In the summer of 1991, Zoia decided to go to Ulaanbaatar, to attend a training course for 
teaching English. She described her shock at what she saw when she returned to Ulgii in 
September:  
All these people who were leaving for Kazakhstan, they just left their houses, left 
their animals, and did not even clean up. It looked like something after a war. I 
saw it all from a plane. So many trucks, people leaving, and those left behind 
crying, crying. The people who were leaving were very happy that they were 
going. Because, earlier, the borders were closed and they could not go to 
Kazakhstan. They were so happy, and, at first, when they came [to Kazakhstan],  
they were welcomed. But then, I don’t know why, but things changed. They were 
not so welcome anymore, people started saying bad things about the returnees.  
Like Saghat-agha, she also describes the migration as something resembling war, destruction, 
and chaos.  
The massive scale of the first 3 years of migration, 1990-1993, is visible in the 
photographs and videos shot in Bayan Ulgii, with long caravans of departing Russian Kamaz 
trucks, piled high with folded kiiz ui (Kaz. lit. “felt house,” Russian “yurt”), suitcases and 
wooden chests (sundukh) filled with belongings, topped by a family shanraq. The shanraq, a 
wooden circular opening of the yurt that lets smoke out and sun in, holds great symbolic 
significance for Kazakhs.  
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Figure 6: Family Shanraq, Ulgii, Mongolia. Photogrpaph by the author. 
 
As Buchli (2007) describes it, the wooden shanraq symbolizes home, family, and lineage, 
similar to hearth in other cultures. Connected to the hearth and smoke below and sky above, 
shanraq symbolizes the continuity of the lineage, as it is passed down from youngest son to 
youngest son. The shanraq passed down many generations from a family patriarch to the 
youngest son upon death, is called kara shanraq (black shanraq), signifying old age and 
continuity, as the smoke opening turns black with age from soot. In the absence of actual shanraq 
or yurt, Kazakhs in Mongolia and in Kazakhstan refer to the parental house as kara shanraq and 
it serves as the gathering point for family events. Similarly, Mongolian Kazakhs often refer to 
Kazakhstan as their kara shanraq, signifying notions of home and shared ancestry and, for some, 
a moral obligation to “return.”  
As I discuss in Chapter Four, such language of ancestry and kinship provides return 
migrants in Kazakhstan with powerful claims to belonging as well as ways to critique the 
shortcomings of the repatriation program through appeals to the sacred duty of hospitality and 
reciprocity among kin. However, as Deiner (2009:184) argues, “diasporic” self-conception was 
not particularly prevalent among Kazakhs in Bayan Ulgii before the 1990s. As I also described in 
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the introduction to this dissertation, Mongolian Kazakh notions of their history and belonging did 
not center on the territory of Kazakhstan and acknowledgement of shared kinship with other 
Kazakhs did not necessarily entail a “return myth” of diasporic homecoming. 
 Rather, the call to migrate to Kazakhstan first came from a small group of Kazakh elites 
living in Ulaanbaatar and they were among the first to spearhead the movement. In the early 
1990s, both economic and “patriotic” reasons for repatriation were expounded by Kazakhs from 
Ulaanbaatar in Bayan Ulgii and Khovd, first by word of mouth and later through local Kazakh 
newspapers and Kazakh language radio station in Bayan Ulgii. (ibid; Ginsburg 1999; Humphrey 
2002; Kuscu 2008).   
‘Chicken is not a bird and Mongolia is not abroad.’8  
I interviewed Saghat-apa9 in the fall of 2008 in her home in an elite and expensive suburb 
of Almaty, nested higher up in the mountains, above the pollution and bustle of the city. Now 
retired and widowed, she lives with her youngest son and unmarried daughter and spends a lot of 
her time at home in devotional activities, like praying and reading Koran and other religious 
literature. In 1990 she was one of several Kazakhs in the Mongolian central government who 
spearheaded the migration to Kazakhstan. Saghat-apa worked at the Ministry of Economy and 
Labor in Ulaanbaatar and was involved in negotiating the first labor agreements between 
Mongolia and Kazakhstan in 1990-91.  
Saghat-apa emphasizes economic factors in her narrative of how the migration began and 
also highlights her own role in it as that of serving on behalf of her people:  
                                                 
8 ‘Kuritsa ne ptitsa, Mongolia ne zagranitsa’ (popular Soviet saying). 
9 “Apa” means “aunt.” 
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Why did we migrate? Because communism fell in Mongolia. The Soviet Union 
fed Mongolia. And when it could not feed it anymore, it fell. It was unable, had 
no strength. Mongolia was like a child without care. Democracy came and how to 
live? It was chaos. Then there was also the national question. In the past, it was 
punished, but now the national question was being openly raised. The Mongols 
say: “Chingis Khan, my Chingis Khan,” and we Kazakhs are wandering, “And 
who are we? Where is there for us?”  
At the time, for her and many other Kazakhs in Ulaanbaatar, that answer seemed clear: 
Kazakhstan. Saghat-apa argues that Mongolian Kazakhs were the ones to initiate the migration 
before the Kazakhstani state had ever realized the possibilities or acknowledged the existence of 
a Kazakh diaspora abroad. She also emphasizes the practical, economic considerations that 
compelled Mongolian Kazakhs to search for a new home. They expected to encounter the same 
language, pastoral lifestyle, and cultural traditions as they were used to in Mongolia.  
Back then, there was no such concept as migration [koshi kong] yet. It was still 
communist, so people were afraid that they would be called nationalists. So, we 
highlighted the economic question: ‘Here are all these unemployed people. They 
need to go work somewhere, feed themselves and their children. And where could 
Mongolian Kazakhs go? They only know the Kazakh language, so that means to 
Kazakhstan. There the Kazakhs are the same, same sheep and animals, same 
work, the language is the same, and they can accept us.’ 
In her current telling of the story, Saghat-apa seems to downplay the initial role of ethno-
national identification with the Kazakhstan state and a sense of newly found patriotism among 
Kazakhs in Mongolia as Kazakhstan proclaimed its sovereignty and later independence from the 
USSR. She recalled the economic problems of the time: 
Also, there was not enough food supply, the economy was in crisis, all the Soviets 
left for their homeland. At the time, I went to Moscow as part of a Mongolian 
delegation. But there was no help from there, it was hard for Kazakhs, Then, I 
thought: we should go to our own Kazakhs.  The migration organization [in 
Bayan Ulgii] would report how many kilograms of flour and so on have been 
saved because we left. There were [ration] cards for staple foods and in 
Kazakhstan it was also the same. Here cards and there cards.  We needed to go, 
using the chaos to come to our historic homeland. The following year [1991-92], 
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other people started making labor agreements too. That is when they started 
bringing people on airplanes and in Kamaz [trucks]. They all went to the North 
[of Kazakhstan], didn’t know where they ended up, among Russians. Among 
those people many went back later. 
As Saghat-apa describes, deteriorating conditions in Mongolia in the early 1990s were 
part of larger economic transformation taking place in the former Soviet Union and its “satellite” 
states in Asia and Eastern Europe. Compared to Kazakhstan, the “economic transition” and 
divestment of state property in industry and agriculture happened much quicker in Mongolia. As 
the Soviet Union yanked the support rug from under Mongolia in 1991, the pastoral collectives 
(negdel) were quickly dissolved, their livestock was distributed among the collective members 
and housing and other formerly state property was privatized. This was also accompanied by 
skyrocketing inflation and unemployment (Barcus and Werner 2008; Kotkin and Elleman 1999; 
Humphrey 2002). In Kazakhstan, on the other hand, President Nazarbayev opted for a more 
gradual process of economic reforms and dissolution of collective farms and privatization of land 
and state property did not begin until 1996. As Saghat-apa explained, many Mongolian Kazakhs 
hoped for better life in Kazakhstan, because they thought it was still socialist. The migration is 
thus both a “return” or “gathering” of Kazakh people and an economic escape from new 
capitalism.   
While people everywhere in Mongolia experienced economic hardships and the 
dismantling of state support infrastructure, the Western region was hit particularly hard by the 
withdrawal of Soviet subsidies and food supplies. Given its remote location from the rest of 
Mongolia, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Bayan Ulgii received many consumer goods, 
including necessities such as flour, from the Altai region of the Soviet Union right across the 
border. Economic agreements between Mongolia and the Soviet Union subsidized the cost of 
these goods and provided stable prices for the pastoralists’ animal products such as meat and 
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wool. As Werner and Barcus (2009) describe, “supply routes between Western Mongolia and 
Russia were severely disrupted by economic restructuring in the early 1990s and consequently, 
all goods that were imported to the region were in short supply, and available goods were no 
longer sold at subsidized prices” (51).  
In 2009, many people in Bayan Ulgii described to me the loss of economic as well as 
geopolitical ties with Russia as one of the most significant consequences of Soviet withdrawal 
from Mongolia. As Maqsat-agha, who I quoted in the Introduction, told me: “Before, in Soviet 
time, we were close to Russia, learned Russian, were friends with Russia. Now we are no longer 
close to Russia. We are now close to China. All our goods, all our trade is now with China. So 
that is the big difference.” Consumer goods and food products from Russia are still sold at the 
Bayan Ulgii market, but now they are too expensive for most people to afford. Most goods are 
now supplied through active cross-border trade with China, which also provides some 
Mongolian-Kazakhs, including many women, with opportunities to earn cash income as “shuttle 
traders” (see Lacaze 2010).   
Like many other Mongolian Kazakhs I spoke with, Saghat-apa emphasized the initiative 
of Mongolian Kazakhs themselves in beginning the migration to Kazakhstan.  
They could not receive us in Kazakhstan. They did not even reply to us, because 
they were afraid of Moscow and the Soviet Union was shaking like this [shakes 
her body]. Kazakhstan was not independent yet, they could not spare any time to 
care about us, about the Kazakhs. But I knew that we had to come right at that 
moment of chaos. If this chaos were to stop, they might not let us leave, because 
there is only two million people in Mongolia.      
Kazakhs from Bayan Ulgii acknowledge the importance and the pervasiveness of 
Kazakhstani state’s nationalizing rhetoric in the early years of migration.  However, they also 
point out that government legislation and practical support for migration and settlement lagged 
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far behind the massive scale of migration through the 1990s. In contrast to claims that Kazakh 
repatriates from abroad served as pawns in a competition to control the nature of nationalization 
within Kazakhstan (Diener 2009:216), they also emphasize their own role in changing the 
demographics and socio-political situation in the early years of independence. Makhum-agha, 
who moved to Kazakhstan in 1991 and is now a successful businessman in Almaty, told me:    
To move was the initiative of Mongolian Kazakhs. In Kazakhstan then, nobody 
knew that so many people wanted to move. Even before the declaration of 
sovereignty, there already came three hundred families. Just made the decision, 
left everything [in Mongolia], and came. There were patriotic feelings. In two - 
three years, sixty thousand people moved.   
  [He then continued] 
This has influenced the immigration of Russians from the Northern regions. Two 
million people left then and it solved the social problem [eto reshilo sozialnuu 
problemu]. They abandoned their apartments, jobs. [He began to laugh] When 
they saw all these Kamazes [trucks], airplanes, they just abandoned everything 
and left. Otherwise, they would not have left. Grabs his suitcase and to hell with it 
[chemodan beret i na fig]. We descended like paratroopers [desant], scared them 
off. This was happening in the northern regions like Karaganda, Pavlodar.  
Kazakhs arriving from Mongolia discovered that Kazakhstan’s languages and cultures, its 
history of Russification, and decades of Soviet transformations contrasted with their expectations 
that, as Saghat-apa put it, “there the Kazakhs are the same, same sheep and animals, same work, 
the language is the same, and they can accept us.” I will explain the nature of the “social 
problem” Makhum-agha is talking about in the next section, where I focus on the situation across 
the border and describe the processes of settlement of Mongolian Kazakhs in Kazakhstan in the 
first years of independence. 
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“It is better to be a common person in your homeland than to be a sultan in a foreign 
country.”10 
When I interviewed him in 2007, Marat-agha, a retired official who worked for the 
Almaty migration bureau in 1992-1993, recalled with apparent wistfulness:  
It was a very exciting time. They came on planes and we also organized cars from 
the regions, Kamaz trucks, to go to Mongolia and bring them here with all of their 
things and household stuff. There was such a stir, such happiness and excitement 
that we were welcoming our compatriots. Local people came and greeted them at 
the train station and everybody welcomed them and made celebrations and 
prepared food. There was great patriotism at the time, but now it is not like that 
anymore. The attitude of the local people toward the returnees [oralmandar] has 
changed, the patriotism has faded.  
Unlike Mongolian Kazakhs, who generally highlighted economic reasons for 
immigrating to Kazakhstan, those involved in migration and settlement issues on the 
Kazakhstani side often emphasized “the patriotism” of the early years of independence as the 
main reason for welcoming their Kazakh brethren. Gulnara Mendikulova, a well-known Kazakh 
scholar of migration and an enthusiastic early supporter of repatriation policy, called this feeling 
of euphoria “childhood sickness” (detskaia bolezn), growing pains of the new-born nation: “The 
reason was this great feeling of happiness, national self-consciousness [natsionalnoe 
samosoznanie]. We were finally free of 250 years of being under someone else, finally 
independent. So, we wanted to welcome all Kazakhs back." 
While the image of “childhood sickness” evokes an idea of innocence, many have argued 
that Kazakhstani government had other than purely altruistic reasons for supporting Kazakh 
repatriation from abroad since the earliest days of independence. Economic problems, 
specifically labor shortages, faced by some regions of Kazakhstan in the early 1990s, made 
                                                 
10 Kazakh proverb. 
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recruiting Kazakhs from abroad an appealing solution for many local administrators and 
collective farm directors. At the time, it seemed like a perfect fit of supply and demand: Kazakhs 
in Mongolia needed jobs and Kazakhstan needed workers to till its fields and herd its livestock.  
Kazakhs in both Mongolia and Kazakhstan made assumptions about the other: 
Mongolian Kazaks assumed that Kazakhstan would be the same and would be easy thanks to 
language, the pastoral lifestyle, and other expected conditions. In Kazakhstan, Mongolian 
Kazakhs were expected to be good for such jobs as farming and animal husbandry, although this 
was not always the case.  
Demographic consequences of large-scale emigration of the 1990s had a devastating 
impact on the labor market in Kazakhstan. The new republic lost two million people or twelve 
percent of its total population of 16.4 million between 1993 and 1999 (Sadovskaya 2006, UNDP 
report 2006). Most of those who left Kazakhstan at the time were ethnic Russians and Germans, 
who, like the Kazakhs in Mongolia, heeded the call of their historic homelands and hoped for a 
better future for themselves and their children there. Of more than three million people who left 
Kazakhstan in the first fifteen years of independence, over two million people were ethnic 
Russians moving to Russia and seven hundred thousand people immigrated to Germany under 
the right of return granted to ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.11 
Especially in the early 1990s, when the exodus of non-Kazakhs from the republic reached 
its peak, the media, academics, and politicians talked about a "demographic crisis" that 
endangered the very future of Kazakhstan as a sovereign nation-state (Doszhanov 2006, see also 
                                                 
11 Almost 1 million ethnic Germans were deported from Volga German autonomous region in Russia to 
labor camps and special settlements in Northeastern Kazakhstan in 1941. 
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Dave 2004). People in Kazakhstan often emphasize the apparent disproportion between the 
country's large size (commonly described as "the size of Europe" or “twice the size of France”) 
and its low population of "only" fifteen million people. The problems are connected to the 
perceived inability to "develop" properly (the comparison to Europe reflecting the global 
hierarchies of "progress"), as well as a great fear of China’s huge population and flow of labor 
migration from neighboring Uzbekistan. As Maqash Tatimov, the outspokenly nationalist 
demographer and political scientist who enjoys a lot of support from the government, asserts: 
"Kazakhstan, in a perspective future, might become an 'underpopulated island' in the 
overpopulated world of the twenty-first century. The consequences of this are fatal [pagubny] not 
only for the indigenous population of our country, but to all of those who consider themselves 
Kazakhstani and are in fact such."(Tatimov 2001: 3).   
Tatimov uses the term “indigenous population” to refer specifically to Kazakhs living on 
the territory of Kazakhstan in contrast to “Kazakhstani,” used by the government (but hardly 
anyone else in Kazakhstan) to promote an inclusive “civic identity” for the country’s multi-
ethnic population. At the same time, in the government’s nation-building rhetoric, Kazakhs 
living outside of Kazakhstan are referred to as a national “diaspora” and “compatriots” (Rus. 
sootechestvinniki). Such understandings of nationhood and statehood, ambiguously employed by 
various actors within and outside Kazakhstan, allow for the notions of national belonging and 
membership both to overflow state boundaries and to exclude large segments of the populations 
residing within state borders (Verdery 1998; see also Brubaker 1992; Dave 2004).  
This expresses another kind of demographic anxiety on behalf of Kazakh nationalists: the 
fact that, on the eve of independence, Kazakhs constituted a minority “in their own country.” 
According to the last Soviet census taken in 1989, Kazakhstan entered independence with 
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Kazakhs representing 39.7% and Russians 37.8% of the total population. How far one can trust 
census figures, which have always been at the mercy of political considerations, is very 
controversial. Many contend that these figures reflect the contingencies of Soviet ethnic policies, 
where you could not have Russians as more numerous than the "titular" nationality and therefore 
Russian numbers were officially underreported (Dave 2004). Continuing importance of ethnic 
representation in Kazakhstan is underscored by Tatimov: “It should be taken into consideration 
that ethnic statistics in Kazakhstan, similar to racial statistics in the USA, have extremely 
important political significance” (Tatimov 2001: 3).  
I met with Maqash Tatimov in 2007, in his office at Kazakhstani Central University in 
Almaty where he is the dean. He spoke enthusiastically about the importance of research on 
Kazakh repatriates and described their importance for restoring the Kazakh genetic pool 
(genofond). He described the genofond of the Kazakh nation as dessimated by the “genocide” of 
Kazakhs during Soviet collectivization and the famine of 1929-1933, which according to 
Tatimov claimed 2.3 million Kazakh lives. He also spoke of the weakening of the Kazakh 
genofond through destruction of their traditional nomadic pastoral lifestyle and decades of 
imposed Russification.  
Such arguments explain why Kazakhstani government embraced the policy of the 
repatriation of Kazakhs from abroad as “the miracle solution for a rapid increase in the Kazakh 
share of the population” (Diener 2005:328). In the official government conceptions of migration 
and repatriation policies, Kazakhs living outside Kazakhstan have been described as 
“demographic reserve," which "stabilizes the demographic situation and changes the ethnic 
balance, compensating for the immigration losses and ethno-demographic disproportions of past 
decades" (Kozybaev: 2007; see also Kolsto 1998).  
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Therefore, from the start, the contributions of Mongolian Kazakh returnees to building 
the future of their reclaimed homeland have been seen only in demographic and ethno-cultural 
terms. Their potential lies exclusively in their pure Kazakh blood and their retention of an 
authentically traditional Kazakh nomadic lifestyle, valorized and romanticized as the unique 
Kazakh national heritage. For example, echoing frequently heard sentiments, one government 
official at the regional level Migration Department, upon hearing that I was conducting research 
with Mongolian Kazakhs, launched into a spirited description of her own work with the 
returnees, describing them as "pure seed and stock", infusing much needed pure blood into the 
veins of the intermixed and sickly Kazakh nation.  
From the very beginning, Kazakh “return migration” has been, by definition, "ethnic 
migration." Official definition of "oralman" (repatriate) in the current Law on Migration is: 
“foreign citizens or stateless persons of the Kazakh ethnicity, who permanently resided outside 
Kazakhstan on the date of gaining sovereignty”. This definition does not include people who, for 
example, were born in Kazakhstan but who are not ethnically Kazakh. This has led one 
prominent Kazakhstani scholar of migration, highly critical of the government policies, to tell me 
in a private conversation that "the migration politics of Kazakhstan are politics of the past 
century." 
 As Saghat-apa describes above, Mongolian Kazakhs in Ulaanbaatar used Kazakhstan’s 
need for labor and population as an opportunity to negotiate labor agreements between Mongolia 
and Kazakhstan and the first labor agreement was signed by the Mongolian Labor Ministry and 
the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Labor in 1990, before the Soviet Union was officially dissolved 
(Zaxankyzy 2001; Kinayatuly 2001). In the next five years (1991-1995), most labor contracts 
were negotiated directly between state farm directors and village akim (mayor/head) in 
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Kazakhstan and the Migration Organization set up to facilitate the process in Ulgii. These were 
five-year group labor contracts that usually involved 10-20 families and specified which type of 
labor they were being hired for: milkmaids (doiarki), animal herders (chabani), or “general 
agricultural laborers.” As part of the labor contract, Mongolian Kazakhs were also usually 
provided with housing, some animals (usually 10-20 sheep and sometimes a cow), free 
healthcare, pensions for the elderly, and free education for the children.  
With very few exceptions, most Mongolian Kazakhs and their families who came under 
these labor contracts were being hired for agricultural work on state and collective farms in the 
Northern regions of Kazakhstan. Some, especially many Russians, told me that this pattern of 
settlement of Mongolian Kazakhs was a deliberate attempt on the part of the Kazakhstani 
government to "dilute" the number of Russians and increase the number of ethnic Kazakhs in 
those Northern and Eastern regions. According to the 1989 census, Eastern Kazakhstan region 
(oblast’), located right across the border from Mongolia, was 27% Kazakh and 66% Russian. In 
Karaganda region to the west of it, where coal mining, heavy industry, Gulag labor camps, and 
Stalin’s ethnic deportations in the 1930s and ‘40s brought workers, exiles and prisoners from all 
over the Soviet Union, Kazakhs were only 17% of the population. 
 However, until 1997, when the first Law on Migration concerning the repatriation and 
settlement of Kazakh returnees was passed, there was no centralized legislation or regulation of 
these processes. Rather these were the regions that suffered the most population losses with the 
exodus of non-Kazakhs from the republic in the early 1990s and, therefore, turned to Mongolian 
Kazakhs for their labor needs. As Mongolian Kazakhs came to northern and eastern areas of 
Kazakhstan, they encountered lack of Kazakh schools and kindergartens, prevalent use of 
Russian over Kazakh, and places where Kazakhs were sometimes a small minority. Many 
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Mongolian Kazakhs described "living among Russians" and "Russian language" as the main 
difficulty in adapting in Kazakhstan. As Saghat-apa described: 
...They didn't know where they ended up. In the North, among Russians.  We did 
not know Russian. There were no schools [in Kazakh], only in Russian. So, 
among those people, some went back [to Mongolia]. We did not know who to go 
to. Nobody wanted to listen, they just left us anywhere. In the districts where 
Russians lived, it was hard. Afterwards, people moved, like a second migration 
inside Kazakhstan.  They went where they had relatives, in Zhetisu (Southeast), 
where it is comfortable. Then, for many years afterwards, we would hear that 
somewhere there were left some shepherds, uneducated, with no knowledge. They 
did not know where they ended up, where they live, why they live, do not 
understand anything, left in the mountains. Such rumors there were. ...So these 
were the difficulties for these families. Whoever was left among Russians and 
also in the mountains.  The children could not go to school. Where is the school, 
how many kilometers? The people who had problems were those who ended up 
on the mountain pastures, with five, six, ten kids and the school is many 
kilometers away. But these were just a few people, not most.  
Like Marat-agha, the retired migration official I quoted above, Mongolian Kazakhs who 
came to Kazakhstan at that time also recall the excited crowd of welcoming locals at train 
stations and the initial goodwill of the local government. However, their descriptions illuminated 
a radical disconnect in the initial understanding of the repatriation situation between the locals 
and the returnees. The Kazakhs who came to Kazakhstan from Mongolia were not illiterate 
nomadic pastoralists, yurt-dwelling remnants of Kazakh traditional past, as the locals imagined 
them to be. The very first groups of repatriates from Mongolia in 1990-1991 were 
overwhelmingly members of Mongolian Kazakh professional, academic, and cultural elite, most 
of them living in the Mongolian capital of Ulaanbaatar at the time. Among them were doctors, 
teachers, engineers, journalists, artists, and academics. Thus, they were baffled by the reception 
they encountered upon their arrival. Makhum-agha who earlier described the Mongolian 
Kazakhs as “descending like paratroopers” on the frightened Russians, explained: 
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They thought that everybody who came were shepherds, only knew how to herd. 
There were even jokes, about how, when our Kazakhs came off the train, we were 
all doctors, scientists. The locals thought we were all going to be poor and dirty, 
but we came off the train wearing ties, with briefcases. They were waiting, said 
they wanted to disinfect us, and we got really angry. Later, we joked: ‘now you'll 
be a shepherd and you'll be a dairymaid. Here, take this big stick, go feed the 
animals.’ Everyone was given animals, sheep, the doctors and the teachers. Of 
course, many of us ran away to the city after a few months. 
In the next section, I turn to history of labor practices and mobility in Kazakhstan in order 
to better understand how such notions of backwardness and modernity are connected to labor and 
spatial hierarchies and moral evaluations of persons and ways of life and how these have affected 
Mongolian Kazakhs’ experiences of settlement in Kazakhstan.  
Labor Practices and Mobility in Kazakhstan 
For them [the Kazakhs] religion is livestock, the people is livestock, 
knowledge is livestock and influence is livestock.  
(Abai, quoted in Olcott 1995:20) 
 
Prior to Russian colonization and settlement, Kazakh nomadic practices knit together  
different ecological zones by moving livestock across latitudes and altitudes, creating large-scale 
grazing systems that exploited seasonal and spatial variability (Kerven et al. 2004). For example, 
in the mountainous Altai region, this involved moving from lower-level elevations in the 
foothills where the livestock wintered up into high mountain pastures for summer and back to the 
drier plains for autumn, a migration cycle of about 200-300 kilometers. Further South, in the flat 
desert  regions, pastoralists wintered in the desert, moved to spring pastures in the semi-desert, 
further north into steppe ranges for the summer,  and returned south in autumn, completing a 
cycle of up to one thousand kilometers every year (ibid: 163). However, as I describe in the 
Introduction, growth of Russian fortification lines along the Eastern borderlands and the opening 
of land used by Kazakhs pastoralists to Russian settlement following the Resettlement Act of 
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1889, severely limited the use of pasture land and water and cut off the migration routes used by 
nomadic pastoralists. By the turn of the twentieth century, Kazakhs were facing what some 
scholars describe as ussian settlement followimany Kazakh reformers at the time were embracing 
sedentarism as the only option for Kazakhs to survive (Dave 2004; Khazanov 1984).  
Already by the turn of the 20th century, there were more than two million Russian settlers 
on formerly Kazakh lands. After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the following civil war, and a  
brief period of attempted independence (1917-1920) led by the Kazakh elites, the territory of 
what became Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) and later the independent state of 
Kazakhstan were incorporated into the Soviet Union.   
The 1920-30s were a period of forced sedentarization and collectivization of Kazakh 
nomads and subsequent famine, resulting in what Maqash Tatimov and other Kazakh historians 
called the Kazakh genocide (genotsid). According to the first official Soviet census in 1926, 
when KSSR was established, of the total population of the republic, Kazakhs were 3,627,612 
(58.5%) and the other two most numerous nationalities were Russians and Ukrainians, with 
20.6% and 13.9%, respectively, totaling about two million (Dave 2004).  
The next Soviet census that was held in 1937 was controversial. As Dave describes, the 
census results were destroyed and its organizers were sent to the Gulag as saboteurs because the 
census showed much lower population figures than anticipated.  Another census was held in 
1939. It shows that, even according to the official Soviet figures, between 1926 and 1939, 
Kazakhs lost 1.3 million people and fell down to 37.8 percent in Kazakhstan (Pianciolla 2001). 
While the loss of life during the famine was great, a lot of the population losses in the Republic 
came from the fact that hundreds of thousands of Kazakh nomads fled across the border to China 
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and to other Soviet republics. The Kazakhs who ended up outside of the Soviet Union were 
referred to as otkochevniki (from the Russian word for “nomad”). As Pianciolla (2001) describes: 
People began to leave Kazakhstan during the first winter of requisitioning, in 
1927-1928; the exodus was to continue in the years to come. People moved to 
cities and train stations, then fled Kazakhstan to all the surrounding regions: 
China, Siberia, Central Asia, and the Urals. Two hundred thousand Kazakh 
herdsmen (less than 10 percent of the Kazakh rural population) fled the republic 
in 1930. Starting in the autumn of 1931, the emigration wave assumed gigantic 
proportions: more than 1.5 million rural Kazakhs fled. According to some 
estimates 200,000 fled to China, whereas another million poured into other Soviet 
republics. The 1931-1932 exodus was the first time refugees left without taking 
their animals with them and the first time that large numbers of people died. A 
new term was coined in bureaucratic language to indicate a former herdsman who 
had lost his livestock and become a refugee - otkochevnik (from kochevnik 
"nomad"). (242) 
Many people in Kazakhstan today consider all return migrants to be the descendants of 
these “otkochevniki,” who fled their homeland, as some argue, abandoning it in time of need. As 
I argued in the Introduction, Kazakhs in Mongolia strongly contest this version of their history 
and claim centuries of habitation in Chinese and Mongolian Altai. However, such views continue 
to influence the way many Kazakhstani Kazakhs evaluate Kazakhs from abroad and negate their 
claims to belonging in Kazakhstan.  
The horrific scale of the requisitioning and sedentarization campaigns and famine could 
be seen not only in the loss of human life but also in the catastrophic loss of livestock, the 
foundation and lifeblood of Kazakh livelihood and society. Nearly all of the nomads’ animal 
wealth was lost in the first four years of collectivization, as Kazaks slaughtered their animals or 
fled to other countries rather than hand them over. For those collective farms that were able to 
maintain a herd, little fodder was available and driving the herds to the pasture was forbidden. 
By the end of the collectivization process, the nomadic pastoral lifestyle in Kazakhstan was 
effectively over: the remaining Kazakh survivors of the famine were successfully sedentarized 
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due to the decimation of their herds, the impossibility of resuming pastoral activity in the post-
famine environment, and the resettlement program that organized former herders into collective 
and state farms. 
Even as the practice of outpasturing livestock was revived later in a very limited form in 
the 1950s, it was a very different system from that followed by Kazakh nomads. Shepherds 
(shaban/chaban) were sent alone, without their families, to outlying pastures where they tended 
livestock belonging to the collective farm. In situations where families tended the collective 
livestock, children were sent away to boarding schools (internat), where they spent most of the 
year away from their families. Late 1950s brought major reorganizations in Central and Northern 
parts of Kazakhstan: more land was taken for agricultural cultivation and small villages, which 
were often formed on the basis of the preexisting nomadic auls of related families, were 
reorganized into large state and collective farms. Livestock production at these farms relied on 
centralized, inputs, distribution, and infrastructure and state subsidies. Khazanov (2012) argues 
that these practices resulted in loss of traditional herding lifestyle and its value for Kazakhs, 
replaced by an inefficient state regulated system. 
The Gulag system of labor camps and deportations of entire groups of people, Germans, 
Koreans, Chechens, Turks, Kurds, and others, from other parts of the Soviet Union, also brought 
millions of involuntary settlers to Kazakhstan in 1930-50s. I argue that Kate Brown’s (2007)  
argument about the centrality of the Gulag in Soviet history is especially salient with regard to 
Kazakhstan, where so many Gulag work camps and “special settlements” were located. 
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Figure 7: Kazakhstan - Map of the Corrective Labor Camps 1930-1950.  NIPTs Memorial and 
Geographic Faculty at the Moscow State University. 
 
 As Brown argues, labor camps and special settlements for exiles and deportees were part 
and parcel of the “spatial regime” of zoning and incarceration through passports and propiskas 
(resident registration) which structured Soviet life even for those who were not labeled as 
criminals. As she notes, Soviet citizens referred to the Gulag as the “little zone” (malaia zona) 
and the rest of society as the “big zone” (bol´shaia zona).  
I would…envision the Gulag as located along a continuum of incarcerated space 
which, like the highways built with convict labor, rolled off from “regime-zone” 
cities, proceeded to “open” cities and towns, exited in the collective farms (where 
villagers without passports had no right to leave), swerved, hardly stopping, in 
deportee special settlements (where villagers were restricted to a 25-kilometer 
zone) and dead-ended, inexplicably, as Gulag-constructed highways sometimes 
did, at the varied zones of unfreedom of the Gulag. (78) 
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The technologies of incarceration and zoning of space worked through criminalizing 
need, mobility, and desire. Most "workforce" in the camps were not political prisoners. "The 
technologies of zoning space for security reasons  - passport checks, sweeps of cities and border 
zones for illegal migrants, draconian sentencing for minor crimes – produced the millions of 
mundane convictions that populated the Gulag” (ibid: 69). As many people in Kazakhstan told 
me, such zoning regimes and residency registration requirement also kept Kazakhs out of cities 
and in the rural areas and collective farms as a captive labor force. As I discuss in more detail in 
the next chapter, Soviet organization of space and labor and criminalization of mobility 
continues to influence ethnic, social, and labor hierarchies in Kazakhstan (also see Brown 2001). 
Building cities and "urban-style" rural centers meant to eradicate the difference between 
(prosperous) city and the (backward) village. That failed fantastically, instead creating internal 
hierarchies of privilege and great inequality: "[z]oned space bolstered a narrative of morality and 
justice: if you are not part of the privileges, it's because you did not deserve it.” (ibid: 43).  
Conclusion: Mobility and Immobility in Mongolia and Kazakhstan 
The collapse of the collective system in both Kazakhstan and Mongolia in the 1990s led 
simultaneously to more mobility, as people were now able to migrate across state borders, and to 
less mobility, as the semi-nomadic lifestyle of Kazakh pastoralists became increasingly difficult 
to sustain. Both in Kazakhstan and in Mongolia, the dissolution of the collective system led to 
new forms of economic relationships and social stratifications which were also different from the 
“presocialist,” usually seen as “traditional,” forms of pastoralism among nomadic Kazakhs. As 
Sneath (1999) and other scholars of pastoralism argue, while these post-Soviet changes may 
resemble a return to some sort of more traditional, more genuinely native form of subsistence 
pastoralism based on kin relations, it is rather a collapse of large-scale pastoral systems which in 
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many respects resembled structures that are much older than the collectives (229.) These scholars 
make the point that: “Rather than assuming that there is some ‘default position’ or generic Inner 
Asian society to which people have recently returned, we [need to] analyse the range of new 
institutions that are taking shape” (Humphrey and Sneath 1996:3). 
Khazanov and Schlee (2012) describe the situation in Kazakhstan after the collapse of the 
Soviet economy.  
 In Kazakhstan, the retreat of state control in the rangelands has allowed the 
former infrastructure to disintegrate or to be stolen. Roads to high mountain 
summer pastures are no longer maintained. Barns and winter houses have been 
demolished and the materials removed to private buildings. Agricultural 
machinery owned by remaining farm cooperatives is left to rust for lack of funds 
to repair them. Fencing and telephone wires are plundered and sold. Wells in the 
desert have broken pumps. Without essential infrastructure, it has become very 
difficult for pastoralists to make use of the seasonal pastures. 
 
Concurrent with the loss of state support to collective farms, an economic crisis in 
Kazakhstan accompanied the shift from a centrally-planned to a market economy. One of the 
casualties of this crisis was the national sheep population, which crashed by two thirds from 35 
to 9 million in a couple of years (Behnke 2002). These numbers are as drastic as those of animals 
lost during the collectivization period.  
Similar processes of decollectivization and the loss of animals occurred in Mongolia, 
about which Finke wrote (2012: 232) "Pivatization and the dissolution of the collectives can be 
seen to have as radical, albeit less violent, a change as collectivization." Pastoralism continues to 
constitute the foundation of subsistence for a large number of people in Mongolia. Semi-nomadic 
and nomadic practices of pastoralism continue as a way of life for many people, although 
perceived as increasingly threatened and disappearing.  As Sneath (1999) describes, in Mongolia, 
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cattle breeding constitutes 70 percent of agricultural gross output. Pasture occupies 80 percent of 
the territory but actually only 30-50 percent of them are in use. Areas nearby the administrative 
centers, like the town of Ulgii, are overloaded with cattle and exposed to pasture disgression. On 
the contrary, the remote pastures are much less used, as it is difficult and expensive to move 
animals and people. Sneath (ibid.) argues that this new, small-scale subsistence pastoralism, now 
common in Mongolia, was never "traditional" or "natural.”  
From a narrowly technological perspective this would appear to be a return to pre-
revolutionary pastoralism; animal- transport instead of trucks; cutting hay by hand 
instead of a tractor. However, in terms of the sociotechnical system of pastoralism 
this is not a genuine return to some sort of "traditional" form, but a collapse of 
large-scale pastoral systems which in many respects resembled structures that are 
much older than the collectives. (231) 
Without institutional support there is a tendency to “fall back” on an achievable system 
that does not require much labor and is also relatively immobile. Pre-socialist systems of pastoral 
movement were not the simple subsistence strategies of individual households. Such a complex 
system required jurisdiction over large numbers of people and areas of land (230-231).   
In this chapter I described how the Soviet spatial regime reshuffled huge populations, 
replaced the nomadic Kazakh lifestyle with sedentary collective farming, and turned Kazakhstan 
into a multiethnic republic. As a result of these processes in both Kazakhstan and Mongolia, 
people have lost substantial mobility as pastoralists, while they gained some additional freedom 
of movement with the opportunity to travel, work, and live outside of Mongolia. In the next 
chapter, I focus on how these hierarchies established in Soviet times continue to structure 
Kazakhstani society in significant ways and examine how Kazakhs from Mongolia map onto, 
negotiate, and challenge these social and moral hierarchies. 
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Chapter Three 
“Black Russians" and "Pure Kazakhs":  Kazakhstan as a Soviet "Laboratory of 
Nations" 
Since the time that the United States began to civilize the Iroquois, Creeks, 
Choctaw, and other redskins, the Indian wars in the country have virtually ended. 
Since 1858, in the United States, 162 schools for Indians have been established and 
an Indian trust has been formed to assist the savages wishing to settle.  
(Chokhan Valikhanov [1904] Sochineniia 1835-1865) 
 
"After 15 years, even a bear would have enough time to learn the state language..." 
 Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
"Only a stick will teach a bear how to pray."  
 Folk proverb. 
(Quoted in Open Letter: "Let's stop actions against the Constitution!" 2009)  
 
This chapter focuses on the experiences of Mongolian Kazakh return migrants in 
Kazakhstan, specifically in the Almaty region, where I conducted my fieldwork. When 
Mongolian Kazakhs came to Kazakhstan, they confronted and were confronted by the 
historical-social realities of post-Soviet Kazakhstan: legacies, for better or worse, of two 
hundred years of Russian colonization and six decades of profound Soviet 
transformations. I examine two major themes that Mongolian Kazakhs and locals of all 
nationalities note and comment on continuously and which have a ubiquitous presence in 
everyday conversation as well public discourse: 1) The multiethnic nature of the 
Kazakhstani state as its most important Soviet legacy and, distinct but closely related to 
the first point, 2) The "Russification" of Kazakhs as a nation, culturally and linguistically. 
First, I examine the history and socio-linguistic landscape of the city of Almaty, formerly 
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the capital of Soviet Kazakhstan and still its largest city. In the second part of the chapter, 
I move out to small towns and villages outside Almaty, where most return migrants live.  
As Kosmarskaya (2002) argues, most scholarship that examines Kazakhstan as 
"bipolar society" focuses on interactions between Russians and other ethnic groups on 
those who choose to leave rather than stay and why. These kinds of accounts are also 
typically built on large surveys and reflect a very static picture of Kazakhstani society, 
showing much more distance between different groups than is actually the case. They 
erase much of the internal diversity that exists within Kazakhstani society while, at the 
same time, exaggerating other kind of divisions and cleavages. I examine how Kazakhs 
from Mongolia variously map onto, reflect, and challenge currently salient divisions 
within Kazakhstan, such as Russian-speaking vs. Kazakh-speaking, urban vs. rural, 
modern vs. traditional. I analyze the apparent tensions between notions of civilization” or 
“modernity” and cultural “authenticity” in descriptions of Russification and cultural loss 
in Kazakhstan. I argue that the symbolic resources of authenticity and legitimacy on 
which Mongolian-Kazakh returnees can draw also serve as hindrances to their claims of 
membership in the modern state. A widespread perception in Kazakhstan, is that Kazakhs 
from Mongolia are the poorest, most backward, as well as the most traditional, most 
authentically Kazakh, having retained the purity of Kazakh language and culture lost 
among “russified” and “deculturated” Kazakhs of Kazakhstan. At the same time, 
hierarchies of ethnicity, language, labor, and residence leave some return migrants 
literally homeless in their ancestral homeland and, as some have described, as a “diaspora 
in their own country.”  
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Vernyi/Alma-ata/Almaty: "City of Prophetic Dreams" 12 
"It was in 1933 that I first saw that curious city, so unlike any other city in the 
world, and I still remember how it amazed me then." This is the opening line of Yuri 
Dombrovsky's novel, The Keeper of Antiquities (1969), about a young archaeologist who 
is sent from Moscow to work in the new Central State Museum of Kazakh Republic, 
opened in Alma-Ata in 1931. Dombrovsky's second book, The Faculty of Useless 
Knowledge [1996] (1975),  is  perhaps better known in the former Soviet Union and 
abroad, but in Almaty, it is his color-saturated, exuberant descriptions of 1930s Alma-
Ata, as Alexander (2009) says, "everybody, but everybody cites": 
...I noticed that the greenery in this town was laid out in terraces. The first 
layer was made up of the acacias. Above the acacias were orchards; above 
the orchard poplars; higher than the poplars were only the mountains and 
the forests that covered them. It  was the orchards that confused me most 
of all: how on earth could I find my way about if the whole town was one 
huge orchard – apple orchards, apricot orchards, cherry orchards, almond 
orchards - pink blossom, white blossom, yellow blossom. (4) 
 
 In the early 1930's, when the young Keeper of Dombrovsky's novel arrived in 
Alma-Ata, it was still "a sleepy Cossack village (kazach'ia stanitsa] of the turn of the 
century" (6): 
Later I realized that there were as many wild creatures in this town as 
there were people. In the evenings, eagle-owls hoot in the town park. As 
soon as it begins to grow dark, bats appear in the streets, orioles sing 
perched on the bus-stops in the middle of the town. Pheasants roost on 
weather-boarded roofs in the suburbs (here they still call them by the 
Cossack old name of 'stanitsas'). A gorgeous red and yellow peacock 
pheasant will sit there looking anxiously around him – he has flown in 
from the grassy foothills of the mountains and he can't think why. In the 
fall, wild goats wander into town and drop their kids in suburban gardens. 
                                                 
12 From Vladimir Lugovskii's “City of Dreams” 
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In short, nowhere in the world, as a zoologist once told me, does wild life 
penetrate so far into a big city as in Alma-Ata.  (6) 
 
The Keeper quickly learns, as everyone who comes to Almaty does, that that the 
city, in its material form and its social geography, as it is experienced by its inhabitants, 
is shaped by the Alatau Mountains: "A spur of the Tien Shan range...It is as if two great 
wings had spread themselves round the town, holding it up in the air and keeping it from 
falling" (5). The mountains, when they are visible through Almaty's current pollution, 
provide the surest way to get oriented anywhere around the city and visitors quickly pick 
up the Almaty way of giving directions and location by using "up" and "down." Printed 
maps of Almaty, sold in shops and newspaper kiosks, are oriented with South (where the 
mountains are) on top, rather than using a standard map layout, where the geographic 
North is always on top.13  
In a less lyrical vein, Alexander (2009) argues that the natural environment has 
largely determined the architecture and layout of the city from its very beginnings. The 
mountains, which trap the air and contribute to the air pollution and the horrible smog, 
also effectively dictate in which directions the city can and cannot grow and how the land 
around the city can be used.  Almaty is also located in an area of high seismic activity 
and is subject to earthquakes and mudslides. Twice, in 1887 and in 1911, the town has 
been almost completely destroyed by earthquakes and in 1921 a massive mudflow caused 
considerable destruction and a great loss of life. As Alexander states: "Harmonious 
                                                 
13 As Kotlyarova (2009) describes, those who moved from Almaty to the new capital, Astana, transplanted 
this way of speaking to the flat steppe:  "for example: to live above; the shop is below; Zheltoqsan street is 
above Bogenbai Batyr"(7).  
 70 
development of nature and people was thus always unlikely from the founding of the 
small Tsarist fortress in 1854 in a pretty but singularly unfortunate location" (ibid: 163).  
Russian military officers, imperial administrators, and civil servants who came to 
build this distant colonial outpost perceived its development as a struggle of the settled 
civilization and order of the city and productive cultivation of land against the 
destructiveness of untamed nature and the unproductive existence of nomads.  Emptiness 
and absence, of both the natural world and the human environment, were recurring 
themes in Russian colonization of Siberia, the Far East, and the nomadic steppe. 
However, unlike these places further north, the fertile Zhetisu region, as its name 
suggests (Zhetisu means "seven rivers" in Kazakh, which Russians translated as 
Semirech'e),  has had a long history of both irrigation agriculture and nomadic 
pastoralism, which took advantage of the abundance of water and rich mountain pastures 
in the foothills of the Tian-Shan mountains. But, unlike Russian conquests further South, 
in Bukhara, Khiva, and Khokand,14 Zhetisu had no great cities full of magnificent 
architecture and written history, such as Timur's (Tamerlane) Registan in Samarkhand or 
thousand year old mosques and mausoleums of Bukhara. So, unlike Russian Tashkent 
and other colonial cities that grew around and alongside native cities with their own 
"urban civilization," Vernyi could be imagined as a blank slate, a lonely outpost of 
Russian civilization amidst the primordial nature, untouched by the wanderings of 
scattered nomadic bands.15 Petr Semenov, a Russian geographer whose travels in the 
                                                 
14 Russian forces took Tashkent in 1865 and made it the capital of the new Turkestan Governor-
Generalship. The Khanate of Kokand was annexed in 1876 and also incorporated into Russian Turkestan.  
The Khanate of Khiva, although remaining nominally independent, became a Russian protectorate in 1873. 
See Soucek 2000.   
 
15 For comparisons of Russian Tashkent to the colonial cities of the Western Empires (British, French, and 
Dutch) see Northrop 2004, Sahadeo 2007.  
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Tian-Shan mountains brought him such fame that Tsar Nicholas II authorized the 
addition of "Tian-Shansky" to his last name, described visiting Fort Vernyi just two years 
after its establishment on the banks of Bol'shaya (Big) and Malen'kaya (Little) Almatinka 
rivers: "I remember how, on the naked foothill, on the bank of Almatinka, stood a few 
wooden huts and yurts. Now, there is a wonderful town, drowning in greenery...I testify 
that when I was in Vernyi, not a single little bush grew there..." (quoted in Kozybayev 
1983: 608).  
From the very beginning, Fort Vernyi's planners, architects, and administrators 
thought to make nature an important part of the city. However, this was not wild nature, 
but cultivated by human thought and labor, and, in the fashion of other colonial empires 
of the late 19th century, shaped by scientific improvements.16 Vernyi was planned with 
street grids of right angles and wide avenues, but a lot of effort also went into the 
"greening" (ozelenenie) of the town by planting trees and incorporating spaces for 
gardens and public parks. General Kolpakovskii, the first Russian Governor of Vernyi, 
commanded the planting of elms, poplars, and mulberry trees along the city street and 
oversaw the planning of the first "public park" (kazennyi sad) in 1857. As Vernyi grew 
from a garrison fort into a settler town, Russian settlers brought maps and measuring 
instruments and also stem cuttings of trees, a wide variety of fruits and vegetables not 
native to the region, and many ornamental plants. The plants rooted themselves in the 
new land and created new localized varieties and amazing hybrids that spread and thrived 
in the water-rich mountain foothills.  
                                                 
16 See Home (2013) for the importance of planting and ideas of "green city" for urban planners and 
architects in the British colonial cities around the world.  
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As the natural landscape needed proper "planning and planting" (Home 2013) to 
transform into an urban environment, the people also required careful cultivation to shape 
them into civilized and productive citizens and proper urbanites. At the center of the most 
enduring stories about Vernyi's history is horticulturalist Eduard Baum who, after 
arriving in Vernyi in 1874 as the forest inspector of Semirech'e region, passionately 
dedicated himself to the "noble mission of greening" (ozeleneniia). Baum used the stick 
and carrot method to disseminate his ideas among Vernyi populace. In 1875, he issued an 
order, obliging every resident of Vernyi to plant twenty fruit and ornamental trees along 
the streets and in front of their houses and the seedlings were provided to each household 
free of charge. Fines were issued to those who failed to comply with the order and for 
cutting down any trees. Almaty inhabitants especially like to tell that Baum allegedly 
issued an order for public whipping of any person who cut down a Tian Shan fir. In 1892, 
he successfully lobbied Governor Kolpakovsky to donate state land on the outskirts of 
Vernyi for a family-oriented "entertainment park" (uveselitel'nyi park), which became 
known as Baum's Grove. One hundred and twenty years later, Baum's Gove is still there, 
testifying to the endurance of Baum's ideas and their importance in Almaty history. It still 
has many of the original trees planted by Baum and his workers, many of which are over 
100 years old, and the neat straight alleyways, favorite with Almaty bicycle enthusiasts, 
follow the layout of the grove drawn by Baum in 1892.  
However, from the very beginning, stories about Baum's Grove were full of dark 
rumors. In Baum's time, it became notorious as haven for criminals and runaways. Its 
dangerous reputation as a gathering place for drunks, drug dealers, and criminal gangs 
persisted through Soviet times. My friend who grew up in Almaty told me that when she 
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was a teenager, in the 1980s, Baum's Grove was known not as a family entertainment 
park, as envisioned by Baum, but as a seedy hangout and a place to dump bodies. As 
much as Kolpakovskii, Baum, and the Soviet administrators and educators after them 
committed themselves to cultivation of civilized order and proper productivity in nature 
and in people, chaos and disorder always seemed to thwart even the most carefully laid 
out plans with earthquakes and mudslides, and human nature failed to live up to the ideals 
of social engineering. The Cossacks and peasants of Vernyi had to be cajoled, fined, and 
whipped into "refining" ( oblagorazhivat) the military fort into a proper city, because 
they themselves were far from civilized 'cultivators.'  
Aport: "The Patriotic Apple"  
The Aport, a local variety of apple, is the symbol of Almaty.  It was pictured on 
the Soviet emblem of Alma-Ata and billboards with images of aport are all around the 
city.  The official version of Aport's origins, quoted in Kazakhstani history textbooks, 
says that in the mid-1860s, a Russian settler, Egor Red'ko, brought with him to Fort 
Vernyi several cuttings of apple trees from his native Don region. Several years after 
being planted in Zhetisu soil, these completely unremarkable trees began to produce 
amazing apples, of quality unseen before: "They were of huge size, bright color, and 
amazing taste and fragrance" (Rumyantsev 2000: 172). Red'ko, like a Russian Johnny 
Appleseed, generously shared these cuttings with all his neighbors and "soon the 
miraculously transformed variety from Voronezh [region] spread across the whole Vernyi 
district" (ibid).  
In Soviet times, Aport was a symbol of Kazakhtan's and Soviet pride: Almaty 
residents love to recall the time when special Aport orchards were cultivated especially 
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for gifts delivered to the Kremlin and the Soviet leaders in Moscow. "In Soviet times, it 
was a custom to bring something especially valuable from every region to Moscow, to 
the Kremlin: for example, cognac was brought from Armenia, grapes from Moldavia, and 
we were ordered to deliver aport, there was even an order that came annually from the 
Central Committee...". Not only Soviet leaders were enamored of the miraculous apple. 
The story goes that Senator Ted Kennedy visited Alma-Ata in 1972 and after tasting the 
apple exclaimed: "I have traveled almost the whole world but have never tasted such 
wonderful apples!" (ibid).   
 
 
Figure 8: Aport harvest.  
Foreigners coveted Aport, but no matter what they tried, could not get it to grow 
in a foreign soil. "No matter how much Germany's best specialists tried, there, the aport 
fruit rotted from the inside. They have attempted to grow aport in other European 
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countries and even beyond the ocean, in USA, but it was all in vain. Aport turned out to 
be such a 'patriot' that it did not take root in any of the foreign gardens." (ibid) 
The story of Aport, the "patriotic" apple, symbolizes so many different things for 
people in Kazakhstan. The story of its origins, transplanted from Russia into the Kazakh 
soil, tells the history of contact and hybridization between autochthons and aliens (Rus. 
prisheltsy). It can symbolize friendship or become the proverbial "apple of discord." It is 
said that the secret of the Almaty Aport is that the trees brought from Russia combined 
with the indigenous wild apples that grew in the foothills of Tian Shan; a compelling 
image for the grafting of the two people, the indigenes and the foreigners. The wild and 
the cultivated trees came together to produce a new hybrid form that grows nowhere else 
but in the soil of Kazakhstan; the beautiful fragrant apple that people would exclaim 
"used to be THIS big," putting two fists together. 
Ryskul worked in a government office in charge of oralman settlement in 
Kaskelen district, about 30 km outside of Almaty. She was a taciturn and perpetually 
tired looking woman whom I saw become excited only once, when she accompanied me 
on a visit to a Mongolian Kazakh family in her district. As they talked about their 
experiences of moving to Kazakhstan, she joined the conversation with her own 
recollections of moving to Almaty from the north in the '80s: 
When I was living in...[unclear in my notes], I heard how people talked 
about Almaty region, as this paradise, all in orchards, trees, flowers 
everywhere. The water flowing from the mountains into the aryq [canals] 
and it is so crystal clear, you can drink it right out of the aryq. And how 
there are orchards everywhere, grapes, apples, you can pick apples off the 
trees and they are so big, like two fists. When I heard this from people, I 
did not believe any of it. It can't be like this. But when I came here, I saw 
it was all true. The orchards, and the apples, and the water in the aryq. 
This place was so beautiful. I remember just picking up apples and eating, 
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eating, until I got sick. I never believed it could all be true, but it was just 
like people said it was.  
 
Alexander (2009) describes similar recollections of Soviet Alma-Ata from her 
interlocutors and also notes "the curious stylistic uniformity of accounts whatever the 
genre: taped oral history, written autobiography, fiction or history" (154). As she argues:  
...it is in such lyrical accounts, felt with nostalgia, that ideas of the right 
order which has been overturned in tales of decay is glimpsed....The 
lyrical mood is intertwined with a notion of the ideal socialist city: the 
urban aesthetic of natural abundance and greenness which is underwritten 
by a normative idea of how best to provide the material environment for a 
model socialist system. (ibid) 
 
By the time I came to Almaty in 2004, the famous apple orchards were gone and 
Almaty residents now buy bottled water. Standing on top of the famous Medeo skating 
ring and looking down at the city, one could see that the orchards have been replaced by 
Kazakh McMansions.  
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Figure 9: Almaty, view from Medeo. Photograph by the author. 
 
Higher up toward the mountains, on the south side of the city, where the air is 
cleaner, there are quiet residential streets, high fences with guard houses attached, and 
expensive American cars parked in the driveways. Almaty residents still orient by "up" 
and "down" directions, but it has developed new meanings of wealth, social class, and 
increasing segregation, as rural migrants and oralmandar are crowded in shanty 
settlements on the northern outskirts of the city, down by the bazaars, the bus depot and 
the train station. When 2009 was announced as the Year of Aport, pictures of the apples 
proliferated on posters and billboards all over Almaty. However, as locals decried to me, 
the real Aport was nowhere to be found. They assured me that the apples sold at the city 
bazaar, claimed as real Aport by unscrupulous sellers, were much inferior fakes. The 
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vanished Aport was a symbol of the disappearance of the prosperous and "cultivated" 
past. 
The Aport provides rich metaphors for notions of human transplantation and 
hybridization in Kazakhstan. For many people, Kazakh and not, Red'ko and others like 
him have a claim to the land through cultivation and the fruits of their labor. And for 
Kazakhstani Russians, the labor that they have contributed to the transformation of land 
in its natural and human-made forms, provides them with tangible signs of belonging that 
are part of the landscape. These include the trees, flowers, and orchards of Almaty; the 
"Virgin Land" of the empty steppe, flowering with wheat and corn; factories, mines, oil 
rigs, and space launch facilities. They make visible in the landscape itself, the kinds of 
claims common among Kazakhstani Russians that they "have built Kazakhstan" with 
their labor and gave "culture" to the uncivilized nomads. These claims, taken to their 
extreme, also appear in the rhetoric of nationalists in Russia who consider the former 
colonies to be a part of the Russian homeland. Famous Russian writer Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn wrote in 1990, in his book How Should We Rebuild Russia (Kak nam 
obusstroit Rossiu), in the opening paragraph titled "Regarding Kazakhstan":  
Its current huge territory has been carved out by communists mindlessly, 
by whatever means: if nomadic herds pass through somewhere once a 
year, then that is Kazakhstan... But, it has been constructed out of southern 
Siberia, southern Urals, and the central barren expanses, which since then 
have been transformed and built up by Russians, cons, and the exiled 
people. And today, in the whole of the inflated Kazakhstan, Kazakhs are 
conspicuously less than half [of the population]. (1)  
   
 Nevertheless, for most people I talked to in Kazakhstan, it is not nationalist claims 
to ownership that frame their recollections of Soviet life. Svetlana was another 
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government official in a district about sixty kilometers from Almaty, who I got to know 
personally in 2009, as she was getting ready to retire from the government job to manage 
her own restaurant. She grew up in a small village not far from the district center where 
she now lived. Describing herself as a quarter German, a quarter Russian, and half 
Kazakh, Svetlana, bilingual in Kazakh and Russian languages and with a wide social 
network of friends, neighbors, and relatives that crossed ethnic and language boundaries, 
she considered herself a quintessential "Kazakhstani." She began her long carrier as a 
government official working at the village soviet, then became a principle of the village 
school, was later elected the village akim (mayor), and moved from there to the post at 
the district akimat (government administration). She worked with the returnees in her 
district and her attitude toward and interactions with the newly arrived migrants cannot 
be seen outside her own social emplacement and life history. When asked about the 
village in which she grew up and lived her entire life, she, like many other Kazakhstanis, 
framed her recollections in terms of the orderliness, cleanliness, stability, and abundance 
of Soviet times. The harmony of natural and social environment was highlighted through 
her vivid images of green shady streets, paved sidewalks, and flowering gardens, 
mirrored by the description of multiethnic coexistence in which everyone, Kazakhs, 
Russians, and Germans, lived happily together: "Everyone tried to keep up with everyone 
else and tried to make their yards green, beautiful. And then the Russians and the others 
began to leave and new people came." Moving into the homes of those that left, she 
explained, they did not take care of what was left, but began to keep animals that 
trampled the beautiful gardens and broke the neat fences: "So, they came, and that is why 
the village now looks so unattractive." 
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Similar to Svetlana's home village, the district center where she now lives and 
works has also seen enormous changes in the two decades since independence. Many of 
the ethnic Russians, Poles, and Germans have left. The neighborhood where I lived in 
2008-09 was once known to all the locals as "West Berlin" and praised for its solidly 
constructed German houses, beautiful apple orchards, and neat picket fences. Now that 
Kazakhs from Mongolia, China, and Uzbekistan live in most of these houses, the other 
locals bemoan the physical and social changes in the neighborhood and in the town after 
"our" Germans have left.  
For the locals, including many of the government officials, post-Soviet changes 
meant that much of the economic and social infrastructure, the significant things that used 
to make up the everyday fabric of their lived social-material space were gone. Gone are 
the collective farms and the light manufacturing that provided stable jobs, benefits, and 
pensions, free universal day care, free healthcare, and many municipal services that used 
to be taken for granted, like garbage collection, tree planting, and road upkeep. The shady 
streets and paved sidewalks, nostalgically recalled by the locals, are often talked about in 
the context of the degradation of living space, mirrored, again, by the degeneration in the 
quality of the people dwelling in it, described as poor, uncultured, and uncivilized 
nomads, unused to living in houses. 
Svetlana Boym (2001) wrote that "the twentieth century began with utopia and 
ended with nostalgia" (xiv). However, she adds that nostalgia has a utopian dimension to 
it as well: 
Unlike melancholia, which confines itself to the planes of individual 
consciousness, nostalgia is about the relationship between individual 
biography and the biography of groups or nations, between personal and 
collective memory. While futuristic utopias might be out of fashion, 
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nostalgia itself has a utopian dimension--only it is no longer directed 
toward the future. Sometimes it is not directed toward the past either, but 
rather sideways. The nostalgic feels stifled within the conventional 
confines of time and space. (ibid.) 
 
When I talked to Kazakhstani locals, Kazakhs, Russians, and others, they often 
spoke of "ran'she" ("before"), without a specific date, indexing the rupture point between 
the Soviet "ran'she" and the post-Soviet "seichas" (now). For those who grew up before 
independence, whether they are more reminiscently nostalgic or critical in their 
evaluation of the Soviet ran'she, it is almost always framed as stability, order, and socio-
economic security, counterposed to the chaos and dispossession of the 1990s (see 
Nazpary 1990; Yurchak 2003).   
While Mongolian Kazakhs also had a contrasting point of reference, they, not 
surprisingly, described the experience of rupture in spatial terms, moving from Mongolia 
to Kazakhstan. Subverting the idea of return myth, closely connected to discussions about 
the nature of "diasporic experience" in nationalizing narratives, oralmandar in 
Kazakhstan wax nostalgic about Mongolia as their "land of birth." As I discuss in more 
detail in Chapter Four, contrasts between Mongolia and Kazakhstan, and Mongolian and 
Soviet Kazakhs, were widespread and deeply moralized through notions of kazakhshilikh 
(Kazakhness). Mongolian Kazakhs criticized Kazakhstani Kazakhs' lack of hospitality, 
loss of nomadic customs, linguistic Russification, and absence of religious knowledge 
and practice. For many of them, Kazakhstani Kazakhs are first and foremost shala kazaks 
(literally, "half-Kazakhs"), or kara orys ("black Russians") with, as a few have pointed 
out to me, Kazakh faces and Russian souls.  
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Like the comparisons with socialist times for Kazakhstani Kazakhs, comparisons 
with Mongolia are used not only for idealization of the past, but as a specific and direct 
critique of the current situation, which allows one to evaluate and articulate better 
alternatives. It also plays an important part in the aesthetics of claim making: for locals, it 
the Soviet, built environment and material and cultural progress, for Mongolian Kazakhs, 
it is their preservation of Kazakh culture and language. However, like for the Portugese 
"retornados" described by Lubkemann (2003), the symbolic resources of authenticity and 
cultural legitimacy on which Mongolian Kazakhs can draw also serve as hindrances to 
their claims of membership in the modern state (82). While being an important part of the 
conception of the Kazakh nation, in practice, their belonging in the national community is 
questioned in everyday forms of social interaction (see also Smith 2003; Tsuda 2009). 
How Mongolian Kazakhs map onto and negotiate the social geography of Kazakhstan is 
demonstrated by Omirzhan-agha's17 story of attempting to pass for a "local" Kazakh.  
I often will not tell people that I meet that I am from Mongolia, because 
right away they think then, 'oh oralman, Mongol.' But I do not speak 
Russian well, so I tell them I am from Shymkent or Kyzyl Orda [southern 
cities], where people do not speak Russian. And also people hear my 
Kazakh and they hear that I speak differently, so they ask me where I am 
from and I say from Shymkent. You know, like when riding on a train and 
people are talking, they ask you where you are from. I do not want to say 
that I am from Mongolia, because maybe they think, 'Oh he is oralman, he 
is from Mongolia, he is poor, uneducated.' So I tell them that I am from 
Shymkent.  
 
                                                 
17 I lived with the family of Omirzhan-agha and Nara-apke for four months, March –June 2007, while 
conducting fieldwork in Shamalghan village.  After three years in Kazakhstan, they returned to Mongolia 
that summer and now live in Ulaanbaatar.  
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In Kazakhstan, "Shymkent," or "the South," as a predominantly "Kazakh" region, 
is often opposed to the North, which is perceived as largely Russian and European, 
ethnically, linguistically, and culturally. Local Kazakhs liked to tell me a joke which 
started, "Shymkent is our Texas of Kazakhstan" (Kazakhstanskii Tehas). "How is it like 
Texas?" I would respond with the expected question. "Because there is no law!" people 
would answer and laugh. While the South is described as Kazakh speaking, traditional, 
and Muslim, such characteristics are also often interpreted to mean "tribal," "patriarchal," 
"corrupt," and "backward." As Omirzhan-agha's creative way of "passing" for a local 
demonstrates, Kazakhs from Mongolia variously map onto, reflect, and challenge 
currently salient divisions within Kazakhstan, such as Russian-speaking versus Kazakh-
speaking, urban versus rural, modern versus traditional.  
 
"If You Want to Become Russian, First Become a Kazakh." 18  
In his article, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State 
Promoted Ethnic Particularism," (1994) Yuri Slezkine borrows a metaphor from a Soviet 
scholar, I. Vareikis, who wrote in 1924 that the USSR was a large communal apartment 
in which "national state units, various republics and autonomous provinces" represented 
'separate rooms'" (414). Like Slezkine, many other scholars have argued that the Soviet 
Union constructed, invented, and celebrated ethnic identities where few had existed in a 
discernible form in Central Asia. It was also the first modern state to implement large-
scale affirmative action through the creation of enumerable, though mutually exclusive 
                                                 
18 A saying attributed to Uzbeks. 
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nationality categories (Martin 2001) thus conferring an objective and material salience 
upon them (Hirsch 1997). Soviet ideology of nationhood has transmitted to the successor 
states a set of "deeply structured and powerfully conflicting expectations of belonging" 
(Brubaker 1994: 56) by forging a natural or primordial connection of nation, language, 
and territory (Suny 1993; Slezkine 1994; Martin 2001). 
Similar to Brown's (2001, 2007) argument about Soviet spatial practices and their 
connections to labor and mobility I discussed in previous chapter, Brubaker (1994) 
argues:  
Nationality as an official component of personal status was introduced in 
1932 as one of a number of elements contained in the newly instituted 
system of internal passports. That system was central to the neofeudal ties 
that bound the coercively recruited labor force of the new collective farms 
to the land; more generally, it was central to the control and regulation of 
migration. But it was the passport system as such, not the legal nationality 
that was encoded in it along with much other information that was crucial 
for this purpose. Indeed the passport-based regulation and coercive control 
of labor supply and internal migration could have been effected just as 
easily without the encoding of nationality. The later uses of official 
nationality were unrelated to the original purposes for which internal 
passports were created. (54) 
However, as nationality became "an obligatory and mainly ascriptive legal 
category" (ibid.), it was recorded in all the documents that accompanied Soviet citizens 
though their lives, in internal passports, school records, job applications, and routine 
bureaucratic encounters, such as registering a car or getting a library card. (This practice 
continues largely unchanged in Kazakhstan.) The assumptions that underpinned the 
nationality categories carried with them distinct histories and hierarchies of cultural and 
moral evaluations that went far beyond mere ethnic categorization. These assumptions 
were not incidental to one's life chances in terms of opportunities for mobility, residency, 
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and relationships with the state. Such divisions in turn further reinforced the hierarchy of 
urban and rural, nomadic and sedentary forms of life, and Kazakh and Russian languages.  
Although this was not an official policy of the Soviet government, it was common 
for Kazakhs in Almaty to tell me that internal passport and residency registration 
(propiska) regulations were used to keep Kazakhs out of cities. Keeping the rural Kazakh 
population immobilized at the collective farms provided the state with cheap agricultural 
labor. As Pohl (2012) also argues: "It seems likely that there was relatively little flow of 
native population from the country to the town and that the growth of the urban 
population derived primarily from European immigrants" (217).  
Soviet Alma-Ata, as a Russian city and Kazakh national capital, embodied these 
tensions and contradictions. In 1936, only a few years after The Keeper in Dombrovsky's 
novel described it as a Cossack village, Alma-Ata became the capital of the Kazakh 
Autonomous Socialist Republic and was beginning to be transformed into a model Soviet 
city. By the end of the 1950s, Alma-Ata had a new city center, laid out in a strictly 
perpendicular grid, according to the plans developed by Leningrad architects, decorated 
with fountains, parks, and ornate Stalinist palaces. The pride of Alma-Ata, Medeo 
outdoor skating rink, was built in 1951 on the southern outskirts of the city, at 5,500 feet 
above sea level, making it the highest outdoor skating rink in the world. 
Like other Soviet Republican capitals, Alma-Ata became a cultural and 
educational as well administrative center of Kazakhstan. It had its own Kazakhstan 
branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Kazakh State University (KazGU), a Central 
State Library, an academic publishing press, and a Central State Museum (where the 
young Keeper came to work.) Cultural institutions that opened in Alma-Ata during the 
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1920-1940s included  Abai Opera and Ballet Theater (founded in 1936),  Kazakh 
National Conservatory (1944), the Kazakh Drama Theater (1926), the Russian Drama 
Theater (1933), and the Uighur  Music Theater which opened in 1934. These cultural and 
educational institutions recorded, produced, and disseminated specifically national 
histories, art, and folklore and contributed to creation of national consciousness among 
Soviet people (Bustanov 2013).  
The population of the capital, like many cities in Kazakhstan, was 
overwhelmingly Russian (over 80% of the population listed their ethnicity as Russian in 
1989) and Russophone space (and arguably still remains so). Visually and audibly, the 
Sovietness of the capital was embodied through Russianness. Soviet internationalism, for 
which Kazakhstan was praised, as the most multiethnic republic, was neither culturally 
neutral nor linguistically unmarked. It spoke Russian, went to the opera and the circus, 
and lived in a stationery house with furniture in it.   
Tamara-apa was one of the few Kazakhs from Mongolia who visited Kazakhstan 
during Soviet times. She was in Moscow in 1976 for a one year training course to be a 
Russian language teacher and went on a class trip to Alma-Ata. At the time, many 
Mongolian Kazakhs went to Russia, Ukraine, and other Soviet republics for education, 
but none of them went to Kazakhstan. The Soviet Union tried to minimize cross-border 
contacts and many people in Kazakhstan told me that they had no idea that millions of 
Kazakhs lived outside of the Soviet Union. Tamara-apa told me that she was struck by 
the fact that in Alma-Ata "there was not one single person who spoke Kazakh, not even 
in stores." 
I was walking down the street and I heard a man curse, he said bad words 
in Kazakh. I got so happy, [she laughed] because I heard Kazakh, even 
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though it was cursing. Kazakhs are small people, surrounded by Russians. 
This is the law of survival ["zakon vyzhivaniya," she said in Russian]. 
Almaty was a Russian city.  
 
 Such cultural, labor, and languages hierarchies became mapped onto the 
urban/rural divide. So, assumptions about Kazakhs from Mongolia already preceded their 
arrival: perceived as rural and Kazakh speaking they were also assumed to be 
uneducated, culturally backward, and unproductive. Gulnara Mendikulova was a scholar 
who I quoted in chapter one as an early supporter of Kazakh repatriation. However, when 
she started talking about her own research with Kazakh returnees, she talked about how 
upset she was when some people chided her for not speaking Kazakh. 
They don't know what it was like here. There was one Kazakh school in 
all of Alma-Ata. In 1987, the first Kazak kindergarten was open in Alma-
Ata and in a newspaper they wrote that [she quotes in a disdainful tone of 
voice, as if the report was making fun of it] “some people got together and 
made a big feast” [ustroili bolshoi pir]. When some Kazaks ask, “why you 
do not speak Kazak?” I get mad. You herded your sheep up in the 
mountains, what do you know about what it was like here. Here was a 
completely different situation. They should be grateful that we preserved 
our language and our culture at all. 
 
When I asked whether she thought that not knowing the Russian language was a 
problem for Mongolian Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, she replied: "Oralman all live in rural 
areas. What do they need Russian for at all? Everyone around them speaks Kazakh. What 
are they going to speak to their sheep in Russian?” ("Chto oni s baranami svoimi po 
russki budut govorit?")  
Northrop (2004) argues that "the USSR, like its tsarist predecessor, was a colonial 
empire. Power in the Soviet Union was expressed across lines of hierarchy and 
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differences were simultaneously geographic, ethnic, political, economic, and cultural. 
Soviet policies, categories, and priorities had the effect of treating colonial people 
differently because of their special status along all of these axes" (22). While scholars 
disagree whether the USSR could be considered a colonial empire, many Kazakhs drew 
comparisons between themselves and the situation of other colonized people in the world. 
In 2004 in Almaty, I was discussing the language situation in Kazakhstan with a Kazakh 
friend who had a PhD in English literature, was fluent in Russian, English, and Italian, 
but learned Kazakh only later in life. She quoted to me a passage from James Joyce's 
Ulysses:   
 -Do you understand what he says? Stephen asked her.  
-Is it French you are talking, sir? the old woman said to Haines.  
Haines spoke to her again a longer speech, confidently.  
-Irish, Buck Mulligan said. Is there Gaelic on you?  
-I thought it was Irish, she said, by the sound of it. Are you from the west, 
sir?  
-I am an Englishman, Haines answered.  
-He's English, Buck Mulligan said, and he thinks we ought to speak Irish 
in Ireland.  
-Sure we ought to, the old woman said, and I'm ashamed I don't speak the 
language myself. I'm told it's a grand language by them that knows. 
(Ulysses 1.424-434) 
 
She then told me that the proudest day of her life was when she bought Mukhtar 
Auezov's novel Abai's Path (Abai Zholy), famous for its beautiful use of the Kazak 
language, and was able to read it without using the Russian translation.  
Kirsch (2001) notes that "indigenous claims about "culture loss" pose a problem 
for contemporary definitions of culture as a process that continually undergoes change 
rather than something which can be damaged or lost" (169). Here, as he argues, "it is 
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possible to speak of loss in relation to the notion of kinship and belonging rather than 
possession" (ibid). The idea of profound cultural loss is often remarked upon by outside 
observers, such as other (post)Soviets, Central Asians and Westerners. (In literature, 
Kazakhs are often cited as "the most Russified of all Soviet nationalities" (see Dave 
2004). It echoes the long-standing tropes of emptiness and absence that I discussed 
earlier. Indeed, it seems that Kazakhstan is often described by what it is not, what it 
seems to lack, rather than what it is. For example:  Kazakhs are not "real Muslims," 
lacking the "devotion" or "fanaticism", as well as the religious knowledge, of its other 
Muslim neighbors. Discussions of short history of "islamization" among nomads and 
assertions that Kazakhs did not become Mulsim until the 18th or 19th century are often 
reiterated in scholarly literature, although this view has been completely rebuffed by 
some prominent Central Asian historians, such as DeWeese (1994, c.f. Khalid 2007). 
Moreover, others argue, Kazakhs are not really "Central Asian" and Kazakhstan itself is 
not part of Central Asia, either geographically or culturally. (In Soviet literature, the 
region was usually referred to as "Kazakhstan and Central Asia.") It is said to straddle 
Europe and Asia in a geographically "liminal" state of being: neither quite here nor there. 
For those in search of local "color," Kazakhstan does not look or feel like "Central Asia": 
it seems to lack "history," in a tangible, visual way. There are no architectural wonders of 
great Muslim cities, mosques, and mausoleums to draw tourists, like in Uzbekistan. 
Kazakhstani cities and towns present to a casual visitor a non-descript gray exterior of 
most provincial Soviet and Russian cities. Kazakh women, especially if one spends time 
in cities, mostly lack the colorful headscarves and recognizably "non-Western" clothing 
of Uzbek or Tajik women. Kazakh clothing, such coats (shapan), hats, dresses, and 
 90 
headscarves, usually appear at self-consciously "traditional" weddings and celebrations. 
So, in a heated discussion I once had with an American friend, who spent several years 
living in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, she emphatically stated that there is no such thing 
as "Kazakh culture": "Everyone says that in the south [of Kazakhstan] it is Uzbek culture, 
in the North it is Russian, but where is Kazakh?" 
 
"Asphalt Kazakhs": Cultural Russification and Language Loss 
I am not an "asphalt" Kazakh, I was born and grew up in an aul [village]... 
Since childhood I have known how to ride a horse. Because, our ancestors 
especially respected the horse. From the earliest years, our consciousness 
is stamped with the images of the wonderful horses, praised in the folk 
stories and legends about the famous heroes: Taiburyl of the warrior 
Khoblandy, Shalkuiruk of Er Tostik, Kulager of Akhan ser. I love this 
noble animal very much, but, unfortunately, do not have enough time for 
riding. And this love was instilled in me at the time by the adults, 
especially by my father. 
(President Nazarbayev in his memoir, In the Flow of History (V Potoke 
Istorii)). 
  
The expression "asphalt Kazakh" (asfal'tnyyi kazakh) is common among 
Kazakhstani Kazakhs and, like "kitchen Kazakh" (kuhonnyi kazahskii), which is used in 
reference to language, it anchors moral judgments about ethnic identity and cultural 
authenticity to particular material and spatial metaphors. The "asphalt" evokes not only 
the meaning of an urban Kazakh person, but one who is Russian-speaking and separated 
from his culturally authentic Kazakh roots in a village. In this context, President 
Nazarbayev's assertion that he is not an 'asphalt' Kazakh and his invocation of village 
roots, horses, and famous Kazakh heroes taps into a particular form of national 
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legitimation, promoting unbreakable bonds among language, people, and state as a deeply 
moral issue, to which all true Kazaks have to be committed (Brubaker 1994).  
Generally, in discussions concerning Kazakhs as a nation, language and culture 
are intimately connected: one cannot be Kazakh without speaking Kazakh. It is most 
often through the idiom of language loss that loss of culture is expressed and debates over 
cultural legitimacy and authenticity are often articulated as debates about language.  And 
like the expression "asphalt Kazakh," which connects the idea of particular kinds of 
persons with their material environment, the expression "kitchen Kazakh" spatially 
anchors the ideas and practices of language use within the circumscribed and highly 
gendered space of domesticity, family, and home.  
In Soviet Kazakhstan, sciences, technical professions, business, jurisprudence, 
were all taught almost exclusively in Russian, and if one wanted to participate in research 
and academic conversations, one had to write, publish, and debate in Russian. The two-
track language system in technical and academic higher institutions continued the 
institutionalized practices of separate but not equal that already began in schools. 
Linguistic stratification translated into hierarchies of labor, social prestige, and gender: 
the Agricultural Institute had Kazakh language instruction, so did the Women's 
Pedagogical Institute (Zhenskii pedagogicheskii institut), and there were Kazakh folklore 
and ethnography departments at the Academy of Sciences, but these were very specific 
exceptions. Many cities and regions with non-Kazakh majorities had no Kazakh language 
schools, but even when instruction in Kazakh was available, parents often decided to 
send their children to Russian schools. Russian schools were generally considered better 
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(in terms of teachers, resources, and instruction) and Russian literacy was important, as 
one could go only so far in Kazakh.  
In post-Soviet Kazakhstan, it is common to hear discussions of the Kazakh 
language as "artificially stunted" in its natural development by the spread of Russian. Not 
allowed to develop, it lacks "modern" vocabulary and concepts and is therefore 
impossible to use for business or science (see Dave 2007).  As in Irvine's (1989) analysis 
of connections between language use and political economy, Kazakh and Russian are an 
example of a linguistic situation in which symbolic capital in one sphere does not always 
translate into economic capital or higher socioeconomic status in others. Linguistic 
abilities are "part of the social division of labor itself, not simply indexing social 
diversity" (252). Many in Kazakhstan argue that such bilingual hierarchy continues in 
independent Kazakhstan and lack of Russian language skills is a problem for many return 
migrants and rural Kazakhs. 
In 2008, I had a discussion about the role of Kazakh and Russian languages with 
Esengul and her husband Bakha, both journalists at Kazakh language newspapers in 
Almaty, who moved to Kazakhstan from Mongolia in their early twenties. I asked them 
whether they thought that lack of Russian language skills is a problem for Mongolian 
Kazakhs in Kazakhstan. They corrected my blanket statement, pointing out that social 
and economic hierarchies are significant for evaluating the language situation. 
Esengul:  Well, certainly, the government is adapting to the Kazakh 
language. But you have to differentiate: the higher you look, the more 
Russian-speaking it is. The higher it is, the more Russian-speakers there 
are in the government. For prestigious, higher-paying jobs or for higher 
government position, one has to be fluent in Russian. The top of the power 
is still Russian-speaking. So, you have to differentiate: top, middle, low. 
The higher you get, the bigger the problem. For me, as a journalist, it is 
also a problem, because I have to interview people in both Kazakh and 
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Russian, even though I work at a Kazakh language newspaper. And, even 
though I can do an interview in Russian, I am not fluent.  
 
Bakha: I think, if a person is educated, literate, smart, that person would 
manage to get along. Everywhere you go now, to government offices, for 
jobs, there are Kazakh speakers. I cannot say that the language problem 
does not exist, but it has to be differentiated by social status. The main 
problem is that there is no established language policy. One second, the 
government is promoting English, then Russian, then Kazakh. But there is 
no language discrimination. If you look, there are signs and 
advertisements in Turkish, and in Chinese, and any other language. The 
most important thing that needs to be done is to lift the Kazakh language. 
The interethnic language must be Kazakh. Russian has already lived out 
its days. In Mongolia, we learned Russian as the only foreign language, 
we watched television in Russian, although we did not really understand 
it. Now, they learn Russian in school as one of the foreign languages. The 
problem is that Kazakhstan and the Kazakh language were not allowed to 
develop along a natural path. This underdevelopment is artificial (Rus. 
Isskustvennyi). 
 
Esengul: But at the top, everybody speaks Russian and after them 
everybody speaks like that. When the Kazakh language will be 
normalized, I don't know.  
 
As Bakha points out, language policies of the Kazakhstani government have been 
inconsistent and ambiguous. In 1991, both Kazakh and Russian were proclaimed to be 
"the state languages of Kazakhstan" in the initial version of the Constitution. This was 
met with a lot of protest and heated debates about the status of Kazakh and Russian 
languages continued (Dave 2004). In 1997, after several changes to the Constitution and 
much heated parliamentary debate, Kazakh was officially proclaimed a "state language" 
and Russian as the "official language on a level with a state language" and the officially 
designated "language of interethnic communication" (iazyk mezhetnicheskogo 
obscheniia). The wording of the 1997 Language Law reflects the kind of careful balance 
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that came to characterize President Nazarbayev's rule, his mantra of stability and 
interethnic accord. The law states that "the state language of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
is the Kazakh language" and then refers to it as "the state language," avoiding the use of 
"Kazakh language." Differences in the Russian and Kazakh language versions of the law, 
although seemingly innocuous are also telling. In Kazakh, the title of the law reads 
"Concerning Language in the Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan Respublikasyndagy 
Til Turaly), where til is (technically) grammatically singular. However, the Russian 
version of the title reads "Concerning Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan" (O 
Iazykah v Respublike Kazakhstan), the Russian "iazyki" (languages) being definitely 
plural. The Language Law defines what is meant by "the state language," listing its 
specific functions and its intended reach, socially and spatially: it is the language of "state 
management, legislation, legal proceedings, and office management, functioning in all 
spheres of social relations on the entire territory of the state." It is specifically in such 
spheres as government and business that the Kazakh language has been seen as most 
absent or most deficient. 
As Deiner (2009) argues, it is important to consider that the law "On Migration of 
Population" was also adopted in 1997, drawn up at the same time that the law "On 
Languages" was under consideration in the Kazakhstani parliament. The law "On 
Migration of Population" was the first draft law to be formulated and written in the 
Kazakh language, rather than originally written in Russian and then translated into 
Kazakh, as was the case with other government legislation. Deiner argues that "the 
authors of the law were purported to be those seeking to prove that the Kazakh language 
is suitable for legal purposes, and the migration of diasporic Kazakhs provided a perfect 
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issue through which this case could be made" (336). The migration legislation concerning 
oralman was drawn up against a background of heated discussion pertaining to national 
language policy, the role of Kazakh and Russian languages in the construction of 
Kazakhstani state. The almost complete absence in these discussions of the voices of 
return migrants themselves leads Deiner to argue that they "serve as pawns in 
competition to control the nature of nationalization within Kazakhstan" (ibid).  
Continuing use of Russian language in Kazakhstan is "the public secret that most 
everyone knows but none dare speak, … which keeps the leaky ship of State afloat" 
(Taussig 1992:65). Thus, the Language Law legislates that all public signs (including 
shop signs) have to be in both Russian and Kazakh. The law attempts to regulate the 
visual details, stipulating the placement and size of the respective letters: "All texts of 
visual information shall be placed in the following order: from the left or the top - in the 
state language, from the right or the bottom - in the Russian language and shall be written 
in the letters of equal size." However, the law cannot regulate the fact that, in Almaty, 
many public signs in Kazakh range from slightly awkward linguistic constructions to 
either ungrammatical or incomprehensible and often both. Very often the source of 
confusion is that something is a calque from Russian and makes no sense in Kazakh.  
In April 2007, I was driving through the city with Omirzhan-agha and his son 
Akhberen, 9 years old at the time, who entertained himself by reading aloud every sign 
and billboard we passed. Akhberen read aloud, "paterler astynda kilt," as we passed by an 
advertisement banner hung over a major intersection, and Omirzhan-agha finally laughed 
out loud and told him to stop reading the signs or he will "spoil" his Kazakh. Maybe, he 
said reprovingly to his son, those shala Kazakhs understand this, but we cannot 
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understand what it means. This makes no sense in Kazakh, he said to me, as translated 
literally it said "apartments under key." It took me a minute to realize that this indeed 
meaningless in Kazakh construction was a calque from the Russian "kvartiri pod kluch," 
meaning finished apartments, ready to be moved in. My knowledge of Russian certainly 
helped to eventually get the meaning of the sign, but it was not automatic. "Pod kluch" 
would have been an expression local Kazakhs would have left in Russian, even if the 
conversation was in Kazakh. This sign, just like business documents and government 
laws, routinely written in Russian and then translated into Kazakh, did not aim at 
linguistic transparency, but was there to fulfil the law and everyone knew it.  
The "Human Flood":  Rural-urban Migration 
When Mongolian Kazakhs I spoke with talked about their experiences in 
Kazakhstan, many told me that their secondary migration within Kazakhstan, after their 
labor contracts have ended, was as significant, or in some ways even more so, then the 
initial immigration from Mongolia. While many people left close friends and family 
behind in Mongolia, the first years of repatriation involved mostly mass migrations of 
extended families and even whole villages. As most people signed collective labor 
agreements, they were often able to stay together, living compactly and working at 
collective farms.  However, for the majority of those who came in 1990-1992, the five-
year labor contracts ended in 1995-96, which also coincided with the final dissolution of 
the remaining collective farms and the beginning of the privatization process in 
Kazakhstan. By that time, most collective farms and state industrial enterprises were 
already bankrupt or on the verge of collapse. Mongolian Kazakhs and other return 
migrants faced additional problems. As land, housing, and farm property were being 
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privatized, Kazakhs from Mongolia, most of whom were employed at the collective 
farms in the Northeast, lost not only their jobs but also housing and land that was 
provided to them by their labor contracts. As a temporary labor force, they were not 
Kazakhstani citizens. Therefore, according to law, they could not buy, sell, or own land, 
did not have any rights in receiving anything that was distributed in privatization, and 
could not privatize their land or the houses they have been living in. Moreover, 
throughout the 1990s, most Mongolian Kazakhs continued to linger in a bureaucratic 
limbo, while their applications for Kazakhstani citizenship were taking years to process.  
Over 90% of Mongolian Kazakh returnees did not receive Kazakhstani citizenship until 
2000, ten years after the repatriation began.  
Thus, due to the breakup of collective farms and their privatization in 1996, as 
well as the end of the 5-year labor agreements, many Mongolian Kazakhs (more than 
10,000 by some accounts) went back to Mongolia. A few years later, by 2000, as the 
economy in Kazakhstan improved, many of the same people came back to Kazakhstan 
again, in a process that was developing into a pattern of cross-border migration, 
challenging the nation-state framework of permanent diasporic repatriation. 
For those who stayed in Kazakhstan (about 55,000-60,000 Mongolian Kazakhs), 
the Law on Migration was finally passed in 1997 and migration quotas were established 
for those who qualified as oralman. As part of the quota system, assistance was offered to 
those who settled in the areas designated by the government, including housing 
assistance. Most of the quotas, like the labor contracts before, went to the Northern and 
Eastern regions. Many Mongolian Kazakhs chose to opt out of the quota system rather 
than live there. Like other people in Kazakhstan, of all nationalities, they migrated further 
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south and to the urban center of Almaty, closer to opportunities for jobs and better 
education. If they left their initial places of settlement, they lost all the benefits and 
housing they might have had and were in the same position as any other rural migrants, 
or in many cases even worse, because they did not have citizenship. As waves of 
migration "flooded" the city, it was becoming more difficult to distinguish, legally and 
practically, "oralman" from other rural Kazakh speaking migrants and from Uzbek labor 
migrants (gasterbeistery) from across the border. While Kazakhs from Mongolia were the 
largest group of repatriates in the beginning of migration, the vast majority of oralmandar 
(over 80%) now come from Uzbekistan. Like the labor migrants who come to 
Kazakhstan from Uzbekistan, most oralmandar prefer to rely on networks of relatives 
already established in Kazakhstan, rather than take advantage of available repatriation 
quotas. Neither were particularly eager to register with the state, as the hassle and 
potential risks outweigh the benefits the state might provide.  
Svetlana, the government official who waxed nostalgic about the orderliness of 
Soviet time, described the beginning of mass migration from rural areas to towns and 
cities in the early 1990s.  
That really was a wave of movement. Before it was not like that. Before, 
such things have not been noticed. Before, life was so settled. If moved to 
Gorniy [village], then he lives there for years. And then, as this unclear 
situation started, everything began to stir. I think, if it was possible to look 
down from space like this, everything must have moved like this: like this, 
like this, like this [she moved her hand and arm in wavelike motion]. 
Everybody was running somewhere, everybody was going somewhere: 
from there to here, from here to there, and like this endlessly. 
 
Migration of rural Kazakhs to Almaty already began in the 1980s, and in the early 
'90s coincided with outmigration of many non-Kazakhs. It is estimated that in 1991-1996, 
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more than 25% of the population was involved in migration within Kazakhstan and 
abroad. These migrants, like most of Kazakhstan's countryside were Kazakh and Kazakh 
speaking. In 2010, the Almaty city administration estimated that, while the city has 
approximately one and half million officially registered inhabitants, an additional million 
people live in the city unregistered.  
Most of the million unregistered and therefore "illegal" Almaty inhabitants live in 
migrant settlements that grew on the outskirts of Almaty in the 1990s. At first, the city 
government did not care much about rural migrants settling on what was then useless 
land, unfit for construction, built in the area of dangerous mudslides. Many people there 
lived in a state of daily anxiety. As one woman in the Duman neighborhood told me, at 
night, she put her three children to sleep right by the door. Even though it was cold and 
drafty by the door, she thought they had more chance to make it out if there was a 
mudslide or an earthquake and the house collapsed. Building in these dangerous mudslide 
zones, without any building code, was the main justification put out by the government 
for not allowing to legalize the houses there and for beginning to dismantle some of the 
settlements in 2006-2007 (see Yessenova 2010). I was repeatedly told by government 
officials that return migrants did not live in these neighborhoods, but that was untrue. 
Like other migrants, many lacked papers and the necessary residency registration, again 
blurring the line between inner migration from the country side and external labor and 
return migration. As Reeves (2013:522) argues, "foregrounding migrant (il)legality as a 
space of relations rather than an unambiguous line is helpful for thinking beyond the 
dichotomies through which migrant residence is typically analyzed: legal versus illegal, 
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documented versus undocumented, authorized versus unauthorized, regular versus 
irregular.”  
Besides neighborhoods newly built on the empty land at the city's edges, many 
rural and return migrants now live in what were formerly suburban dachas, the summer 
cottages of Soviet urban dwellers who went there on weekends and summer vacations to 
enjoy a small plot of land and a garden. Dachas were not meant to be permanent 
dwellings and they often lacked insulation for the winter, and, unlike city apartments, 
most had no indoor plumbing, heat, or gas. The dachas are now filled by people who live 
there all year round. The houses still continue to lack running water and gas; they are 
heated by coal, adding to the city pollution, electricity is illegally "pulled" from the 
power lines and water is hauled from street pumps. Dachas present additional problems 
that again blur the legal/illegal divide: living at the dacha, one cannot officially register as 
city resident, as dachas are not considered permanent shelter. As officially dacha 
residents have no permanent place of dwelling, this causes difficulties in receiving 
government services, registering children for school and finding legal employment.  
"We are like a diaspora in our own land"  
I am writing to you on behalf of the residents of Taskala-2 village, the 
oralman. We moved to Atyrau in 2005 on a migration quota. We have 
built houses and for more than two years already we live like on a desert 
island: we have neither light, nor gas, nor water, even though all the 
highway roads pass nearby. More than once we have written to the 
administration of the village and the region. They reply to us that the 
treasury does not have the means. But is it really such a big problem for an 
oil capital? Or do the authorities spit on the problems of ordinary 
people.[sic] If even for a minute they would give a thought as to how 
families with small children and the elderly who need special care survive 
a cold winter. Such indifference to big problems of little people is for us 
painful and humiliating.  
(Kamshat Aliyeva, letter to the Atyrau city newspaper, August 2, 2007.) 
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For many locals in the Almaty region, including the government officials, the 
returnees were the most obvious culprits of the land shortage problems, perceived as 
having an unfair advantage in the distribution of limited resources. Land problems are 
most often blamed on secondary migration of returnees from places of their initial 
settlement, usually in the northern regions of the country, where the population is low and 
land is not perceived to be scarce. Even when, in my conversations with government 
officials, I attempted to point out that the number of returnees is dwarfed by the massive 
rural-urban migration of Kazakhstani Kazakhs, they continued to ignore the issue of 
internal migration and put the blame squarely on the returnees. Svetlana echoed the 
frustrations I heard from many other officials when she explained: "There are too many 
of them.  There is a lot of empty land in Atyrau, Kokchetau, Kostanai [northern regions], 
but they all want closer to Almaty. They say 'the weather is bad there'. So they all want to 
live here and there is no space, no land here".  
Moreover, for the government officials the issue of land was not only a question 
of distribution. Considering how contentious the land question has been, the fear of the 
possibilities of social tensions and political conflict also made it part of the local 
government's concern to control and limit, rather than welcome, return migration. As 
Svetlana continued to explain: "Now, it is mostly oralman who receive land. And now, 
because of this, the locals also have woken up (prosnulis). They also go to akimat asking 
for land. Before, they didn't think of asking, lived with big families in small saman 
houses. And now, they are also going and asking for land". 
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Rather than seeing land as scarce resource and as an object of contention, 
Mongolian Kazakhs perceive the land as a piece of ancestral homeland, imbued with 
great symbolic as well as material value. The symbolic and material value of land (zher) 
is inextricably intertwined and having a piece of land on which to put a house is an act of 
tangible reclamation of ancestral homeland. Like many other migrants struggling to find 
a place to live close to the city, Saghat-agha lived in a 2 room temporary lean-on 
(vremianka), with 11 other members of his household, including his three grown sons and 
their wives and children. In a common arrangement, they were able to live there in 
exchange for "watching" the land for the owner who lived in the city. Having no official 
contract or legal agreement, and, perhaps even more importantly, no close social 
connection with the landlord, they were in a state of daily anxiety. As Saghat-agha put it: 
"if we see the landlord on the road, we are thinking: is he coming to ask for money, or is 
he going to ask us to vacate the house?" While many rural migrants in Kazakhstan also 
experience similar hardships, Saghat-agha, as other returnees, used the language of return 
and ancestral homeland to hold the government responsible for the failure of its own 
promises to them: "Here we came to build a house on a little piece of land which was left 
by our ancestors, but they demand a propiska (registration) from us." Being without land, 
or without a place (as zher can be understood as both in Kazakh) is described as both a 
terrible material hardship and a pitiful state of being: "So, our children are seen 
wandering here and there in the land (zherde telim-telim bop zhur) begging anyone they 
see for a registration and a job." In my conversation with Esengul and Bakha, who I 
quoted earlier in the chapter in the discussion of language ideologies and practices in 
Kazakhstan, they repeated a sentiment that I heard from other return migrants and which 
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turns the nation-building logic of Kazakh repatriation on its head: "we are like a diaspora 
in our own land."  
Esengul: Oralman now in Kazakstan are like the fourth zhuz. Oralman are 
a social stratum (sozialnaia prosloika).  For example, to be an elected 
representative, one has to live in Kazakstan for ten years, so the oralman 
cannot be represented in government. This is an infringement of rights. In 
the new changes to the Constitution, the Assembly of Peoples gets nine 
representatives in parliament, one for each nationality. This is 
discrimination, infringement on the rights of oralman. Oralman should 
also get one [representative] then. These nationalities already adapted as 
Kazakhstanis, but not oralman. Adaptation is a long-term process. It will 
take not ten, not even fifty years for oralman to adapt. But the national 
policies of the state do not integrate the nationalities but, on the contrary, 
divide them. We are like a diaspora in our own country.  
 
Shamalghan and Uzynaghash: Living Together and Apart 
 As Almaty is a symbol of Kazakhstan's Russification, Shamalghan and 
Uzynaghash represent the "multiethnic" nature of Kazakhstan and its Soviet legacy. 
Soviet descriptions of Kazakhstan celebrated the republic as a success in the 
"multinationalist" (mnogonatsional'nyi) and "internationalist" (internatsional'nyi) 
socialism building project. Kazakhstan was described as "land of a hundred peoples" 
(zemlia sta narodov); "planet of a hundred languages" (planeta sta iazykov), and 
"laboratory of the friendship of peoples." 
The towns and villages surrounding the city of Almaty are known to be very 
"mixed" ethnically. This is due, people explained to me, to the presence of many 
"repressed" groups living there: Germans, Chechens, Turks, Kurds, Koreans, Assyrians, 
and others. Even before I went to live in the village of Shamalghan, people in Almaty 
told me what a unique place it was. My Kazakh teacher got excited when I told her I am 
moving there to live with a Mongolian Kazakh family. She told me that it is a very 
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interesting place and has been, in her words, "a very interesting and unusual place" since 
Soviet times. It has always been known and famous for a number of "repressed people" 
(repressirovannye narody) that lived there:  Germans, Chechens, Turks, Tatars, and 
Kurds. She said that it has always been known for being ethnically mixed and "everyone 
who lives there speaks Kazakh and respects Kazakhs very much. Other people agreed 
that the district was very "multinational" but also mentioned that it was notorious for 
interethnic altercations, especially between Chechens and Kazakhs.  
In the neighboring town of Uzynaghash, where I conducted fieldwork in 2008-
2009, many small businesses were owned by oralmandar from Mongolia, China, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkey. Mongolian Kazakhs set up a canteen inside the bazaar, catering 
to the Mongolian Kazakhs selling furniture there by serving fried meat paties, 
"hoovshuur," a specifically Mongolian dish. Chinese cafes served yughur and Western 
Chinese dishes, noodles, and spicy meats. All of these served vodka. Chinese Kazakhs 
dominated the barbershop business and there were four of them, right next to each other, 
inside the enclosed part of the bazaar. Mongolian Kazakhs had their own section of the 
bazaar, surrounded by a metal fence, where they sold furniture, home-made and imported 
from China.  
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Figure 10: Business signs in Uzynaghash. Photographs by the author. 
 
In Shamalghan, ethnic boundaries were as often casually dismissed as they were 
subtly upheld. Ethnic stereotypes, expressed often jokingly, sometimes quite seriously, 
abounded, but were easily put aside for those one knew personally: "My brother-in-law is 
Russian, but he is alright, he doesn't drink." I felt that the seeming casualness and 
frequent crassness of ethnic talk and joking actually concealed a potential minefield, 
around which those who knew it stepped quite carefully, in their own post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan version of political correctness. It was only I who did not understand the 
unspoken rules, as implicit assumptions were brought to light only when breached. This 
is how our elderly neighbor, Baba Masha [Grandma Masha], described her trip to the post 
office to me one morning, as we chatted across the fence: 
I had to pay a phone bill and it is far to walk to the center, so there is a 
Turkish woman (Turchanka) that lives nearby. She was getting in her car 
and I asked her where she was going and she said to Kaskelen. So I asked 
her to take me to the post office. So she drove me to the post office. I paid 
my bills and then I bought a few things for myself, medicine and other 
stuff, and I was walking back. Then I saw an acquaintance Turkish woman 
(znakomuy turchanku). She took my bag from me.- Baba Masha, let me 
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walk you to Mira [street] - she said. - Well, if you are going to walk me to 
Mira, you should walk me all the way home- I say to her and laugh. She 
walked me to Mira and she stopped in a shop. And there, a Kazakh girl 
(devushka Kazashka) said, -  Let me help you babushka (grandma)- and 
took my bag. And then by the next shop, another Kazakh girl (esche 
devushka Kazashka) also helped me and carried my bags all the way to my 
house. That's how I got home. (She laughed)  
 
People also self-identified themselves in ethnic terms. There was another 
neighbor who lived across the street, a hefty woman, always flashing a mouth full of gold 
teeth at me in a big smile. I therefore introduced myself and told her I was from the US 
and the woman looked very interested. "Oh, from the US" she said.  "So, are there people 
like us in America?" I didn't understand what she meant by the question, so I paused with 
my answer. "Are there Turks[Turki] in America?" she asked. "Well, yes" I said.  "Many 
different people live in America." "Many Turks?"  "I think so, yes. At least in New York 
there are a lot." When I came to her house for tea a couple of days later, a pop group from 
Turkey was playing on their stereo and the house was decorated with Turkish made 
carpets, coffee accessories, and posters of Turkish music stars and soap opera actresses. 
I got used to people casually speaking Kazakh around me, assuming that I did not 
understand them, because of the way I looked like an akh kulak (literally "white ear," a 
term for "Russians" and "Europeans" in general). Among many uncomfortable 
encounters, I especially recall a mundane bus ride on the outskirts of Almaty, which 
turned quite tense when an elderly passenger began to berate the bus driver for calling out 
street names in Russian rather than Kazakh. He then spent the next 20 minutes loudly 
talking in Kazakh about Russians who do not want to learn Kazakh, staring pointedly at 
the only European-looking face on the bus, mine, while all the other riders looked very 
uncomfortable and clearly tried to avoid staring at me. It seems that public and 
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anonymous urban spaces, such as buses, bazaars, and shops, were especially prone to 
bringing out some of the underlying tensions not usually expressed.  
Another kind of public performance of ethnicity happened during public 
celebrations, organized by state and local government for national holidays, such as 
Independence Day and Nauryz (Central Asian New Year celebrated in spring.) When I 
lived in Shamalghan in 2007, I attended a Nauryz celebration in the town of Kaskelen, 
the district center. There, like in almost identical looking Nauryz celebration in Almaty, 
the holiday was also a stage for the enactment of the Soviet-style friendship of peoples. 
Except for Kazakhs, each nationality represented in the district had their own booths 
lined around the square. Each booth bore the name of a particular ethnic group -Russian, 
Ukrainians, Uzbek, Kurds, Kabardino-Balkhars, etc., and people in "national" clothes 
served the "national" food of each group (Ukranians had borsch, Uzbeks served plov, 
Yughurs had dumplings).    
As much as this kind of public performance reiterated Soviet "national in form" 
multiethnic celebrations, it was also an enactment of ethno-national and social 
hierarchies. Kazakhs were not included in the peripheral circle of ethnic minority booths, 
but had rows of tables set at the center of the square, serving baursaq (fried bread) and 
Nauryz kozhe (a kind of gruel made especially for Nauryz). Next to them, were three 
large yurts with rich dastarkhans (lit. tablecloth, spread of food, feast) for the government 
officials. Besides food, there were performances from each of the groups: dancing Uzbek 
girls with tiny tea saucers on their heads, a choir of Russian women accompanied by an 
accordion, Kurds doing a sword dance. All these performances were also taking place on 
the side, as the main stage, faced by rows of chairs, had performances of Kazakh music 
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and then an aitus (Kazakh improvisational poetry competition). The mood was festive, 
people wandered around to different booths, tasting food, and enthusiastically clapping 
for all the performances. This was a holiday of inclusion, a celebration of safe difference 
through food, music, clothes, and dancing children. So, this made the exclusion of certain 
people all the more glaring. While smiling women in the booths loudly called on the 
passers-by to taste their food, Lyuli women (mostly called tsyganne (gypsies) by the 
locals) got only an exasperated "ket" (go away) when they tried to join in the sharing of 
food.  
In discussing similar public celebrations in Uzbekistan, Adams (2010) presents 
such celebrations as mass spectacles of state nation-building ideology, reproducing old 
Soviet forms for a passive audience. Although such celebrations might look stereotypical 
in form and tightly managed by government officials, in the process, they also become 
negotiations of local hierarchies and national ideologies which do not always reinforce 
the idea of the state and nation-building.  
As I personally experienced while living in Shamalghan, more than public 
displays of ethnic identification, it was often the everyday experiences of living together 
that evoked the ideas and practices of group identification and ethnic inclusion and 
exclusion. In April 2008, while spending a weekend in Almaty, I received a phone call 
telling me that Omirzhan-agha and Nara-apke (my Mongolian Kazakh host family in 
Shamalghan) have been in a really bad car accident, crashing into a minibus full of 
people, and have been rushed to the local hospital.  First, in panic, I ran to the wrong 
hospital, but finally found my way to the right district hospital with the help of a 
policeman and a couple he flagged on the road, who went out of their way to give me a 
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lift in the back of their milk truck. When I got there, there were dozens of injured people 
lying in the hallway, on the floor, on stretchers, and on gurneys, while doctors and nurses 
ran in and out of intensive care rooms, too busy to pause to answer my questions. I 
frantically ran around, slipping on puddles of blood, unable to find Omirzhan or Nara, 
calling their names, sounding increasingly hysterical. A "Russian" woman who was 
sitting on one of the chairs in the hallway noticed my distress and asked me who I was 
looking for. Stopping in my frantic search, hoping she might be able to help, I told her 
that I am looking for my friends (druz'ia) who were brought to the hospital in one of the 
ambulances. "Oi", she said sympathetically, then leaned over and patted my arm: "There 
were no Russians, only Kazakhs" (Russkih nikogo ne bilo, tolko Kazahi). Even in that 
state of utter shock, her quiet remark struck me still for a moment. Somehow, her 
unspoken assumptions that my "friends" would not be among the "Kazakhs" brought in 
from the site of the accident stuck with me as the clearest memory of that day.  
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Chapter Four 
Local entanglements: genealogy, history, and politics 
Elim-ai/ Oh, My People  
The first time I met Kazakh returnees from other countries was during my first 
visit to Almaty in the summer of 2004, before I began my dissertation fieldwork in 2006. 
Through a confluence of odd events involving various people in Ann Arbor, London, and 
Almaty, I ended up with a Kazakh research assistant, conducting household surveys in 
one of the migrant settlements on the outskirts of Almaty. At that time, Duman  
(festivity) was an illegal migrant settlement, officially not part of the city administration 
or infrastructure. Even though Duman was one of the oldest and largest migrant 
neighborhoods, dating back to the perestroika years of the late 1980s, the people who 
lived there, in the eyes of the city officials, were illegal squatters. The settlement began 
when the first waves of rural migrants came to Almaty and started to build homes on 
what at the time was empty land outside the city limits. As the number of people began to 
grow rapidly, some young komsomol (Communist Youth League) members from the city 
became involved in helping to organize a self-governing council, as well as carpentry and 
brickmaking workshops that operated as member cooperatives. At the time, they also 
helped to secure tacit recognition from the city government. Duman was never legally 
recognized and people were not able to claim legal ownership of the houses they built 
and the land on which they lived. However, as that land was worthless in the 1990s, the 
 111 
city administration simply kept their eyes closed and as government officials changed, 
Duman continued to grow.    
However, by 2004, this situation changed considerably. The housing boom in 
Almaty made previously worthless land into coveted real estate and government officials 
were no longer willing to ignore the people they now pronounced "illegal squatters."  By 
this time, there were multiple unrecognized migrant settlements on the outskirts of 
Almaty and the city government began to threaten evictions and destruction of "illegal" 
homes. So, when my research assistant Saule and I went to Duman to collect our survey 
data on rural-urban migration, this was an especially bad time to be barging into people's 
homes at inappropriate times, breaking just about every rule of Kazakh politeness and 
hospitality, and asking rudely direct questions about their families, homes, and lives. Our 
notebooks and survey forms immediately made people suspicious and my "Russian" face, 
unremarkable on the streets of Almaty, immediately stood out among overwhelmingly 
Kazakh inhabitants of Duman. We looked and acted like government employees or 
journalists and neither were particularly welcome in Duman at the time. People who lived 
there could not register as legal residents of Almaty and did not own deeds for their 
homes and land plots, so attention from the state was unwelcome. Journalists were also 
met with suspicion and, occasionally, thinly veiled hostility. As tensions with city 
government and rumors of unrest in Duman and other neighborhoods grew, there was 
increased attention and visits from newspaper journalists and television crews. Many 
people seemed to resent the attention, because local media tended to have very negative 
coverage of the "migration problem," describing neighborhoods like Duman as "Kazakh 
Bidonville" and "ghettos" (see Lobanov 2006).  Even sympathetic accounts of rural 
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migrants and their situation focused exclusively on the negative aspects, describing 
poverty and unemployment, lack of infrastructure, poor construction, crowded 
conditions, and precarious illegality.   
  Nevertheless, even in this situation, Kazakh ideas of proper hospitality did not 
allow most people to simply turn suspicious-looking strangers like us away from their 
door. With very few exceptions, most people we met in Duman over those two weeks, 
invited us in, seated us at the table, and served us tea before starting any conversation 
about who we were and what we were doing in their homes. Most people we talked to in 
Duman had moved to the city from other rural areas and told us stories of leaving villages 
and small towns all over Kazakhstan in search of job opportunities, better schools for 
their children, or medical care for elderly parents. Many people also came from areas 
around the Aral Sea in Western Kazakhstan, where land and water are so polluted, they 
had been forced to leave in order to escape an environmental disaster. More surprisingly 
for me at the time, I also met people who told me they moved to Kazakhstan from other 
countries. Most Kazakh repatriates I spoke to were from the neighboring countries of the 
former Soviet Union, mostly Uzbekistan, while others came from China, Mongolia, and 
as far away as Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan.  
During that first summer in Almaty, there was one encounter that I especially 
remembered. It was during one of our routine household visits, trying to collect 
information for the survey. This particular visit was with an elderly woman—an apa—
grandmother, as she would be respectfully called in Kazakh. She told us that she moved 
to Kazakhstan from China just a few months earlier, as she put it, "to die in the land of 
her ancestors." We sat around the table, sipping tea and eating bread, and at first, she 
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seemed quiet and understandably suspicious of us. As she started to tell us about her life, 
apa grew more animated and she spoke about her mother. Her mother was born in 
Kazakhstan and in the 1920's fled with her family across the border to Chinese Xinjiang, 
like hundreds of thousands of other Kazakh nomads who were escaping famine, violence, 
expropriation of livestock, and the forced sedentarization campaigns of the Soviet 
government. As political unrest began to grow in Xinjiang as well, some Kazakhs later 
migrated further north to Mongolia, while others trekked south, crossing the Hindu Kush 
on foot and settling for a time in Pakistan and Kashmir.42  
Apa told us that she herself was born in China, but her mother told many stories 
about her land of birth. Growingly visibly emotional, the woman recalled how as a little 
girl, she would listen to her mother's stories, her homesick descriptions of the great 
Kazakh steppe, the green grass, and the sharp smell of jusai – an aromatic wild onion that 
grows in the Altai region. Starting to cry, apa sang us a song, which, she said, her mother 
sang often to her when she was a little girl – "Elim-ai" ("Oh, My People!"). Widely 
known and loved among Kazakhs in Kazakhstan and abroad, this song of lament, 
popularly attributed to a legendary Kazakh epic singer, Kozhabergen zhyrau, describes 
the hardships of the Jungar wars in the 18th century and is said to have been passed down 
for 300 years. 
From the top of the Karatau mountains the migrating auls43 are descending  
and a baby camel who lost his mother walks alone.  
So hard is the loss of his close kin  
as pure tears drop from the black eyes.  
 
                                                 
42 An article, describing the migration of Kazakhs from Xinjiang across the Hindu Kush was published in 
National Geographic in 1954 with the title "How the Kazakhs fled to Freedom" by American journalist 
Milton J. Clark. See also Lias 1956, Benson and Svanberg 1988, Jacobs 2010.  
43 Aul is a nomadic encampment usually consisting of several related families.   
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Elim-ai Elim-ai 
 
What times are these?  
Times of difficult trials for the people  
and the loss of past happiness and wealth.  
The flight of all the people raises a cloud of dust  
stronger than the winter snowstorm.  
 
Elim-ai Elim-ai 
 
What time is this?  
Is it the time of lawlessness and panic?  
Will the happy past ever come back?  
Kin and homeland are left behind.  
Longing for them, a sea of tears pours from my eyes.44 
Apa went on to say that her mother never forgot about her homeland, never 
stopped missing it, longing for it. And her mother now many years dead and herself an 
old woman, she came here for what her mother told her about the land of her ancestors: 
the wide open steppe, the pure land, the blue sky of her homeland. As she was saying 
this, apa actually pointed out of the little low window set in the thick clay wall of her one 
room house. As my eyes followed her finger, all I could see were the tips of the Alatau 
mountains in the distance, as usual, barely visible through a black choking soot of 
Almaty's notoriously thick cloud of pollution. (In 2007, Almaty made it on the list of the 
world's 25 dirtiest cities, ranking 9th, right below Mumbai and Baghdad.)    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Excerpt from the Kazakh version of Elim-ai cited by Ilyas Esenberlin (1986) in his historical novel 
Zhantalas (Despair). A very similar version of the song is quoted in Russian translation by Tynyshpayev 
(1992).   
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Figure 11: View of Almaty.  
 
It seemed that nothing at that moment could be further from the images conjured 
by apa so vividly from her mother's recollection of the altyn besik (golden cradle) of her 
birth. The ancestral pasturelands of her Naiman ru (clan/lineage) were actually located 
500 miles to the north from where we sat, in a country called Kazakhstan, which did not 
exist at the time her mother left for China. Apa herself returned to the ancestral homeland 
she never knew and was living in an illegal migrant settlement which, although it was 
home to thousands of people, did not exist on any official city map and where, as one city 
official told us with a sigh, "the state does not reach."  
This chapter, like the one before it, focuses on one specific place in Kazakhstan, 
outside the city of Almaty, the Shaprashty heartland. However, while, the previous 
chapter focused on Soviet ideas and practices of nationality and history and notions of 
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language and culture, in this chapter, I highlight that ideas of identity and history did not 
appear in a cultural and historical vacuum during Soviet times and neither did they leave 
a cultural and moral vacuum behind them with the end of the Soviet Union. For many 
Kazakhs, rediscovering their genealogical roots, pre-Soviet histories, and ancestors 
allowed for articulations of identification and belonging to the Kazakh nation that 
simultaneously embraced and questioned the heritage of Russian colonialism and Soviet 
nationality policies. Mongolian Kazakh returnees, as well as those from other countries, 
are an integral part of and participants in these engagements with history and genealogy 
and of how Kazakhs more broadly perceive themselves and their histories.  
What I examine in this chapter is the importance of genealogical histories, the 
expressed connections to place and ancestors as experienced and narrated by persons, 
who like apa, face the tensions of both belonging to the nation and being excluded from 
it.  My argument hinges on the political importance of this tension, as the very idea of a 
Kazakh nation and its connection to a Kazakh state are both recreated and subverted 
through the forms of genealogical belonging expressed in these tensions.  I highlight the 
role of ancestral histories, local genealogies, and attachments to place in practices of 
national identification and local politics in Kazakhstan.  I move beyond the nation-state’s 
criteria for citizenship to show how on the local level people negotiate their perception of 
who is Kazakh and who is oralman by drawing on and narrating their genealogies in 
interactions with state institutions and their representatives and in their struggles over 
membership, resources, and various sources of legitimation and authority.  This is not 
limited to interactions between state and citizens, but also includes negotiation of claims 
to the land and the nation, articulations of differences with Kazakh citizens, and everyday 
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struggles over membership, resources, legitimacy, and authority. In this way, I consider 
the different value judgments, ideas about community and about belonging within the 
framework of sociality, including "imagined communities" of various kinds—not just of 
the nation-state.  As DeWeese (  ) states "The point is that if we look only for the overtly 
political, we will miss much that informs the foundations of political life."  
The first part of the chapter focuses on history and genealogy, lineage, tribe, and 
ancestors. Specifically, I consider a lawsuit that reveals the interrelations of different and 
competing forms of power, authority, and legitimacy in Kazakhstan. The second part of 
the chapter delves into everyday experiences of returnees and locals in interacting with 
state institutions and government officials. It shows how those aspects of understanding 
what constitutes Kazakhness informs state practices. I consider this in the context of 
interactions between the state/government and the tribalist framework. I consider how 
these frameworks are often understood to be in opposition to each other. Based on 
mechanical structuralist models, many scholars claim that regionalism and "clan" 
interests are pitted against other clans and the central state, in formations that the political 
scientist Kelly McMann has called the "paradoxically weak-strong state” (McMann 2004: 
241; also see Jones Luong 2004; Cummings 2002).  Instead, I look at spatial hierarchies 
and claims on a local level, through the particularities of specific encounters with 
institutions and practices of the state, local government officials, and specific 
articulations of concepts like political authority, citizenship, and governance on the local 
level. Rather than assuming an opposition, I examine the circulation of ideas and 
practices, as well as claims and identifications at different scales of interaction, politics, 
and government. Throughout, I question the objectification of notions such as the state 
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and its power by pointing to the ways in which Mongolian Kazakhs challenge not only 
specific practices of the state, but also the configurations of power, and legitimacy 
contained within the discourse of the Kazakh nation-state.   
By capturing the state through the flow of interactions, I reconsider the state in 
terms of the emergent relationships between ideas of place, locality, and home. I also 
reconsider group identifications in genealogical, regional, territorial, ethnic, linguistic, 
and religious terms. In considering how these notions interpenetrate and inform each 
other in the process of their actualization, I show the varied lines between state and 
society, public and private, and the exercise of personal and institutionally authorized and 
legitimated power (Gupta YEAR: ##).  
In many ways this chapter is not about the state, as it does not examine the state in 
or for itself. Rather, it considers the state insofar it is one way of articulating community 
and belonging among others, such as spatial divisions, ethnic differences, linguistic 
hierarchies, and economic inequalities.  I consider how all of these dimensions of 
belonging come together with ideas about the morality of persons and the legitimacy of 
their claims to inform and shape interactions of power. Non-statist and non-national 
articulations of community are possible outside of the nation-state framework in the form 
of genealogical histories and narratives of time and place that tell how the local and the 
personal articulate with the national and the historical. 
As I talked to more Kazakh repatriates from China and Mongolia, I recognized 
the rich descriptions used by apa in her genealogical narrative – the great open steppe 
(keng dala), the vast blue of the sky (kok aspan), the smell of jusai, as recurring narrative 
tropes and images also found in Kazakh poems, songs, and stories of homeland longing 
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from China to Turkey. In the twenty years of repatriation, the song Elim-ai that the 
grandmother sang to us has been taken up as the unofficial anthem of the Kazakh 
diaspora and their return. In its numerous variations, the song is part of a larger body of 
Kazakh oral history and literature that recounts the time known as "aqtaban shubyryndy 
alkakol sulama," which Tynyshpayev (1992:18) glossed as "the time when all the people, 
with the soles of their feet worn out [from running], lay exhausted by the lake of grief."  
It describes the time in the 18th century (1720's – 1730's) as one of bitter defeats and 
violent displacement of Kazakh nomads by the Mongol nomadic confederation of Jungar 
and Oirat tribes. Embedded in songs, poems, stories, and recitations of shezhire 
(genealogical histories), Aqtaban Shubyryndy, or as it is also called, "the time of great 
troubles," is a particular narrative of Kazakh history, shared among different groups in 
Kazakhstan, China, and Mongolia. In the 20th century, they have carried this narrative in 
waves of flights and migrations in the 1920's, '30s, and '40s to Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Iran, and later all the way to Turkey and Europe.  
"The Time of Great Troubles" is a narrative trope that characterizes the Kazakh 
diaspora in terms of exile, loss, and displacement. Such stories of shared suffering and 
resistance also appeal to those who want to rethink Kazakh history as a specifically 
national history, centered on the territory of Kazakhstan. For Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, 
"The Time of Great Troubles," both as a historical experience and as a metaphor of 
collective suffering, is recontextualized and reinterpreted through the narration of other 
times and events: the Bolshevik revolution and the coming of the Soviet government in 
the 1920's, the famine years of forced sedentarization and collectivization of Kazakh 
nomads and the Stalinist purges of the 1930's, the sacrifices of the WWII years, and the 
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"Zheltoqsan" events of 1986, when Kazakh youths marched on the streets of Alma-Ata, 
later hailed as the (re)awakening of Kazakh national consciousness. In the sometimes 
intertwining, but often divergent histories of Kazakhs in Mongolia and China, Elim-ai, as 
a song and a lament, also weaves through the stories of the Jungar invasions, the violent 
years of Chinese communist revolution in Xinjiang, and the stories of relatives who fled 
across the Hindu Kush into Kashmir in the 1940's. As Smith (2003: 27) argues for the 
processes of return migration in Western Europe: "history is implicated in the difficult 
incorporation of the "repatriates" into national communities. The problem of social 
memory – and, more specifically, of conflicting memories and identities – is a central 
theme."  While the central government continued to officially encourage repatriation, 
local government officials commonly framed their work with repatriates in terms of 
efforts to "limit," "control," and "organize" what they interpreted as chaotic and 
overwhelming migration processes. In the process of their interactions with the returnees, 
Kazakh government officials often constructed their own parameters of inclusion and 
exclusion, reconfiguring not only the legal criteria of returnee status, but also the 
affective and moral dimensions of citizenship and national belonging. 
"Poor Great Jambul"  
In 2007, an unprecedented lawsuit made its way through the Kazakhstani courts 
and on the pages of Russian and Kazakh language media. The case involved three men 
who sued Russian-language newspaper Svoboda Slova (Rus. "Freedom of Speech") for 
the amount of 800 million KZ Tenge (about 6 million USD). The focus of the lawsuit 
was an article published by the newspaper in January 2007 and entitled 'Poor Great 
Jambul' (Neshchastnyi velikii Jambul). The three plaintiffs from the village of 
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Shamalghan claimed to have filed the lawsuit on behalf of their entire Shaprashty ru. 
They accused the newspaper of "defaming the names of their ancestors,"  "insulting the 
honor and dignity of the claimants," "slander," and "grievous moral injury" (tyazhelyi 
moral'nyi ushcherb).  
The defendants published the article, for reasons clear only to them, acting 
against their people, against their homeland, on the instructions of morally 
corrupt people, who set the goal to sow discord and chaos, ceaselessly 
stirring up strife among the Kazakh Zhuzes, arousing strife and enmity 
among the clans.  Their desire, insulting not only to us but to the entire 
people, is to increase social, ethnic, and spiritual strife, and to speak out 
against the security of the state. 
  
What was the perceived danger of this slanderous article? Yerbol Kurmanbayev, 
the author of the polemic piece, personally named in the lawsuit, pulls no punches when 
criticizing the Kazakh habit of praising their lineage ancestors. He connects productions 
of these distinct and local genealogies to recent "nationalist" histories that absurdly 
exaggerate the global significance and "the dizzying depths" (golovokruzhitel'nye 
glubiny) of Kazakh history. Kurmanbayev states: "Nationalist versions of history are 
needed by a certain part of the population, in the same way that housewives need soap 
operas and children need fairy tales." 
The claimants specifically objected to several jokes related by the author, which 
rely on phonetic coincidences to make fun of the exaggerated claims put out by some 
Kazakhs about their ancestors:  
For example, there is a myth going around among jokers that the equator 
was discovered by two Kazakhs - "eki batyr" [two warriors]. There is 
another joke as well:  One Shaprashty man sent his two sons out into the 
world to seek fortune. Their names were Parakhbai and Orakhbai. They 
discovered in South America two new countries -Paraguay and Uruguay... 
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The author sarcastically continues:  
But, Uruguay and Paraguay are nothing. The Arghyns have a whole 
country outside of Kazakhstan – it is called Arghyntina [Argentina] and it 
is also in South America. But other Kazakhs, not just the Arghyns, also 
have something to boast about. Do you know where the famous orientalist 
scholar Konrad [?] as well as the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
are from? Correct! From the Kazakh clan [Khongrat]. And where did the 
name of the Baltics come from? It is simply that Kazakhs from Balta got 
there. Some people will talk nonsense to the point that Alexander the 
Great of Macedonia will turn out to be a Kazakh from the Zhalair clan. 
Basically, anywhere you spit, there are Kazakhs everywhere. 
 
In a country with no shortage of identifiable ru, taipa (tribes) and illustrious 
ancestors and local saints vying for national honors, the reason the author of the article 
singles out the Shaprashty ru appears clear to the claimants: it is the lineage of President 
Nazarbayev himself who also comes from the same village as the three plaintiffs.   
The main objective of the defendants is, through the newspaper, "Freedom 
of Speech," to lower in the eyes of the people and in the eyes of other 
states, the authority of the direct descendant of Karasai, our head of state, 
Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev, as well as cause chaos and enmity 
among people and lead to a civil war. 
 
In Kazakhstan, most of the media, including print, radio, and television 
broadcasting, are sharply bifurcated along the Russian/Kazakh language divide. Kazakh 
and Russian language newspapers, magazines, radio stations, and local television 
networks not only use different languages, but they usually orient their programming to 
what they perceive to be different kinds of audiences, address different topics of interest, 
and are written and produced by different journalists. In fact, very few journalists that I 
know publish in both Kazakh and Russian languages. Debates concerning Kazakh 
 123 
genealogies and ancestral histories, such as those brought up in the article, along with 
concerns about the fate of the Kazakh language and discussions about Kazakh 
repatriation, are largely seen as specifically Kazakh issues. They are usually relegated to 
the pages of Kazakh language newspapers, perceived to "specialize" in these topics, such 
as Kazakh Adibiety ("Kazakh Literature"), Ana Tily ("Mother Tongue"), or Turkestan.  
However, as Svoboda Slova makes clear, this particular genealogical (and in a 
way intensely local) debate transcends the interests of just the Kazakhs in the country, 
because it concerns the lineage of the country's President: "...what lineage that is and its 
position in today's tribal [rodovoplemennoi] hierarchy is well known even to the Slavic 
population of our country."  
To illustrate the central argument of the article that "the mythologizing of history" 
is perpetrated by those in power to legitimize their rule, the author focuses on two famous 
"historical figures" (istoricheskie lichnosti) of the Shaprashty lineage:  the legendary 
batyr (Kaz. hero/warrior) Karasai, said to have fought the Jungar enemies in the 18th 
century, and the blind aqyn (poet-singer) Jambul (1845-1945), whose grave is one the 
major pilgrimage sites for Kazakhs in the Almaty region.  
The author contends that, far from being a national hero who repelled the Jungar 
invaders from the Kazakh lands in the 1720's, Karasai Batyr was completely unknown to 
most Kazakhs until 1992, when President Nazarbayev publicly proclaimed him to be his 
8th generation direct patrilineal ancestor. Nazarbayev described how when Karasai Batyr 
and his wife Sara's ancestor stood "back to back," "500 enemy Jungars could not defeat 
them." Kurmanbayev argues that this story turned out to be enough "to establish a factual 
base for the existence of the little-known Karasai from the Shaprashty clan" and "as the 
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result of a widescale PR campaign, literally out of nothing, there appeared an image of a 
powerful Karasai Batyr, the ancestor of President Nazarbayev." Former Kaskelen district, 
the birthplace of President Nazarbayev, was renamed Karasai in 1993 and a large 
monument of Karasai seated on a rearing horse and holding a spear was erected in the 
central square, in front of the local government administration (akimat) building. Another 
mounted Karasai monument was erected on a hill near the President's home village of 
Shamalghan and lavish celebrations in honor of "the 350th anniversary of Karasai's birth" 
were held around the country in 2007.   
In contrast to Karasai Batyr's dubious historicity, aqyn Jambul Zhumabaiuly, "the 
Kazakh Homer," who died in 1945, reportedly at the age of one hundred, was widely 
known, celebrated, and anthologized throughout the Soviet Union in the 1930's and 
1940's. Jambul's large house, personally gifted to him by Stalin in 1936, is still preserved 
as a house museum, with displays of original furniture, the poet's personal objects, as 
well as various editions of his poetry in many languages and numerous awards and 
medals. The house is surrounded by extensive grounds, with gardens, flowerbeds, and 
shady mulberry trees around a small mausoleum containing Jambul's grave, all tended by 
the poet's two elderly great-granddaughters. Like many famed Kazakh aqyn, Jambul is 
known not only as a gifted poet-singer-orator, but is also considered a healer (baqshy) 
and a seer, known to have performed miraculous feats during his life. Now, busloads of 
pilgrims visit his grave year-round, to pray, read the Koran, circumambulate the saint's 
grave, and leave cuts of white cloth as an offering for prayers answered and wishes 
fulfilled.45  
                                                 
45 See Dubuisson 2009 for a description of pilgrimages to Jambul's grave and house-museum. 
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However, Kurmanbayev argues in his article that the legend of Jambul as a great 
poet is another historical falsification: "Jambul was not a poet, his poems were created by 
Russian poets." His odes to Stalin and poems on the themes of Soviet life, supposedly 
translated by famous Russian poets, were actually written by teams of Russian 
ghostwriters: "there existed, so to speak, a copy but no original." According to 
Kurmanbayev, these poems were disseminated in Soviet school readers without any 
knowledge or involvement of the "poor great Jambul," an old, blind, illiterate man who 
did not speak a word of Russian.  And the continual fame and official eulogizing of 
Jambul in monuments and places named after him, like that of Karasai Batyr, is due to his 
Shaprashty lineage.  
Drawing a clear parallel between Soviet power, built on lies and falsifications, 
and "the new spiral of falsification of history" in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Kurmanbayev 
warns that "history is often distorted for the benefit of rulers." He finishes the article with 
an exhortation to his readers: "It is clear that we are used to falsifying elections, falsifying 
achievements, falsifying life. But we cannot permit anyone the opportunity to profit from 
the mythologizing of history." The anxieties underlying the final criticism in this article 
make clear that different versions of history are understood to serve as alternate sources 
of authority and legitimation. Genealogies and historical narratives that highlight 
connections to the Kazakh nation through ancestry are central to the legitimation and 
authority of Mongolian Kazakhs. Additionally, these claims add further complexities to 
the usual boundaries of belonging by cross-cutting the division among Kazakh-
non/Kazakh-Russian.  
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It took eight months for the lawsuit to wind its way through the courts and various 
departments of the National Academy of Sciences, which was called on for the "expert 
opinion" by the presiding judge. The "scientific expert testimony" (nauchnaya 
ekspertiza), signed by two philologists from the Academy, fully rejected the claim of 
harm and moral suffering and found no fault with the newspaper. Nevertheless, the judge 
ended up rejecting the expert opinion she herself solicited and decided the lawsuit 
partially in favor of the claimants, ordering the payment of damages for "moral injury," 
although much smaller than they were originally seeking. She justified her decision by 
Article 8 of Kazakhstan's Civil Code (GPK RK), which states that the interested parties 
have a right to protection of honor and dignity, if they are able to prove, in accordance 
with the law, that they are included among the circle of descendants of the deceased 
relative. The judge concluded that the claimants did provide such proof, stating, with no 
further elaboration: "As proof of their kinship relationship, descendants of Karasai and 
Jambul presented a shezhire (Kazakh genealogies) certified by the local akim [mayor]." 
This response evidences the entanglement of state and genealogical forms of authority: 
one bolstered and legitimized by the other - like the monuments and state-sponsored 
celebrations of ancestors. Additionally, it makes explicit the perceived relationship 
between political and economic power and lineage: particularly as respects Shaprashty. 
In response to the court verdict, the newspaper Svoboda Slova published an 
editorial which became an extended commentary on (the absence of) Kazakh history, 
acknowledging that "for Kazakhs history is always personal. And so is the perceived 
injury."  They explain:  
In contrast with settled populations, where only aristocrats were interested 
in genealogies, among nomads, the knowledge of shezhire was 
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population-wide [obschenarodnyi]. So, history is sensed by them much 
more acutely then by other people. Because, the historical works reflect 
the actions not of some abstract, but fully concrete ancestors of specific 
and currently alive Kazakhs....Thanks to all the conditions described 
above, Kazakhs have no history as the science of events. 
 
The editors concluded with stating the matter bluntly: "Warriors who in one 
district are considered heroes of a national scale, for the inhabitants of a neighboring 
district are nothing but horse thieves."  
This lawsuit and the debates surrounding it, illustrate the entanglement of orally 
transmitted genealogies and histories with written forms. In the context of the lawsuit, 
shezhire is a written object, textual and graphic, recorded, and historically accurate. It is 
also certified by local government official, who lends the authority of the state and his 
stamp and signature to a written genealogy as a material object that can serve as evidence 
in the court of law.  
These local and genealogical ways of demarcating who is Kazakh are intertwined 
with national and state ways of identifying who is Kazakh.  How they are conceived at 
each scale allows one to legitimize or confront the other, as both the nation and the 
genealogies Kazakhs draw upon often refer to the Kazakh homeland as the point of 
reference for who counts as Kazakh—or not.  The state often draws on genealogies of 
ancestors to territorialize the territory of the nation, which is in turn the territory of the 
state. In this way. state directed national building uses the shezhire and ancestors to claim 
territory and identification of the Kazakh nation with the current state. In fact, it is the 
genealogical conception of the Kazakh nation and history and sacralization of particular 
ancestors as generalized national Kazakh saints and heroes that underpins many claims to 
political legitimacy by President Nazarbayev and Kazakhstan as a nation-state. On the 
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other hand, this move also has the potential to undercut and cuts across these statist 
conceptions of belonging.  Kazakhstani historian, Irina Erofeeva (2007: 155) called this 
an "unceremonious attempt at 'ethnic privatization' of the common historic-cultural 
heritage of all Turkic- speaking people of Eurasia."  
While Mongolian Kazakhs have lived outside of the Kazakh nation-state’s 
territory, and their relatively recent history and ancestry also places them outside of the 
state territory, their genealogies cross state boundaries. In Mongolia.  Kerei Kazakh 
stands as the identification of Mongolian Kazakhs. Also, Islam separates them from their 
Mongolian neighbors. In Kazakhstan, their claims focus on being Kazakh - their claim 
being one of blood and genealogy, they are the children of Alash.  In the following 
sections, I consider how such claims are made and interpreted. 
Shezhire: "the genealogical tree of the Kazakh nation" 
When editors of Svoboda Slova argue that "Kazakhs have no history," they do not 
claim that Kazakhs have no ways of narrating or remembering the past. It is rather that 
they do not consider Kazakh shezhire - its narrative forms, its sources of authority, and 
modes of transmission - to be "real history." It is something distinct from history as a 
science of events, something that does not allow history as science of events, rather 
shezhire allows to "feel" the past personally.  
The Kazakh word shezhire is usually translated as "genealogy," but, depending on 
the context, could mean "history" or "chronicle," as in the title of Zardykhan Kinayatuly's 
book about the history of Kazakhs in Mongolia (1995), Zhylaghan Zhyldar Shezhiresi 
(Chronicle of the Crying Years). Shezhire is derived from the Arabic word meaning 'tree' 
(shajara) and the image of a tree with its root and branches has been the idiom of 
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genealogical reckoning for Kazakhs, including biological and spiritual notions of descent, 
reproduction, and transmission  (see DeWeese 1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Baghylatuly Zarykkhan, Ulgii, Mongolia, August 2009.  
Zarykhan-agha is displaying his book: "Sherushi Suindiktin tor shezhiresi".  
 
 
In the narrowest sense, one's personal shezhire could be synonymous with zheti 
ata, literally "seven forefathers": the knowledge and ability to recite the names of the 
seven generations of one's patrilineal ancestors. The ability to recite zheti ata is a cultural 
ideal, a true mark of Kazakhness. As I described in the introduction to the dissertation, 
Zhetisiz for Kazakhs is synonymous with "orphan"  
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How does this understanding of Kazakh ancestry and belonging affect return 
migrants? According to Kazakhstani law and its practical understanding by government 
officials, receiving the official 'oralman' (returnee) status depends on being ethnically 
Kazakh. When state-issued identity documents, like passports or birth certificates, are 
missing, do not include information about ethnicity, or are suspected of being fake, 
reciting one's zheti ata may provide the necessary final proof.  Several migration officials 
I interviewed voiced to me their suspicions of people from China or Uzbekistan who 
claim to be Kazakh, but could in fact be Uyghurs or Uzbeks trying to pass in order to 
receive the benefits and expedited citizenship reserved for Kazakh returnees. In such 
cases, the officials demanded additional proof, such as the old "red" (Soviet) passports, 
considered more trustworthy and harder to fake than the post-Soviet documents issued by 
the newly independent states.46  Kazakhstani media echoes and amplifies these suspicions 
by frequent articles about "fake oralman."  For example in an article titled "Migration 
mimicry" (Migratsionnaya mimikriia), the author discussed the problem of fake Kazakhs 
in the context of trying to obtain the benefits of Kazakh repatriation. 
The other day, one of Almaty TV channels announced that in Kazakhstan 
there has been an increase in ... fake Kazakhs (lzhekazakhov). Apparently, 
some persons, mostly from Xinjiang-Yughur region of China, pretending 
to be Kazakhs, migrate to Kazakhstan, where they take advantage of all 
the benefits and privileges of oralman. 
 
Here ideas of fake and authentic oralman are made explicit and sourced as critical 
sites for identifying the legitimacy of claims to Kazakhstan. Also, it is the potential for 
                                                 
46 See Lemon 1998 for discussion of material qualities and surfaces and their connection to notions of 
"authenticity" of objects and people in Russia. 
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fake Kazakhs that required institutional bureaucracies to monitor the authenticity of such 
claims and the bestowal of Kazakh rights and privileges. If the documents or the people 
themselves looked suspicious, they were often sent to the World Association of Kazakhs 
(WAK) to certify their authenticity.47 The person who most often dealt with oralman 
requests on an everyday basis was Botagoz-apa, the executive assistant to the director, 
who has been with WAK since its beginning. Botagoz-apa is herself an oralman from 
Mongolia and moved to Kazakhstan from Ulaanbaatar in 1992, during the early wave of 
migration.     
She described to me how, even when the official documents seemed to be 
unambiguous, officials rather trusted the verification of kin, personal knowledge and 
genealogies. 
Many people have it stated in their passports that they are Kazakh. But, 
they, our migration [police], don't look at that. They still accept them 
through us. Generally, we know our own very well.  Well, the majority of 
Kazakhs know each other. Even if one came from China, some way we 
figure it out.  If we have any doubts, then we can ask a few people, they 
will provide proof. If they know [him], we already know him too.  
 
She continued: 
 
But for the majority of people, you can already see they are Kazakh just 
by looking at the face, it is already clear by their appearance [vneshnii 
vid]. Well...there are some similarities with Uzbeks and with Yughurs. 
Nevertheless, we Kazakhs have zheti ata. We would ask that too. It is 
possible to find out about them. We have never made a mistake in this. We 
have been working for fifteen years already and have never received any 
                                                 
47 WAK is a quasi-NGO, nominally headed by President Nazarbayev. Although, officially responsible for 
maintaining cultural ties with Kazakh diaspora abroad, the organization also helps returnees in Kazakhstan. 
They provide oralman with legal advice, translate and certify documents written in non-Cyrillic scripts (for 
those from Iran, Afghanistan, and China), and sometimes provide proof of Kazakh ethnicity.  
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complaints. 'You wrote Kazakh for another nationality,' this never 
happens. That means we know this process very well and can give 
confirmation.  
 
It is easy to point out that Botagoz-apa cannot know if they have ever made a 
mistake, because those people would be unlikely to confess and, especially among 
Uzbeks/Karakalpak and mixed families, distinctions between ethnic groups are not so 
clear cut. However, her certainty lays in a trust in something other than official state 
identification and certification of nationality. Kin relations, membership in the 
community, and genealogical knowledge are what determine membership. The arbiters of 
membership are things that unlike pieces of paper and stamps cannot be faked, a triumph 
of oral transmission over written knowledge.  
When state issued identity documents fail to authenticate one's membership in the 
national community, Kazakhs turn to genealogy as proof of what makes them Kazakh, as 
it also serves to separate from other neighboring people with similar cultures, languages 
and appearance but who have distinct genealogies, which are not part of the Kazakh 
shezhire. Many Kazakhs in Kazakhstan claim that Naiman and Kerei lineages, to which 
the majority of Altai Kazakhs belong, are actually turkified Mongols, which constituted a 
part of Chingiz Khans armies and were left behind with their subsequent retreat. Here 
genealogically based notions of descent and ancestry are part and parcel of ethnic 
identification and membership and neither can be examined separately (see also Edgar 
2004; Shryock 1995, 1997). For Shaprashty locals in the Almaty region, the often heard 
assertion that they never ran away from their homeland but stayed and protected their 
ancestral land from enemy invasions, serves as a claim to ancestral names, places, and 
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histories that are also articulated as an integral part of Kazakh national history, unity and 
territory. As I discuss later in the chapter, Shaprashty Kazakhs in the Almaty region 
narrate their histories and their ancestry in ways that assert their belonging in this 
particular place, as it also makes them part of a unified Kazakh nation.   
Many argue that to know one's zheti ata is a responsibility of every Kazakh and 
that Soviet repression of genealogical knowledge and practice caused the loss of an 
essential framework for Kazakh identification and belonging.  However, in pre-Soviet 
time as well, knowledge of one's zheti ata seemed to be more of a cultural ideal than fact 
for the vast majority of Kazakhs who belonged to the kara suiq ("black bone") 
commoners’ class (see Valikhanov 1904, Bacon 1958, Krader 1963). Even less common 
was the knowledge of other genealogies that involved people outside of one's immediate 
aul and lineage. Such knowledge of shezhire seems to have been a prerogative of experts 
– aqyn and zhyrau (poets and epic singers), whose intricate knowledge of genealogies 
and the relationships among different regions, lineages, and political dynasties was part 
of their craft and an important source of authority. Over the last two hundred years, this 
enormous collection of what became the corpus of Kazakh "oral folklore," including 
recitations of zheti ata, genealogical narratives, epics, songs, and poems, has been 
meticulously collected, written down, organized into kinship charts, and analyzed as an 
important source of ethnographic knowledge about people without written histories.48   
Russian and Soviet orientalist tradition of ethnography and history, including its Kazakh 
practitioners, relied on Kazakh oral sources and illiterate Kazakh informants. In the 
second part of the 19th century, a generation of Kazakh elites, incorporated into Russian 
                                                 
48 For an overview of Russian and Soviet orientalist scholarship and the role of indigenous scholars, see 
Hirsch 2005, Znamenski 1995, Kemper and Conerman 2011, Campbell 2011.  
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Imperial aristocracy and educated in Russian schools and universities in Kazan and Saint 
Petersburg, actively participated in the creation of a new Kazakh historiography and 
ethnography. Like other scholars at the time, they were influenced by Russian historians 
and orientalists, Herder's theory of the Volksgeist, and Morgan's study of kinship.49    
Shoqan Valikhanov, the most famous Kazakh scholar who continues to be the 
authoritative source on Kazakh history, kinship, and oral art, exemplifies the influence of 
contemporary Orientalist tradition in his writings. Born Muhammad Qanafiya in 1835, 
Shoqan (nick-name which he always used and signed with) belonged to the cream of 
Kazakh aq suik (white bone) aristocracy: Chingizzid, direct descendant of Chingiz Khan, 
great-grandson of the last Kazakh Khan Abylai and son of Sultan. At the time, his native 
Kokshetau area was part of Russian Siberian governorship and all Sultans and Khans 
were appointed by the Russian Tsar. Chokan first studied at mekteb, where he learned 
Arabic, Persian, and Chagatai. His father recognized the value of cooperating with 
Russians, was on good terms with the colonial government, and sent his son to the 
Imperial military cadet academy in Omsk and later to the Imperial capital. Well educated, 
smart, witty, and charming as described by his contemporaries, Valikhanov shined at the 
capital and had close friendships with many Russians, most notably Dostoyevsky. 
However, he soon returned to the steppe as colonial officer and administrator, but also as 
heir to his fathers' properties, offices and responsibilities as Kazakh Chingizzid. He 
traveled extensively through Kashgar, Kulja, Zhetisu, and Issyk Kul and wrote travel 
accounts that remain the source of the most detailed information on the region. He 
devoted his life to writing about Kazakh history, language, and culture. Considered the 
                                                 
49 For the importance of Morgan's work in Russian and later Soviet ethnography, see Znamenski 1995.  
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father of Kazakh historiography and ethnography, his writings and opinions influenced 
generations of Imperial and Soviet scholars and continue to be authoritative. Valikhanov 
read works in history and ethnography in Russian, English, and German and shared the 
views of the scholars at the time.  
 Truly, it is difficult to determine the origins of the people like the Kyrgyz 
[Kazakh], nomadic people, who do not have writing and, therefore, no 
monuments of the past. I do not deny that a subject such as the history and 
origin of nomadic peoples, which does not present any evidence or facts, 
can lead only to various obscure conjectures that prove nothing. 
Nevertheless, studying carefully the ethnography of the people, we may 
open, if not the truth, then at least a weak reflection of it, in some measure 
ripping apart the dense layer of darkness of the unknown.  If the poetic 
legends of Homer and stories collected by Herodotus through rumors have 
any historical merit whatsoever, if any distorted, fabulous story has at its 
foundation an event and a truth, then there is no doubt that positive and 
coherent stories of the Kyrgyz, their way of life, traditions, and 
contemporary manners, which reflect the lifeway of their ancestors and 
upon comparison are concordant with historical records, may have 
historical significance.  
 
For Valikhanov, the wealth of Kazakh history lay in their oral art of poetry in 
many forms: historical epics, lyrical poems, songs, didactic verses, philosophical 
reflections and religious meditations, virtuosic contests of poetic improvisation, 
memorized and passed down for generations. Other Kazakh scholars after him also 
focused on these as important historical sources. In colonial hierarchy, lacking writing, 
this was their claim to civilization and culture. As Valikhanov wrote: "Out of all the Tatar 
[Turkic] people, as concerning poetic abilities, the Kyrgyz [Kazakhs] take possibly the 
first place. The same could be said about them, as our respected Orientalist Senkovskiy 
noted about the Arabs: bedouin is an artist by nature and in essence a poet" (ibid.). 
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At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, pastoral 
lifestyle among Kazakhs declined, becoming increasingly threatened by expropriation of 
nomads' land and Russian settlement. Kazakh intellectuals turned to language and history 
to support their newly developing notions of Kazakhs as a unified nation. The same 
period (1880s-1920s) was marked with the first compilations of the Unified Kazakh 
Shezhire, genealogically based historic accounts of all Kazakh tribes and lineages 
(Yessenova 2004; Erofeeva 2000). Kazakhstani historians, Yessenova (2004) and 
Kendirbaeva (1999) argue that as pastoral lifestyle declined and was threatened at the end 
of the 19th-century, Kazakh intellectuals looked to history and language as defining 
Kazakh identity.  Three known versions of Unified Shezhire were compiled and 
published by Zhusyp Kopei-Uly (1873), Shakharim Kudaiberdy-Uly (1911), and 
Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev (1925). Each of the three Shezhire versions was a 
genealogical account of the Kazakh lineages, starting with the genealogical founder of all 
Kazakhs, the legendary Alash. They also included accounts of significant historical 
events, such as the Jungar wars in the 18th century, descriptions of prominent Kazakhs of 
the past, and biographies of distinguished citizens of the time when the Shezhire were 
written (Yessenova ibid.).  Kendirbaeva (1999) argues: 
Transformed into the unifed written account, Shezhyre was, perhaps, the 
most effective way of demonstrating the cultural unity of territorially 
dispersed and politically disjoined pastoral communities and of building 
the grounds for nationalist claims... 'We are children of Alash ...' was the 
idiom through which Kazakhs increasingly made sense of their group 
identity. (29) 
 
The Unified Shezhire allowed these Kazakh reformers to at once imagine the 
whole Kazakh nation and their specific place in it in relation to others. Its importance for 
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the conception of Kazakhs as a nation continued to influence subsequent generations of 
Soviet Kazakh scholars and writers who integrated the unified shezhire into scholarly 
analysis of Kazakh history and into Kazakh-Soviet literature as an indicator of cultural 
integrity of Kazakhs in the past (Kudaibergenova 2013).  
As Yessenova (2000) describes, versions of unified Shezhire that were published 
by Shakarim Kudaiberdy-Uly and Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev in the 19th and early 
twentieth century became bestsellers in Almaty in 1990 when they were republished for 
the first time since the 1920's. They came out in both Kazakh and Russian languages and 
not long after that, multiple Shezhire charts of individual lineages drawn from these 
versions became available in bookstores and newspaper kiosks throughout Kazakhstan. 
"The Shezhyre, in one version or the other, quickly became a 'coffee table' book and a 
poster in the houses of many Kazakh urban families" (ibid: 672). 
Turn of the century notions of nation, rediscovered in 1980-90's, form the basis of 
Kazakhs as members of a nation that perceives itself through genealogies. Many 
Kazakhs, including those who do not know their genealogies, scholars, and ordinary 
people turn to these books, as well other forms of genealogical reckoning, as authoritative 
sources on their history and their own place in the Kazakh genealogical tree. 
Rediscovered and reimagined again, these genealogies unite a Kazakh national 
community and its identification with the state.  
Turkic petroglyphs and Kazakh ethnoarchaeology in Mongolia 
I first saw Omirbek on TV, when Meiram-agha and Bijan-apa, my hosts in Ulgii, 
were watching the evening news on a Mongolian language channel from Ulaanbatar. This 
was the only television program they watched in Mongolian. Like other Kazakhs in 
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Bayan Ulgii, they watched mostly Kazakh language channels from Kazakhstan and China 
and the nights were usually devoted to Turkish soap operas, dubbed in Kazakh and 
subtitled in Russian, broadcast from Kazakhstan. As Meiram-agha was about to switch 
the channels, he exclaimed "Look, it's Omirbek on the news." He was a young man of 
about 30, dressed in sky blue shapan (long Kazakh overcoat), which was decorated with 
unusual symbols, embroidered in silver thread. I noticed that the decorations seemed 
unusual, not the familiar patterns of Kerei Kazakh decoration motifs. Meiram-agha 
explained that he was wearing his "Turkic shapan" and the pictures were depictions of 
Turkic petroglyphs found in Western Mongolia. Omirbek was an archaeologist who 
studied Turkic petroglyphs in Bayan Ulgii and the short news segment featuring him 
discussed publication of a photo album of Western Mongolian "rock art." It was a large 
coffee sized book with glossy colored photographs of petroglyphs and stone monuments 
(baba), displaying the same symbols and motifs that adorned Omirzhan's Turkic shapan.   
A week later, when Omirbek returned from Ulaanbaator, my research assistant 
Zoya and I visited him in his house on the outskirts of Ulgii, where the town gradually 
dissolved into overgrazed pastures. Omirbek talked passionately about his work on 
Bronze Age Turkic rock art found in Bayan Ulgii and scattered all over Western 
Mongolia. These include dramatic stone babas, large structures that might be ritual 
complexes, small rock carvings, and petroglyphs, scattered on the sides of rock outcrops 
around Ulgii.  
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Figure 13: Petroglyphs near Ulgii. Photograph by the author.  
 Omirbek told me he was an ethnoarchaeologist (and when I said 
'archaeologist' later, he corrected me) and saw his work as discovering Kazakh ancestral 
past in Mongolia. After showing me the photo album published in Ulaanbaatar, he 
modestly explained that his own scholarship is nothing compared to his late father's, 
Magauiya Sultaniyauly, an ethnographer who devoted his whole life to the study of Kerei 
Kazakh culture, customs, and traditions. He hauled out a battered suitcase held together 
with ropes and when he opened it, it was filled with books, print outs of articles, Xeroxed 
copies of newspaper and magazine articles in Kazakh and Mongolian. Carefully taking 
the books out of the suitcase and spreading them out on the floor, Omirbek said that his 
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father published 26 books about Mongolian Kazakh culture and he solemnly offered me 
one of the books as a gift. Most of the books in the suitcase were slim paperbacks printed 
in Ulaanbaatar and Bayan Ulgii on rough grayish paper that bled the ink through and 
carried titles about Kerei Kazakh customs and traditions (salt-destur). Several of them 
were about eagle hunting, as Omirbek said, his father's life passion and the most noble of 
all Kazakh traditions. Inside, the books were filled with short descriptions of various 
"Kazakh customs," long lists of names and genealogies of Kerei Kazakhs, and many 
pages of epic-style poetry.  
The book that Omirbek presented to me as a gift, presented on the front cover a 
photograph of eight men on horseback, each holding an eagle in the right hand. Dramatic 
formation of rock outcrops is in the back, towering over the line of men. The first two 
pages of the book have several dedications and epigraphs. First, on the left, is a quote 
attributed to the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev: "Our ancestry is Turkic, 
our religion is Islam and we must never forget that." Next to it, on the right side of the 
passage is a long excerpt from the famous Kudat Bilig (the mirror of the princes) book by 
Zhusyp Balasagun, an 11th century Uyghur poet from the city of Balasaghun, the capital 
of the Karakhanid Empire in modern day Kyrgyzstan.  
The juxtaposition of the two quotes is interesting: in anachronistic territorial logic 
of post-Soviet ethnonational claims, Zhusyp Balasagyn is "Kyrgyz." The likeness of him 
is on a 100 som Kyrgyz bank note, just like the famous Al-Farabi, possibly born on the 
territory of modern Kazakhstan, adorns the Kazakh tenge. However, the author, scholar 
of Turkic culture and history, must have known that Kutadgu Bilig is considered one of 
the earliest known examples of Turko-Islamic literature (Levi and Sela 2010), fitting into 
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the Turkic-Islamic heritage highlighted by the Nazarbayev quote. The next page has a 
quote attributed to Chokhan Valikhanov: "Kerei are the strongest of the Kazakh ru." And 
beneath it is a dedication by the author:  "To our Kerei forefathers and our Abaq mothers, 
we bow!" (taghzym - to bow with respect to elders).  Among the Kerei Kazakh customs 
described in the book, besides description of eagle hunting and Kazakh traditions 
commonly discussed in other ethnographic accounts (feasts, celebrations, rites of 
passage), Sultanayatuly also lists reading Namaz, smoking, and drinking vodka.  
Many archaeologists and other scholars of Turkic history in Mongolia, argue that 
the stone monuments and petroglyphs found around Bayan Ulgii have no direct 
connection to the current Kazakh population that lives there. As I mention above, most 
consider Kazakhs to be recent arrivals in Mongolia and their connection to the Turkic 
artifacts as historically tenuous as that of any other Turkic peoples, from China to 
Anatolia. However, as Omirbek's dedication to his ethnoarchaeological research testifies, 
such constructions of historical links among imagined ancestors, current populations, and 
the land they continue to occupy, provide strong claims for Kazakh belonging in 
Mongolia and counter-pose the homeland conceptions of Kazakhs in Mongolia to those 
in Kazakhstan (Diener 2009:197). However, as the epigraphs framing his father's book 
testify, Mongolian Kazakhs also see themselves as connected to larger Turkic and Islamic 
heritage and to Kazakhstan.   
In Kazakh homes, both in Kazakhstan and Mongolia, photos of ancestors are hung 
in the most sacred place: high up near the ceiling, on the central wall of the house or the 
yurt. They are always hung at tore, the head place, opposite the entrance, where the 
master of the house sleeps and where the most honored guests are seated. They are often 
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displayed next to Islamic wall hangings, like depictions of Kabbha and embroidered wall 
hangings of Shahada and other verses from the Koran.  
 
 
Figure 14: Photographs of family ancestors in a winter house. Bayan Ulgii. Photograph by 
the author. 
 
While I was in Ulgii, making photographs was the main way I was able to repay 
the hospitality of many households I visited out on the jailau (summer pastures). 
Developing photographs is expensive in Ulgii and for many people getting to town from 
the outlying summer pastures is also expensive and difficult. One of the biggest sources 
of income for the Ulgii photo studio (besides wedding photographs) was restoration of 
old photographs of parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, which people treasured 
and displayed. Several people gave me such old photographs and asked me to take them 
to the studio for them. 
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Figure 15: Restored photograph, late 1940s.  
 
As I examined the original old photographs, I realized that all the family photos 
taken outside had the backdrop of Altai Mountains behind them. The ones that were shot 
indoors, in a photo studio, had a painted backdrop, also featuring the mountains, blue sky, 
and green grass, like the photograph above. When people had the photographs digitally 
restored at the studio, they commonly requested to add color to black and white 
photographs and also to add naturalistic backgrounds in the photographs that lacked 
them. For example, the studio would routinely photoshop a background of snow-capped 
mountains, green grass, and yurts into a portrait of a couple seated indoors. These 
photographs were not so much "restored" as they were "altered" and "enhanced" through 
digital technologies, then, framed and displayed on the wall. The ways in which these 
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photographs are altered and displayed, brings the sacrality of landscape, ancestors, and 
Islam together, as significant dimensions of Mongolian Kazakh identification and 
belonging.   
Digital shezhire and "molecular genealogy"  
At the end of the 20th century, a new medium for the creation and circulation of 
Unified Shezhire, such as computer software and the World Wide Web, bring thousands 
of people together to compile their genealogies on the internet. One of the most popular 
online portals for Kazakh genealogies is the website titled Shezhire: Genealogy of 
Kazakhs (Shezhire. Genealogiya Kazahov) at domain name elim.kz.  
 
 
Figure 16:  Screen shot of homepage. Accessed 7.30.13 
 
The website was started in 2000, as a way to put online the genealogy of one 
specific Kazakh lineage, the Naiman. The story of the website's original creator, Oleg 
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Khalidullin, echoes many similar stories of Kazakhs who have become interested in their 
zheti ata and shezhire in the 1980s and '90s. In his recollections, published on the 
website, Khalidullin describes how a personal interest in family history became a 
"patriotic project of the whole Kazakh people" : 
Twenty years ago, Sangispayev Nabish Halidullovich, my uncle, my 
father's older brother, entrusted me to systematize the numerous writings 
of relatives, which he has been collecting all of his life, regularly visiting 
the elders (aksakaly) of Semipalatinsk district. These were fragments of 
shezhire of the Nayman clan, represented in a form of ordered lists of 
names, or in a form of charts with many rectangles with names. I began to 
get interested and to collect different booklets and books that had Naimans 
in them. Especially many entries appeared after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 
 
By the year 2000, when my uncle died, quiet many books were collected, 
which turned out to have a great deal of material about many other clans. 
At the memorial feast, I promised to create for my uncle an unusual kind 
of monument. It was to create a site, shezhire of all Kazakhs. In this way, 
an insignificant goal, of a private, family nature, transformed into a 
product of a social-patriotic plan of the whole Kazakh people. The site, 
Unified Shezhire, was created.  
 
Currently, the site claims about 15000 active users, who have contributed almost 
800,000 individual names to the compilation of Unified Shezhire. It has grown beyond its 
initial virtual creation into a live forum and an online library of books and articles about 
Kazakh history and genealogy in Kazakh and Russian languages. Lively forum 
discussions receive over 1000 hits a day and include topics such as DNA analysis, Turkic 
history, detailed accounts of specific lineages, and many personal enquiries about finding 
relatives. The Unified Kazakh Shezhire (Edinnoe Shezhire Kazahov) consists of 
genealogical tables and lists of names for each of the known Kazakh ru (currently 164), 
although these vary widely in the amount of information and names provided.  These 
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charts are available for download in Microsoft Excel format and are also distributed as 
printed booklets, widely available for sale at newspaper stands and bookstores around 
Almaty.  
In the early 20th century, publication of Unified Shezhire helped the Kazakh 
reformers to articulate their ideas of national consolidation and historical continuity by 
transforming disparate tribal genealogies into a unified and permanent historical record. 
Now, digital technologies open up new ways to engage with the Unified Shezhire by 
allowing those who can access the website to change and update the genealogical charts.  
All visitors to the website are encouraged to contribute their own names, dates, and 
stories: 
Using modern informational technologies, we can extend an ancient 
tradition for centuries into the distant future. So that our as yet nonexistent 
descendants could open their page on the internet and see us in photos, 
find out what we were like. That is why we need to fill in the tables not 
only with lists of names, but also biographies and descriptions of ourselves 
and our fathers, mothers, our children. To show our life, our time. 
 
The website offers instructions on how to read the tables in Excel format and to 
upload one's own information. However, it also instructs the contributors on what are to 
be considered authoritative and authentic sources on Kazakh genealogies. "The authentic 
basis" of Unified Shezhire," states the website's creator, is Mukhamedjan Tynyshpayev's 
1925 edition: "To Tynyshpayev's version we only add, but we do not correct anything 
that is being published or offered in the manuscript." 
All the historical literature and social science literature, such as textbooks 
of history, literature, historical works, everything that has been published 
from the moment the Russian colonial policy was born until the gaining of 
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sovereignty after the collapse of the soviet system, all these ideologically 
manufactured means of mass influence, demand a fundamental revision 
and possibly a total refusal of reception. Only primary sources, which 
might have been preserved in private archives, or records made before 
"the voluntary joining of Kazakhstan to the Russian Empire," can be 
entered into the appropriate chronological space of the given table. 
Comparison and painstaking analysis of such data can provide new views 
on the history of the Kazakh people. 
Here genealogical charts are expanded and authoritative sources are established; 
they put forward "a total refusal of reception" of Soviet sources of Kazakh history.  
Instead they move to a reexamination of Kazakh history that turns to what are understood 
as its authentic roots - oral transmissions of genealogical records through "elders". The 
site provides an alternative means of envisioning the Kazakh nation.  Not in terms of the 
state territory, instead this is a vision of the Kazakh nation as a genealogical tree, 
branching out of its roots - Alash.  
Oral and written sources support each other and draw on different sources of 
authority. On the one hand the words of ancestors and their mode of transmission, which 
attest to their "authenticity."  On the other hand written words in the form of published 
books, genealogical charts, as well as academic and popular works of history and even 
fiction become part of narrating history.  Along with the written word other forms of 
material proof such as archaeological finds and more currently DNA are drawn upon to 
constitute the genealogical tree of the Kazakh nation. People draw on these sources in 
ways that reinforce their claims and construct new texts. As Shryock argues, “In a war of 
(spoken) words, textuality is a new source of power." (Shryock 1997:110) 
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Figure 17: Genealogical table. 
 
In addition to oral and written accounts, those who wish to discover their 
genealogical roots can now turn to genetic analysis, which promises to uncover the 
genealogies coded literally in one's DNA. This is advertised on the United Shezhire 
website as "molecular genealogy" (molekulyarnaya genealogiya), offering DNA test kits, 
claimed to be able to provide information about one's genealogical lineage.  
Now any Kazakh that whishes can receive a scientific confirmation of his 
belonging to one or another clan [rod]. Scientists have proved that sets of  
'X' and ' Y ' chromosomes remain constant from generation to generation. 
Currently, descendants of only 4 clans have been identified: naiman, kerei, 
isti, and tama. However, the results of these DNA studies should not be 
considered final. 
This "DNA Project" is advertised on the website by USA company Family Tree 
DNA ("History Unearthed Daily") which offer customers various "test kits" to test Y-
DNA and MtDNA, ranging between $50 and upwards of $500 for "Comprehensive 
Genome package" (see www.familytreedna.com).  
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The signature and stamp of a state official may grant authority and legitimation to 
a locally produced genealogy. At the same time, such genealogically understood forms of 
community may undermine territorial claims, statist historical narratives, and, as 
DeWeese (1999: 528) argues, "borders between pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet 
projections of communal history and their political implications."  
Karasai and Jambul districts: 'Land of poets and warriors' 
I cannot talk about the place where I conducted most of my fieldwork in 2008-09 
without mentioning that it is the birthplace of President Nazarbayev, strongly identified 
with his family and his Shaprashty ru. The birthplace (Kaz. tughan zher) of the 
Shaprashty is considered to be the Karasai and Jambul districts, south of Almaty, in the 
foothills of the Alatau Mountains.  I have often taken one of the many minibuses and 
shared taxis that ferried people and goods between the city and the neighboring district 
centers, villages, and settlements that supplied much of the city's food, inexpensive 
goods, and its cheapest labor.  Buses and taxis left from the edge of the city, on the main 
highway going south, first passing the former dacha suburbs and small collective farms 
that have been gradually swallowed up by the expansion of the city and the influx of 
migrants from further away. In 2006-2007, the narrow streets of these growing 
neighborhoods were packed with delivery trucks, cement mixers, and piled up building 
materials, as construction was booming, the bubble soon to burst in the global recession 
of 2008.   
Next, the packed minibuses stopped at the large wholesale market, "Altyn Orda" 
(The Golden Horde), selling everything from children's toys and home appliances to 
livestock. Many Mongolian Kazakhs worked there, selling homemade furniture, felt 
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products, and other "traditional" crafts, the specialty of Mongolian-Kazakh women. 
Finally, as the bus left the traffic and bustle of the city and the market, it followed the 
road south, abutted on both sides by stretches of land strewn with garbage and overgrown 
with weeds and tangled trees. When traveling with local friends, they repeatedly told me 
that the land used to belong to collective farms and twenty years ago was covered by 
fields and fruit orchards. The bus drivers called out stops along the road, evoking the past 
that simultaneously pointed out the current absences: "the canning factory" (konservnaya 
fabrika), now defunct; "the fruit-berry collective farm" (plodoyagodnoe), now the village 
of Zhandosov, inhabited mostly by oralman; and finally, before reaching the town of 
Kaskelen, simply "the stop" (ostanovka), marked by a broken bench and a few remains of 
a bus shelter sticking out of the ground. As the bus entered Kaskelen, the administrative 
center of Karasai district, the road opened onto a hill, topped by a monument of 
Nauryzbai Batyr, the most celebrated Shaprashty ancestral hero, seated on a horse and 
overlooking the entire town, framed by the spectacular Zailiskii Alatau mountains. 
 
Figure 18:  Monument of Karasai Batyr. Photograph by the author. 
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The entrance to Kaskelen followed along a seemingly endless stretch of open car 
lots, packed with used and new Japanese, Korean, American, and European models. 
"This is Barys, the biggest automobile market in Central Asia," I was told every time we 
passed the bazaar. Another fact my friends liked to mention upon passing the autobazaar, 
was that it belonged to Bolat Nazarbayev, the President's younger brother. Bolat 
Nazarbayev himself lives in Shamalghan, "the Presidential aul," as Shaprashty locals 
proudly call it, on a street named after his mother. On the main square near the renovated 
House of Culture and the district government (akimat) building, is a monument of 
Karasai Batyr, also seated on a rearing horse, distinguishable from the Nauryzbai Batyr's 
statue only by its plaque. In fact, when they bothered to notice or comment on the 
monuments at all, the locals often confused the two batyrs.    
Other monuments and memorials to Shaprashty lineage dot the landscape of 
Shaprashty land. As one leaves Kaskelen and crosses into the neighboring Jambul 
district, a large sign, decorated with two shields and a huge dombra, proudly proclaims: 
"land of poets and warriors" (akyndar men batyrlar eli). The town of Uzynaghash, the 
district center, also features a Karasai monument as well as a statue of the poet Jambul, 
holding a qobyz and gazing into the distance. 
As Bruce Grant (2001) describes for state sponsored monument project in 
Moscow "To view monuments such as these simply for their "artlessness" misses the 
very artful ways by which these state-sponsored public works manage to assert 
themselves as outside the political realm, at the same time as they create it." State nation-
building rhetoric appropriates these ancestors as generalized Kazakh ancestors. Gullette 
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(2010) describes very similar processes of ancestral veneration as part of state-building in 
neighboring Kyrgyzstan. 
In Kyrgyzstan, I suggest that discussion about genealogies has achieved 
such wide recognition not only because it contributes to people's 
understanding of relatedness, but also because it complements the 
government's nation-building project, which has created a genealogy of 
ancestors through the commemoration of historical figures who were 
regarded as contributing to the development of the Kyrgyz state 
(particularly in 2003 during the 'Year of Kyrgyz Statehood') and through 
the erection of statues of these figures throughout the country. The 
manipulation of history that ultimately informs memory and the way 
people understand their patrilineal ancestors is profoundly political.  
 
The Presidential theme in Kaskelen continued with the regional history museum 
(istoriko-kraevedcheskij muzej), usually called the President's museum, or, depending on 
how much sarcasm one chose to put in the reference, "The First Museum of the First 
President of Kazakhstan." As the director of the museum explained, after carefully 
copying the information on my business card, my passport, and my Kazakhstani visa, and 
then personally taking me on the tour of the rooms, it opened in 1999 with an exposition 
dedicated to President Nazarbayev.  The rest of the museum housed various exhibits 
associated with the President: photographs of him greeting various foreign luminaries, 
photographs of his parents and family, and numerous gifts presented to the president by 
foreign state officials, such as commemorative medals, engraved pens, and even a tea set. 
Prominently displayed on the central wall of the main exhibit room, framed behind glass, 
is a large print of Shaprashty shezhire, culminating with the name of Nursultan 
Nazarbayev himself.  Similar copies of the shezhire are displayed in many offices of local 
government officials. 
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At the time of my visit, the director of the regional history museum acknowledged 
that she did not know much about local history and sent me to Usenbai-ata, who studied 
and collected materials about local history for many decades. He knows anything there is 
to know about Kaskelen history, she assured me, and then phoned ahead to make sure I 
did not miss the meeting. Usenbai-ata, a man in his seventies, lived alone (unusual for an 
elderly Kazakh man), in a small apartment in a 5-story Soviet-era building. He served me 
tea in a kitchen, lit up at the sight of my recorder, and quickly got down to what was 
clearly his passion: talking about local history.  As my recorded conversation with him 
was over two hours long, I am only presenting certain excerpts.  Usenbai-ata begins the 
conversation: 
Is the recording going?  
 
[pause]  
 
Now, scientists have found historical documents from all around the world 
and have established that the history of Kazakhs, of Kazakh people, is 
more than four thousand years old. More than four thousand years old. 
This is documented. Now, anthropological research and archeological 
research also support these documents.  
 
Right after he checks that the recorder is on, Usenbai-ata begins with the claim 
that Kazakh history is 4000 years old, which is about 3400 years older than the date 
accepted by most academic historians, who usually date the beginning of Kazakh people 
no earlier than the establishment of the Kazakh Kaghanate in the 1450's. This is the date 
that the word "Kazakh" begins to appear in the written sources. Usenbai-ata's claim is 
precisely the kind of argument about "the dizzying depth" of Kazakh history that was 
mocked in the newspaper article discussed above and is frequently scorned by "expert" 
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(meaning academically trained and institutionally affiliated) historians in Kazakhstan. At 
the same time, Usenbai-ata relies on similar kinds of authoritative "documentary" sources 
to support his argument ("this is all documented"): written documents, anthropological 
and archaeological data, such as human remains and artifacts, such as ancient coins 
excavated in Almaty.  
In a similar way, Kazakhs in Mongolia, most of whom belong to Kerei and 
Naiman ru, bring up "The Secret History of the Mongols" and runic and Turkic stone 
inscriptions to claim their belonging in Mongolia, along with reciting shezhire, place 
names, songs, stories, and poems, considered to be the usual sources of Kazakh "oral 
historical traditions." Kazakhs in Kazakhstan and Mongolia have also been almost 
universally literate (many in more than one language) and have all gone through the same 
compulsory public education system since at least the 1940's. Kazakh students in both 
countries used the same textbooks, imported to Mongolia from the Soviet Union and their 
teachers trained in many of the same places. More recently, Kazakhstan has been 
spreading its particular narrative of Kazakh history through television, radio, and print 
media in Bayan Ulgii. Much of what people in Kazakhstan and Mongolia know and tell 
of their history has been learned in classrooms, read in popular history books and 
historical works of literature, and portrayed on film. It is in these contexts that, like 
Usenbai-ata, they also learned to privilege specific kinds of sources and methodologies: 
as Svoboda Slova editorial put it, "history as the science of events" and material 
(permanent) objects that can be dated and claimed as evidence: written text, rock marks, 
human remains, coins, and other artifacts.   
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Usenbai-ata followed his more general historical introduction with the longest, 
most richly detailed part of his narrative, describing the 18th century Jungar wars and the 
Kazakh resistance against them. As he focuses on famous Shaprashty ancestors, he also 
weaves in the theme of territorial and national unity of all Kazakhs tribes. 
 
...But one very interesting side of this question is this: from Uralsk to 
Altai, meaning from west to east, and from Omsk to Almaty, or even to 
the Issyk Kul [lake], (Issyk Kul used to be Kazakhstani land, the Kyrgyz 
moved there later as the Kyrgyz were given this place by the Kazakhs.)  
And, so all of this place, even though they [the Kazakhs] were migrating, 
they preserved this territory, because they gathered armies. As soon as 
they needed to fight against an enemy, they always became united. And 
the last battle took place in 1780. This was Abylai Khan who went against 
the Jungars and the Jungars were thrown out of here, across these Jungar 
mountains. They also won because, while the Jungars were involved in 
capturing our territory, their lands were captured by the Chinese. So when 
they came back, they had no land, no homes, no cities left at all. And so 
the Jungar state disappeared completely. There is no Jungar state at all 
anymore. 
 
In her analysis of Kazakh historiography, Yerofeeva (2007) argues that, from the 
end of the 17th century, the long struggle between the three Kazakh zhuzes (tribal 
confederations) and Jungaria "has become one of the main themes of Kazakh popular 
folkore (historic and genealogical legends, songs, poems, sayings and proverbs), and 
later, of Kazakh national written literature (fiction, dramaturgy, popular history, academic 
and popular science publications), as well as visual art, cinema, and theater" (138). These 
are also the events recounted in the song Elim-ai, which the apa from China sang to us in 
Duman.  
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Usenbai-ata recounted the stories of famous Shaprashty batyrs and their battles 
with the Jungar enemy in vivid detail.  
And Jungars, when they captured this place, they permitted themselves to 
be complacent, careless. They were, we could say, like the Hitler's 
occupiers; "We captured everything, the land is ours, the people are ours, 
everything is ours." But, meanwhile, the Kazakhs are gathering in the 
steppes, far away in the steppes, and preparing their armies. First, 
Nauryzbai killed Kaskelen here in hand to hand combat [Kaz. zhelpe-
zhek, form of wrestling]. In the book of Kazybek Bek, it is written that 
Nauryzbai pierced him. Kaskelen had a hole, right here, in his stomach. 
And Nauryzbai found this hole and stuck his spear through it, and raised 
him on his spear, because he was a strong man. His height was two meters 
and he had great strength. And he threw him down, stone dead. So then, 
Khooren cried: "Botamai Botamai" ["Oh my baby camel" affectionate, 
meaning my child or my my baby], meaning my son. Then, the Kazakhs 
berated him. "What were you thinking when he marched against the 
Kazakhs? You should have said something then. What are you crying for 
now?" And so that is how Kaskelen was killed by Nauryzbai.   
 
Stories of Kazakh batyrs, like that of Nauryzbai, narrated by Usenbai-ata, 
including the narrative scenes of hand-to-hand combat and their words in the field of 
battle, are deeply embedded in Kazakh oral histories, poetry, and genealogies. Since the 
late 18th century, these were also compiled, written down, analyzed, and turned into 
works of national Kazakh literature and art. They are also part of national history in 
textbooks and popular non-fiction works of history aimed at non-academic public 
(publitsistika).  
Attention to sources and narrative themes that Usenabai-ata weaves into his 
narrative shows how histories of specific lineages connect with nationally framed 
historical narratives and ancestors of specific tribes and lineages become articulated as 
generalized Kazakh ancestors. Later in the conversation, he tells the story of the three 
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Kazakh judges (bii) who united the disparate Kazakh tribes in the face of the Jungar 
enemy. 
...And at that time, Kazakhs gathered together and many migrated away 
east and many migrated over the mountains and many perished. And this 
is called, how is this called... Alkakol Sulama...Aq...how to say this. 
 
[Me: "bedstviya" (Rus. Troubles)]  
 
Yes, troubles... terrible troubles. But Kazakhs saw this and the Kazakh 
biis, Tole Bii, Aiteke bii, Kazbek bii, the three biis of the 3 clans (rodov) - 
the Eldest zhuz, the Middle zhuz and the Youngest zhuz; these biis 
pressured their khans to unite. ToleBii, he took a straw and gave it to one 
person: "Break it!" He took it and broke it. Then, he took a whole handful 
of straws: "Now try and break them." He cannot break them. "So," he 
says, "now, if we go one by one, we will be killed. If we unite, we will not 
be conquered." And that is why they united: here Nauryzbai Batyr, there 
Kabanbai Batyr, over there Bogenbai Batyr, the three heroes gathered all 
the armies. This one 10,000, that one 10,000, that one 10,000 more, and 
basically they gathered 100,000.  
 
The story of Tole Bii and his handful of twigs, and the 3 biis (judges) that brought 
the Kazakh Khans together in time of war, are also well known axiomatic stories, retold 
again and again in Kazakh poems, songs, and novels of Soviet Kazakh writers. Themes 
of division and unity among Kazakhs are reoccurring thematic and political tropes and 
these stories are often referenced on the pages of Kazakh newspapers. When talking 
about Kazakh history or commenting on current political situation in Kazakhstan, people 
often cited a saying attributed to Tole Bii, concerning Kazakh historical division into 
three distinct zhuz.  
Uly Zhuz [eldest Zhuz] -  give them a [shepherd] staff and let them raise 
livestock. 
Orta Zhuz  [Middle Zhuz]  - give them a pen and let them be judges. 
Kishi Zhuz [Youngest Zhuz] - give them a spear and let them fight 
enemies. 
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As Yessenova (2005:671) argues: "defining the talents of Kazakhs from different 
zhuzes, this idiomatic expression neatly supplements the genealogical construct of the 
Kazakh ethnicity." It is used to illustrate differences among Kazakhs, sometimes 
explained by historical and geographic circumstances: Kazakhs of Orta Zhuz are the most 
educated and are inclined to scholarly and intellectual pursuits, because they were the 
first to come in contact with the Russians. Kishi Zhuz, such as Adai, are warlike, 
stubborn, and aggressive, and Adai women have a particularly fierce reputation. This is 
because they lived near Turkmen tribes and had to fight a lot and protect other Kazakhs 
from Turkmen raids. Orta Zhuz, mostly associated with the fertile regions in the south 
and east, are described as always having been pastoralists.  
The story of the three bii serves as a powerful metaphor for nation building, used 
by the Kazakhstani government, which erected a statue to them in the capital Astana (see 
Deiner 2002. However, for Kazakhs familiar with these idiomatic stories, their meaning 
could be also be interpreted in a way that criticizes the Nazarbayev family and what 
many perceive as privileged position of his Shaprashty ru in the country. So people 
would say that Shaprashty are from the Orta Zhuz, they have always been shepherds and, 
therefore, they should not be running the country. The Shaprashty, and by extension 
President Nazarbayev, are unfit to run the country, as the Shaprashty were never known 
to lead in affairs of state among Kazakhs.  
Kazybek bek and the buried book 
In his description of the Jungar wars, Usenbai ata mentioned a book by Kazybek 
bek, which he cited as an authoritative historical source. However, the story of the book's 
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existence itself, as well the histories described in it, are quite controversial. In 1993, a 
man brought a manuscript to the editorial office of Almaty newspaper Zhalyn (Kaz. 
Flame). Balghabek Kydyrbekuly was a journalist and writer, chief editor of Sotsyalystyq 
Kazakhstan and head of Kazakhstan Union of Writers in 1983-1989. He had a long and 
prolific writing career and published many articles, as well as fiction novels and short 
stories. This time, however, the book he brought to the publisher was not his own. 
Balghabek-agha presented the editor with a handwritten manuscript, which he claimed 
has been written by a 17th century Shaprashty Kazybek Bek, of whom Balghabek was a 
direct descendant. He explained that the original manuscript was written by Kazybek bek 
sometime in the 1730s and was entitled "Tup-tukiyannan ozime shejin" ("From distant 
ancestors to myself"). According to Balghybek, the book has been preserved by 
Kazybek's descendants by being copied by hand every forty or fifty years. According to 
him, in 1937, the manuscript was given to Uraz Jandosov, well known Kazakh activist, 
commissar of education (Rus. narkom prosveschenniya), and head of Almaty regional 
executive committee. However, Zhandosov, like many other members of Kazakh elite, 
did not survive the year in party purges. Balghybek's mother, who lived next to 
Zhandosov, saw their neighbor being arrested and "old books with Arabic writing" 
confiscated and burned in the yard. She became afraid, took the manuscript from the 
house and buried it in an empty field. Balghybek said that the book has been reburied 
several times after that, and only now he felt safe to bring it to light.  
The book and especially the stories of how it was preserved by Kazybek Bek's 
Shaprashty descendants became a media sensation and created lively debate in the press 
that published excerpts from the books, discussions, interviews with historians and 
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philosophers and arguments pro and con whether the book was indeed authentic or a fake 
written by Balghabek himself. Scholars consulted on the subject, historians, linguists, 
archaeologists, and ethnographers, almost universally proclaimed the book a fake, given 
its contents, vocabulary, and its many anachronisms. Some have criticized the book for 
inventing genealogies and focusing exclusively on Shaprashty lineage and glorification of 
Shaprashty ancestors (see Masanov 2007).   
Nevertheless, the book was published in hard cover edition of 300,000 copies, and 
was followed by many public festivities organized by members of Shaprashty lineage and 
local government. There was a feast in 1993, celebrating 350 years of Orbulaq Battle, 
when, as the author of the book describes, 600 Kazakh warriors defeated a Jungar army 
of 10,000. Later, in 2010, Shamalghan station, where Balghybek was born, was renamed 
Kazybek bek. In 2011, a memorial was opened there, featuring four seating figures of 
Shaprashty ancestors described in the book, Tausar-ata, Kazybek bek, Kaskary, and 
Moldabaj, surrounded by flowerbeds and asphalt paths. As I lived in Kaskelen and 
Jambul districts, considered the home of Shparashty, I also lived with and visited many 
local Shaprashty. The book was on the shelves of many local homes and, like Usenbai 
did in his interview, people quoted from and referenced the book as an authentic 
historical source and documentary evidence. It was compelling to them not only because 
it described their own Shaprashty history, but also because of the way it was written and 
preserved, passed down through generations as material evidence that could not be 
ignored. The book also represented an authoritative source through which moral 
judgments of contemporary forms of government and community can be evoked. As 
historians at the Academy of Sciences picked over the historical inaccuracies and 
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fantastical claims in the book, it is the prophesies of Maiky bii, a judge, poet, and sage, 
quoted in the book, that gained the most attention and discussion among locals and in 
popular media that disseminated the story outside of academic journals.   
People will live in big houses. Every month there will be meetings around 
the land, from which people will see no use.  Rule will change often. To 
you [sing.], Kazakh, there will be born envious people – your sons. And 
your daughters will be disobedient. And your daughters-in-law will not 
step out of the way for their elders. People will drink water which even 
dogs do not drink. However, the people will develop a liking for it. 
Medicines will be round like small buttons. There will be among you 
elders whose advice and admonitions noone will listen to. And you will 
have younger brothers who will argue against you. And your language will 
be motley, made of mixture of many languages. And your faith will be 
made of faiths of different gods. There will appear people who will suck 
blood from other people. And your kin will not help you in time of 
trouble. And husbands will live with their wives like cats with dogs. You 
will have worthless money made out of paper, which you will throw 
around and which will have no value. And when you will finally pass 
through all these trials of life, you will die.  
 
As Keane (YEAR) argues, in this case the mode of transmission is more 
important than its content, highlighting the importance of the chains of authority 
involved. Nation-building rhetoric and political legitimation of the Kazakhstani state rests 
not only on the model of common territory, language, and culture ("modular 
nationalism"), but also on genealogies, the celebration of particular ancestors, the 
restoration and building of shrines, mausoleums, monuments, and memorials to 
generalized Kazakh ancestors.  
I was reminded of the line from Kazybek bek' prophecy "Every months there will 
be meetings around the land, from which people will see no use" when in April 2007, my 
research assistant Zhake and I drove from Almaty to the town of Kaskelen to meet with 
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an official at the district land committee (zemel'nij kommitet)50.  As we drove past the 
large new administration (akimat) building, a renovated House of Culture, and, by then, 
our third monument of another Shaprashty batyr seated on a horse, Zhake noticed the 
colorful banners announcing the new "Presidential Address to the people of Kazakhstan" 
festooned on building walls and billboards around the main square. "They are probably 
having a meeting (sobrannie) all day today. Probably for discussing this Presidential 
Address," Zhake waved his hand at the rows of parked cars and groups of men in suites 
smoking on the steps of the akimat. Then he sighed, "We are now like in Soviet times" 
("u nas teper kak v sovetskoe vremya"). As it turned out, Zhake was right. The official we 
were looking for was not at her desk at the land committee, but in the meeting about the 
Presidential address, in the akimat building we just passed on the way. 
 Comparisons to "the Soviet time" came up again a few days later, in a 
conversation with Omirzhan-agha. I asked him why he wanted to drive his wife Nara to 
the district hospital in Kaskelen to see a doctor, when a brand new hospital building was 
right across the street from us. I just moved to Shamalghan and was impressed by the 
seeming prosperity of the "Presidential" village, compared with other places I've seen, 
like a large Friday mosque next to the mausoleum where Nazarbayev's parents were 
buried, two new schools, and a state-run kindergarten. In response, Omirzhan laughed out 
loud. That hospital, he said, was built about one year ago, when they first moved to 
Shamalghan. There was a grand opening, a shynouik (government official/bureaucrat, 
from Russia chinovnik) came, cut the blue ribbon, and people threw shashu51. As soon as 
                                                 
50 Government department in charge of all local land transactions, such as sales, deeds, leases, legalization 
of land titles, and allocation of land plots to oralman and other newcomers who register as permanent 
residents in the district.    
51 Kazakh custom of throwing candy and other sweets into the crowd of guests attending a celebration. 
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the official left, they just locked the building back up again and it's been closed ever 
since. It's just a fancy outside, with nothing inside, completely empty. 
Besides, Omirzhan added, Nara wanted to see a specific doctor at the Kaskelen 
hospital, because the doctor's sister is married to a man from Germany, so they know 
each other. (Nara and Omirzhan lived in Germany for 10 years before moving to 
Kazakhstan and Nara really enjoyed speaking German when she got the chance.) It's 
useless to see another doctor anyway, Nara agreed with him.  Although, theoretically, the 
state provides free health care for citizens and returnees, connections, acquaintances, or 
bribes are often necessary to insure decent care, to get necessary tests done quickly, or to 
obtain medicine. Like schoolteachers and other state employees, doctors and nurses 
routinely relied on payments and "gifts," in cash and kind, to supplement their miniscule 
state salaries (about $90-120/month in 2007-2008 in rural areas).  
This conversation led into Omirzhan's and many Mongolian Kazakhs' favorite 
topic of discussion with me: criticism of government inefficiency and corruption in 
Kazakhstan. "Everywhere here, things only get done when Nazarbayev says so. Whatever 
Nazarbayev says should be done, they do it. But if he doesn't say anything, then they 
don't do anything. The Kazakhs here have sultan destur...[he paused and offered an 
explanation] ... this means like in Russian "mentality" (mentalnost). Like these 
'Presidential Addresses' every year. It's so funny, how the President just says something 
and people rush to do it. If he doesn't say anything, no one ever bothers doing anything 
about it. It's like in the Soviet time."  
While Zhake has lived his whole life in Kazakhstan, Omirzhan and Nara were 
from Mongolia and only moved to Kazakhstan two years elarier. Yet they both noted the 
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simialirities and continuities with Soviet time in current government institutions and 
forms of power.  In interactions with the state, people interpret their experiences as 
familiar continuities (institutional, cultural, habitual behavior) through personal 
interactions with local state officials and the physical spaces of government buildings 
they occupy, bureaucratic practices, and their material artefacts (Hull 2003). Aretxaga ( 
2003: 400) described the state as "a certain genre of representation" and such continuities 
are at once symbolic and material, like the monuments of national heroes and banners, 
and ubiquitous portraits of Nursultan Nazarbayev himself, who has been at the head of 
Kazakhstan's government since 1986.  
The idea of  "sultan dastur" or "khan mentality" is often brought up to explain 
people who by their history and mentality or "culture" are not ready for Western-style 
liberal democracy as in descriptions of "post-socialist" people who are stuck in the past,  
as apathetic passive populace, applied to everyone from Russia to Kazakhstan (see Liu 
2003, Lemon 2009).  These are not only stereotypes employed by outsiders. Within 
Kazakhstan itself, such criticism has long history, from famous Kazakh poets of the 
nineteenth century who blamed the passivity, selfishness, and tribal divisions of Kazakhs 
for their demise in the face of Russian colonialism to "zombified public" criticism of 
post-Soviet intellectuals (Abai 1995; Masanov 2007).  
Nazarbayev himself has offered elaborations on this view in his description of 
Kazakhs as a "consensus-hierarchical society." In his "Strategy 'Kazakhstan 2030': The 
Strategy for Development" (a kind of Presidential state of the nation address), he stated: 
We are a Eurasian country, possessing our own history and our own 
future. Therefore our model will not be similar to anyone else's. It will 
absorb into itself the achievements of different civilizations...Our strategic 
objective is the unity of numerous groups of the population, a reasonable 
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combination of personal and communal fundamentals, which supplements 
the consensus-hierarchical traditions of our society. 
 
Nazarbayev further explained what he might mean by "consensus-hierarchical 
traditions" of Kazakh society in his interview on the Russian news program "News on 
Saturday." He was asked about the title Elbasy, commonly used for him in Kazakhstan, 
which literally means "head of the people" or, as it is rendered in Russian, "leader of the 
nation" (lider natsii).  
We are an Eastern society. In Asia, there has been its own order and its 
own relationship toward a chief, a leader, an emir, a ruler. And there is 
nothing that can be done about it. Since the first days of independence and 
my presidency, I have been struggling with adorations addressed toward 
me. Attempts to name some street, some school where I studied, or 
something else, after me are constant. But, at the same time, one should 
not take offense. Sometimes, you see that it is being done very sincerely, 
from the heart.  I know for sure that more than ten thousand letters were 
written to me and the parliament, in order to confirm such title, "Leader of 
the nation." 
 
He continued by drawing on Kazakh cultural notions of tor and dastarkhan as 
symbols of traditional social hierarchies of age, gender, and status:  
'El' means people and 'basy' means head. Kazakhs have 'dastarkhan'; it is a 
table covered with tablecloth in a yurt, and the most honored person is 
seated at the head of the table [tor]. So he is the one called "torbasy," from 
which the word 'elbasy' came from. The new for us Latin word "President 
"originally meant "the eldest at the table," the head of a gathering, whether 
big or small...For Kazakhs, the term "President' is not fitting to talk about 
the head of state."  
 
As Elbasy, President Nazarbayev benefits from substantial legal protection. In 
May 2010, during the OSCE chairmanship, the parliament gave Nazarbayev the 
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constitutional title of  Elbasy, and granted him unprecedented legal privileges. The law 
guarantees his lifelong immunity from prosecution for acts committed during the 
presidency and protection of his and his family's property; it also prohibits public insults 
against him and defacing his image (Kazakhstan: Waiting for Change 2013). 
 President Nazarbayev legitimizes his power by drawing his own continuities, not 
with the Soviet past, as Omirzhan and Zhake did, but with the "traditional" ancestral 
values of Kazakh "nomadic" society that serve as a cultural and moral ideal. However, I 
argue that his conflation of ideas about kinship and hospitality with political power is 
challenged by many people in Kazakhstan who perceive it rather as a mode of 
governmental corruption and legacy of Soviet times and not the sacred way of the 
Kazakh ancestors.   
This came across in my conversation with one government official at a district 
akimat. He shared an office with another woman official in charge of oralman issues and, 
when he heard that I was studying return migration, he told me that he himself was an 
oralman. He moved to Kazakhstan from Uzbekistan (Karakalpakistan region) in the late 
1980s and, although, strictly speaking, not officially an oralman, because the policy of 
repatriation did not then exist and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were the same country, he 
nevertheless identified with them. After meeting me, he talked to me outside the office 
and he urged me to write about the position of Shaprashty ru in his district. He said: "You 
should write about what I tell you. Maybe you can't talk about it too sharply, but, maybe, 
you can mention about it in your dissertation." 
I was a head of professional union (profsoyuz) in Noukos, I know how to 
run things, but when they were going to appoint a new head of the 
financial department, they would not appoint me, because I am not 
Shaprashty, because I am an oralman. The head guy said no.  
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[Did he say that himself directly to you like that?  I asked.] 
 
No [he waived his hand.] The little people (malenkie ludi) told me that it is 
because I am not shaprashty. Instead, they put some young kid, 25 years 
old. Should it be done like that? I want to say, Nazarbayev is OK, he is an 
alright guy. He did a lot of good things. Among all the countries, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgiziya, Ukraine, Belorus, Pribaltika, we live well. There is 
enough bread, we live ok. There are some people who struggle to get 
bread for their families, but in general we live alright. From Uzbekistan, 
from Kyrgiziya, people graze here [pasutsya u nas]. Because here it is 
better. Nazarbayev molodets, but he makes mistakes too. Bolat [his yonger 
brother], Dariga [his daughter], they have so much money, they are 
millionaires. This is not right. And he knows about it too. If he told them: 
"Stop this. I forbid you," this would be right, but he doesn't do anything 
about it. If he was doing that, if anyone said anything bad about him, I 
would say, stop criticizing him. But this Bolat Nazarbayev. Who is he? A 
plumber [slesar'] with no education. But his word is the law in our district. 
Should things like that be allowed? Whatever he says, everybody runs to 
do it. Plumber, what does he understand about anything?! (Slesar, razve 
on chto to ponimaet?) But the shaprashty always get the green light. 
 
Later I mentioned this conversation to a local Kazakh friend and mentioned the 
word "tribalism" (traibalizm) which I recently saw in a newspaper. He responded: 
Yes, well strictly speaking the word tribalism is not applicable to Kazaks 
and our divisions into zhuzes. Strictly speaking what we have is not 
tribalism, like among the Arabs. But, this tribalism, if we can call it that, 
this "zhuzism" ("zhuzovstvo"), this began in Soviet time, during the time 
of Kunaev52. When [A] was the secretary of Almaty oblast commitee, he 
was from the Elder Zhuz, and he only accepted people from his zhuz to 
work for him. People said that you could not get a job anywhere if you 
were from the other zhuzes. This was all unofficial, quite, people 
whispered about it. And those who were from other zhuzes did not like it. 
I, for example, I am from the Youngest zhuz, but I grew up among the 
Middle zhuz, in Kostanai region. Although I am from the Youngest zhuz, I 
grew up there. So, when I came to Almaty to work here, the director of the 
institute who hired me was also from the Youngest zhuz. And his wife was 
from the same town where I was from, so she was like a relative to us. 
                                                 
52 Kunaev was the longest lasting Kazakh Soviet leader as the Head of Kazakh SSR in 1942-1952 and 
1964-1986.   
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And then there were people who wrote complaints about him, that he hired 
relatives, people from his zhuz. So, he said to me: 'If I hire you, they are 
going to say, he is hiring his wife's relatives." So this "zhuzovstvo", 
"kumovstvo," it happened, but it wasn't common. And Nazarbayev, he 
inherited [unasledoval] all of this. He stayed in power, after Kunaev and 
Kolbin, and when he became president he had all of the people around him 
from Kaskelen, Shamalghan, like this guy E [someone we knew] and 
many others, all from the Eldest zhuz. And now, how is it called, "the 
team"[kommanda], right? When a new akim comes, he can fire all of the 
older akimat people and gather his own kommanda around him. They say, 
this is because he has to know people working for him, have people he can 
rely on. But I think this is wrong, this "kumovstvo." It is necessary to look 
not based on people's nationality or clan (rod), but their knowledge and 
what they can do, right?  
 
This assertion that "zhuzovstvo" was a Soviet and not specifically Kazakh 
phenomenon was common and people connected it to nepotism as a Soviet phenomenon, 
not something intrinsic to Kazakhness (see also Schatz 2004). As Gullette (2010:97) also 
argues, as a local concept, 'tribalizm' is "an allegation of corruption; it is not primarily an 
identification of kinship." As Shryock (1995) argues for Bedouin tribal histories in 
Jordan,  "there can be no doubt that nationalist discourse is the medium in which the 
tribes are textually historicizing themselves."  Nation-building rhetoric and political 
legitimation of Kazakhstani state rests not only on the model of common territory, 
language, and culture ("modular nationalism"), but also on genealogies, celebration of 
particular ancestors, restoration and building of shrines, mausoleums, monuments, and 
memorials to generalized Kazakh ancestors. At the same time, Shryock's argument that, 
in the Middle East, genealogical forms of thought and tribalism are two completely 
distinct concepts is also apt for describing the way people in Kazakhstan think about the 
relationship:  
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Authentic forms of human community, and certainly the most reliable 
forms of human knowledge, are reproduced genealogically, whether in 
biological pedigrees or intellectual chains of transmission. Arab identity 
itself is often defined, like family or clan affiliation, in an idiom of 
descent; most Arab states are ruled by family cliques or hereditary 
dynasts; even Islamic learning, which transcends the world of biological 
ties, has traditionally been depicted as an inheritance whose authenticity is 
safeguarded by the accurate, lineal, face-to face transmission of sacred 
Arabic utterances and authoritative texts: in other words, by legitimate 
"genealogical" succession. At the same time, however, the idea that tribes 
are (and should be) peripheral to the concerns of the high culture-to Law, 
Religion, and Government-has been the moral bias of urban intellectuals 
in the Middle East since ancient times.  
 
Local government officials and return migrants 
It is crucial to remember that local government officials who work with returnees 
are themselves local residents of the villages and districts where they work. They are a 
part of the local community, embedded in the dense social networks of kin, friends, 
neighbors, and coworkers.  Many of them have been involved in local government 
administration for many decades, often seamlessly transitioning from positions in village 
or district soviets to fulfilling the same or similar functions in the post-Soviet government 
administration now known as akimat. Thus, like all of us, they speak and act from 
multiple social positionings, as government officials, concerned citizens, and local 
residents who themselves have witnessed and participated in the tremendous changes of 
the post-Soviet decades. The government officials at the district akimat level are the ones 
most immediately involved in dealing with questions and issues that concern the 
returnees specifically. These include keeping information about returnee families, 
answering their questions, dealing with residency registrations and permits, and assisting 
with applications for financial help, housing, and citizenship. In the Almaty region, the 
officials that are responsible for "oralman affairs" are usually at the lowest level of the 
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bureaucratic hierarchy and they are invariably women, "volunteered" for these duties by 
the head of the district administration, the akim. They fulfill these responsibilities in 
addition to what is considered their "regular work" and they are not paid extra to do it. 
They are all part of the "culture, sports, and recreation department" of the akimat, still 
routinely referred to by everyone there as the "ideological department" (ideologicheskij 
otdel), as it was known in Soviet times. Thus, work with the returnees was officially seen 
as part of the government administration that involved general community outreach work, 
assistance to needy families, and cultural work of organizing district-wide events and 
celebrations. Many of these officials did not consider their work with returnees to be a 
priority in their often extremely busy schedules. In one district akimat in the spring of 
2007, the official who I spent considerable time with, talking to her and observing her 
work, spent all of her time in dealing with the immediate problem of a highly 
controversial land dispute involving a community of Hare Krishnas and planning a large 
public Nauryz (New Year) celebration. In the fall, she was again busy with collecting and 
distributing clothes, toys, school supplies and food to needy families, as well as many 
other regular duties.     
Government policies concerning repatriation and settlement are often ambiguous, 
vague, and sometimes contradictory. Thus, they leave considerable space for variable 
interpretations and implementations on the ground. Significantly, there are no clear, 
centrally established criteria for allocating quotas to the returnee families. Only those 
who are included in the annual repatriation quota are eligible to receive government 
assistance, such as money, land allocation, and housing. While the central government 
decides on the number of quotas allocated annually for each region, it is the regional 
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migration committees who receive the applications and decide who would get it and in 
what order. A government official at the regional Migration Department acknowledged to 
me that there are no established standard criteria by which the quotas were allocated. 
Some, she said, favored allocating quotas based on need, such as to families with many 
children, elderly, and disabled. Others, allocated quotas based on the level of education or 
specific occupations. As in the official conceptions and policies circulated by the central 
government, the tension between different understandings of repatriation directly affected 
their practical implementations.  
Even before the applications went to the regional Migration Committee, the local 
akimat workers, although not themselves responsible for allocating quotas, played an 
important role in this process, weeding out the applicants and often deciding who should 
apply and who should not. As they were usually the ones that the returnees went to for 
information and help, I routinely observed government officials discourage certain people 
from applying, telling them that they were not eligible for or had no chance to receive the 
benefits. In some cases, a monetary bribe was a decisive factor in who got the assistance 
or was pushed toward the front of the line. In other cases, the officials explained that their 
decisions were based on the individuals' previous occupation, level of education, 
ethnicity of their spouses, or their perceived "moral character".  
Far from using centrally established, objective, or universal criteria, the local 
officials rely on their own understanding and interpretation of the laws, constructing their 
own parameters of inclusion and exclusion, membership and belonging. In the course of 
their interactions with the returnees, the officials are creating and articulating social and 
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moral norms of personhood, general behavior, even gender roles, and family life. As one 
local government official explained to me: 
We write nationality by the father. If the father is Kazakh, then the 
children are Kazakh. So, if her husband is Kazakh, this woman, she is 
giving birth to Kazakhs (rozhaet Kazahov). Then the children and the 
wife, they all get quota. If the wife is Kazakh, but the husband is for 
example Uzbek, she is giving birth to Uzbeks (rozhaet Uzbekov). Then she 
can receive oralman status, but the husband does not. When the children 
go to receive their passport [at age 16], they can decide what nationality 
they want to choose, the mother's or the father's. So, it goes by the 
husband.  
 
Although Kazakhstan law states that returnee status is reserved for the "persons of 
the titular nationality", who exactly qualified as Kazakh is far from obvious or 
universally shared. The local officials evoked multiple criteria, including their personal 
understandings of kinship and ethnicity, based on their interpretations of shared Kazakh 
norms of genealogical descent, Soviet-based criteria of ethno-national membership, and 
central government directives. This involved not only interpretations of kin and ethnic 
belonging but also ideas of what constituted "normal" or "ideal" families and gender 
roles. Frequently, the unstated assumption is that "the head of the household" (an official 
designation) is a man, even when many households are in fact headed by women. 
 
Labyrinths of institutions 
In conversations with me, Mongolian Kazakhs often expressed their frustrations 
with Kazakhstani government bureaucracy and corruption. As Tamara stated: "In 
Mongolia, it was better, more democracy, but here they only talk about it. Here, it is 
'Kaghazstan' not 'Kazakhstan' (literally "paperstan," as kaghaz means paper in Kazakh.)  
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Even the physical spaces of government office buildings are labyrinthine. One 
needs inside knowledge, reason and permission to be there to navigate the internal 
hierarchies successfully. Unlike in the US, where one might have to go through a metal 
detector to be able to enter the government building, at the Kaskelen district akimat one 
must pass the guard who asks each visitor where they are going and the reason for 
coming. The guard wears a uniform, he is a figure of authority, and he may bar one from 
entering, but he could also be asked for help, swayed to sympathize with one's situation, 
or might turn out to be a source of useful information.  
Immediately inside the building is a waiting area with a few chairs out of which 
lead long narrow hallway with anonymous doors, all painted white and displaying only 
room numbers. In order to see a government official, one first has to know who 
specifically to see for issue or problem and then have to figure out where and when they 
might find that person. One could ask the guard, often having to explain the issues and 
problems, which is the path I took trying to figure out where to find anyone in charge of 
oralman migration and settlement. I unsuccessfully tried to figure it out from an office 
directory hanging at the entrance, which listed the office of the Presidential party Nur 
Otan and the state-published newspaper "Kazakhstanskaya Pravda" among a long list of 
names and titles but nothing about oralman, migration, or anyone who might have been 
helpful. The guard informed me that there is indeed an official specifically responsible 
for oralman issues, in room #3 and that she is a part of the akimat "ideological 
department." Once you know which official you need to see, you could try and catch the 
official by waiting around, catch them as they exit the office, in the building cafeteria, or 
on a way to the bathroom.  
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For most people, including oralman, the majority of their encounters with the state 
are with local officials on the very bottom of the bureaucratic pyramid. The structure of 
government institutions is highly structured and hierarchical, with villages, cities, 
districts, and regions having their own administration offices, and moving from one to the 
other is seen as moving up the professional ladder. Within each government 
administration office, whether local akimat, land bureau, or migration police, rank and 
spatial hierarchy are reinforced by an office with a door, leather furniture, and a large 
desk for the top government officials, like the head akim and his deputies. Akim's (almost 
always men) assistants (always women) would sit in the atrium outside the office, and so 
on down the hierarchy, with lower level officials stuck in small rooms, often shared with 
several others, with each official having no more than a small desk and file cabinet. Most 
people would never see the akim or even any of his deputies, except at public 
celebrations, where they sit on a podium and give speeches or have their own dastarkhan 
in a separate yurt.  
Many of the difficulties that the migrants face are the result of their lack of 
knowledge of specific local nuances of social interactions, as well as the absence of 
personal contacts and networks of social reciprocity, which structure much of the way 
Kazakhstanis interact with their local government. As one returnee from China expressed 
his distress: "We are used to giving bribes to government officials. It is also common in 
China. But here, we know we have to give a bribe to get things done, but we are afraid. 
Because we don't know how much to give or who to give it to. We are scared: what if we 
give a wrong amount or give it to the wrong person and then we would get in trouble, so 
we are afraid to give money." Apparently, as I've also been told by many people, both 
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returnees and akimat workers, some officials make it easier by providing, literally, a 
standard pricelist for various services. In fact, most of the time, the migrants referred to 
such basically required payments as a "price", required for particular services or favors.  
Not only were citizens/petitioners running around from one government office to 
another, collecting documents and acquiring signatures and stamps, often having to travel 
to different towns and even regions, but lower level officials were rarely in their offices. 
They spent much of their day going from office to office, delivering papers for signatures 
to various higher up officials, running various errand for the akim, or attending local 
meetings that were not deemed important enough for their superiors to attend, like local 
farmers asking for loans or return migrants trying to organize Russian literacy classes for 
women.  
In 2007, because of problems with proliferation of different departments and 
jurisdictions, administrative changes began to be implemented on the local level by 
introducing    TsON (Center for the Service of the Population) to be established in every 
district. These centers were described as "working by the principle of a "single window" 
(odno okno): one place where citizens and oralman can go to receive information, 
register, and receive necessary documents. The centers are run by Ministry of Justice 
rather than local akimat (another fragmentation through attempts to combat it) and they 
are discussed in terms of increased "modernization," transparency, and efficiency of 
government:  
TsONs for the service of the population through the principle of "one 
window" is an institution where every citizen would be able to solve their 
legal problems in a civilized and efficient way. Great importance is given 
to the solution of social problems and blocking corruption. Service 
through the principle of "one window" is the main step against 
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bureaucracy and bribe taking through direct contact between clients and 
officials. 
 
I witnessed how these changes were being implemented in Uzynaghash in the 
summer of 2008. One afternoon, Svetlana took me along in the akimat car, as she was 
rushing to get a stack of papers signed for the deputy akim. On the way there, she told me 
that we are going to the new TsON, where oralman can now take care of everything they 
need in one place, instead of  running around from akimat to passport office to Migration 
Police in order to get their oralman registration, residency permit, or SIK number (similar 
to the US Social Security number).  
This is "the principle of one window" she told me, repeating the phrase that was 
reiterated in government publications and circulated in the media. She added that the idea 
for such centers is based directly on the US practice. "Only, you'll see, it is not civilized 
yet," Svetlana warned me, laughing, as we pulled up to what looked like a school 
building with a courtyard surrounded by a fence. This is where the new Service Center, 
along with the Department of Justice and the Migration Police, was set up during the 
summer, while the school was closed. According to Svetlana, the directive to open the 
centers immediately came "from the very top," but none bothered to allocate any money 
that would be needed for such major administrative changes.  
As we got out of the car and approached the school yard, we could see a thick 
crowd, almost all of them women, spilling outside the fence onto the sidewalk. There 
were no seats or benches, so most people just stood shoulder to shoulder in a thick crowd, 
looking grimly determined to not yield an inch, and a long line of women sat on the 
raised edge of the pavement surrounding the courtyard. Svetlana, a woman of formidable 
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physical proportions, fought her way through the crowd, one hand firmly gripping my 
arm, pulling me behind her, the other raised high above her head, clutching a folder of 
documents. The crowd got thicker and palpably angrier the closer we got to the entrance 
and the low background of murmurs turned to shouts- 'And who are you?" "Where do 
you think you are going?" By the door, the crowd was so thick, I got separated from 
Svetlana. When I got right to the door, I was ambushed by a tiny old woman, wrapped 
completely in shawls and scarves. "Where are you going?" she demanded shrilly from me 
in Kazakh, as her surprisingly strong yank on my purse sent me sprawling back into the 
crowd. "I am with her, with her" I answered desperately as I struggled to make my way 
back to Svetlana at the entrance. She herself got bogged down by the entrance by a 
harassed looking woman with a nametag pinned to her blouse, who held up a piece of 
paper and shouted names into the crowd. "And where are you going?" she also 
demanded. "I am from the akimat", Svetlana answered, retrieving me from the steps and 
pushing her way past the woman inside the building. "You only think about yourselves, 
you don't think about people at all. You should be ashamed!" the woman yelled into her 
back.  
The principle of one window, while seemingly designed to make life easier for 
people and more efficient for administration, created huge crowds. Everybody who 
before waited in scattered lines at different government buildings, were now trying to get 
the same amount of bureaucratic paperwork processed in one place. As Ferguson 
describes what he calls "bureaucratic state power": The explanation of bureaucratic state 
power, then, does not necessarily mean that "the masses" can be centrally coordinated or 
ordered around any more efficiently; it only means that the power relations are referred 
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through state channels - most immediately, that more people must stand in line and await 
rubber stamps to get what they want. What is expanded is not the magnitude of the 
capabilities of "the state," but the extent and reach of a particular kind of exercise of 
power."   
When I came back the following year, 2008, the new service center was 
functional and everyone hated them. Unlike the old offices, where visitors and officials 
were separated perhaps by a table, a literal wall of glass with a small opening now 
separated them. Employees of the center could not be caught in the hallways, walking to 
the bathroom, or going down to the ashana (the canteen) to eat.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I show the interconnectedness of things that are often dichotomized 
and separated into different analytical scales: (1) oral folklore and genealogies versus 
written history and material artifacts, including human DNA;  (2) clan versus local versus 
national and ethnic identities; (3) pre-Soviet and post-Soviet understandings of identity 
and belonging; (4) sedentary versus nomadic notions of place and group; (5) modern state 
and liberal society’s understanding of traditional clan-based identities; dichotomies that 
seem to presuppose and split from each other in an infinity of analytical fractals. I 
analyze these concepts as a series of relationships,  that may be somewhat determined by 
national and global factors, but also as malleable. These relationships may be 
reinterpreted in discourse and practice by people, literally on the ground, as they interact 
with these objects and institutions. Legitimation has to be continuously fought over and 
contested with different kinds of authorities and sources.  These different sources of 
authority and legitimation could come together to produce the kind of verdict in the 
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lawsuit I discussed in the beginning of the chapter, where local genealogies, national 
politics and the authority of the state (symbolized by akim) came together.  In other cases, 
tools of political legitimation and forms of authority can be questioned, turned against the 
state as kinship relationships, genealogies can be used to question the legitimacy of those 
in power. Continuities and differences, similarities and breaks with the past are 
experienced and articulated in varied contexts, in order to resort to traditional authority or 
"cultural mentality," or  to comment on the present as in "we are now like in Soviet time."  
Like the Unified Shezhire, oral narratives, written documents, and genealogies enshrined 
in tables came together as a project of Kazakh new national identity and as a response to 
Russian colonial pressures, as an articulation of Kazakh national identity and history that 
has been "unearthed" (literally in case of the book) again in post-Soviet time and put on 
the internet. As these genealogies have changed their forms and purposes they have 
carried with them traces of their authority (Keane).  
 Ultimately, genealogies and histories are profoundly political, intertwining state 
power, territorial and national belonging along with local and intimate connections. The 
"imagined communities" that emerge and the narratives they draw upon include 
ancestors. In the next chapter, I examine how the notions of kinship and hospitality 
couched in these genealogies are not just idioms or metaphors for relationships to and 
within the nation, but also profoundly affect people’s understanding of relatedness and 
belonging.  Such understandings, in turn, affect people’s notions of social hierarchy, 
political authority and power, democracy, and morality. 
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Chapter Five 
Kazakhshylykh: ancestors, kinship, and hospitality 
 
What is to be considered a misfortune in life? 
Grasslands with not enough space for pasture is a misfortune. 
 
A kind word which we 
had no time to say is a misfortune. 
 
Elders who lost their kin 
and the care of their relatives is a misfortune 
 
A mother in-law who does not value her kin, 
for a daughter in-law is a misfortune. 
 
Valleys where no animals are pastured 
and the grass dies in waste is a misfortune. 
 
Murids who do not teach respect  
for worthy people are a misfortune 
 
A ruler who does not know how to lead his posterity, 
his people, into prosperity, 
 
However good he is otherwise, 
for those he rules is a misfortune. 
(Asan Khaighy, or “Asan the Sorrowful”) 
 
 
The excerpt above is attributed to the poet Asan Khaighy, or “Asan the 
Sorrowful,” who has been identified with the 15th century Hassan, a legendary poet-
philosopher-saint figure.  In this poem, Asan mentions various situations and 
circumstances that are “misfortunes”:  not being good stewards of the grassland and 
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animals, not taking advantage of opportunities to display acts of kindness to others, not 
taking proper care of relatives after a death in the family, not valuing kinship ties, not 
showing respect to teachers and venerable elders, and not leading society to success.  
These misfortunes arise when something is “absent” or “lacking,” causing bad things to 
happen to the people. As I show in this chapter, several of the themes Asan considers in 
the poem are also echoed by people I spoke with in Kazakhstan in the present day, as 
they consider questions of moral behavior, good leadership, and just economic and 
political systems. In the previous chapter, I focused on the importance of genealogies and 
local histories for understanding politics in Kazakhstan and how it affects Mongolian 
Kazakh returnees. In this last chapter, I highlight some important conceptions of Kazakh 
culture that are significant for Kazakhs in Mongolia and in Kazakhstan. They converge 
on a particular understanding of Kazakhshylykh as a deeply meaningful quality of 
“Kazakhness.” Certainly there are important differences and sometimes heated debates 
within and among the different groups of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan and Mongolia about the 
right and responsibility to belong. Between these groups there are different conceptions 
of homeland, ancestry, and belonging. While Mongolian Kazakhs are creating 
connections among ancestry, landscape, and movement to highlight a specific and 
distinct identity encompassed within a larger Kazakh world, Kazakhs in Kazakhstan are 
using the same cultural tropes to illuminate a shared history, one generalized to all 
Kazakhs.  
However, what also emerges are clear points of commonality in the fundamental 
terms of the debate, namely what “belonging” entails as a complex set of culturally 
embedded ideas and practices. A shared primary aspect of this worldview is a non-linear 
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conception of history, a worldview in which ancestors and contemporary populations are 
co-present and in which Kazakhs inhabit the land cyclically (as in the seasonal migration 
of nomadic herders). The acclamation of a Kazakh world is one way in which Kazakhs 
are actively seeking authority and meaning outside the nationalizing promises of the 
Kazakhstani state and the often contradictory and disappointing pragmatic consequences 
of those promises.  In this chapter, I consider a possibility of an alternate view of history 
and community - an “imagined community” that is neither ethnicity nor nation. Rather, 
they are anchored in understandings of a “good life,” economic and spiritual prosperity, 
and a just system of governance.  
First, I examine practices of ancestral veneration and the power of dreams to open 
lines of communications with other worlds and other than living beings. That the 
ancestors are alive is a fundamental tenet of Kazakh belief (see Privratsky 2000). 
Ancestral veneration, expressed in household rituals and frequent pilgrimages, is the 
focus of religious life and practice in Inner Asia and Kazakh practices of Islam can be 
described as a religion of ancestors and sacred places connected with them. Communal 
and religious identities are inextricably linked through ancestors and through practices of 
hospitality that encompass living and nonliving, as well as human and nonhuman entities 
(some Kazakh ancestors are also sacred animals).  I also examine the significance of 
kinship and hospitality, which are seen as the defining characteristics of “Kazakhness" 
and as an essential part of Kazakh “nomadic heritage.” I argue that, more than serving 
simply as cultural idioms or political metaphors, ideas and practices of kinship and 
hospitality significantly shape the negotiations of political and cultural authority, 
legitimacy, and claims to belonging across political borders. In conclusion, I explore 
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these practices of kinship and hospitality in relation to notions of iman (morality), justice,  
authority,  and leadership. Ultimately, I contend that conception of “just authority” based 
in these communal values challenge prevailing economic and political paradigms of 
socialism vs. capitalism and Western liberal democracy vs. “illiberal Islam.”  
Ancestral veneration, nomadic hospitality, and open doors 
My first encounter with the importance of aruakh (ancestral spirit; from Arabic 
'arwah') and the significance of dreams in communicating with the ancestral world 
happened only two weeks into my first trip to Kazakhstan in the summer 2004. On a 
Friday morning I was woken up by sounds of cooking and a strong smell of frying oil 
coming from the kitchen of my friend Zaure's tiny Soviet-era Almaty apartment. Zaure 
was a busy professional woman with a full time job and, in her own words, not 
particularly domestic, at least by Kazakh woman standards, and she would usually grab 
her meals on the fly. So I was surprised to see her hovering over the stove where a huge 
pot of cooking oil was filling up the kitchen with smoke.  
As Zaure was dropping round pieces of dough into the oil for a few seconds, 
snatching the round thin shelpek (flat round bread deep fried in oil) and stacking them on 
a plate next to her, she told me that last night she has seen her deceased father in a dream. 
When she woke up, the image of her father still vivid in her mind, she realized that it was 
not a meaningless dream but an actual appearance of her father's aruakh:  the night before 
Friday is when the dead are unbound from their graves and can visit their living 
descendants in dreams. Zaure was convinced that the appearance of the aruakh, dressed 
in all white and silent, was an admonition, to remind her of her failure to remember her 
father properly. This made Zaure feel very guilty and she immediately decided to fry the 
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shelpek. She explained that the smoke rising from the heated oil is to feed her father's 
aruakh and warned me against eating the seven shelpek stacked on a plate and covered 
with a cloth napkin, as these were supposed to be given away to neighbors.  
Later that night, after she returned from work, Zaure knocked on the doors of 
three different apartments in her five-story Kruschev-era building and gave the shelpek to 
whoever happened to open the door, telling them that it was in her father's memory. She 
later mentioned to me that almost all of her neighbors were Russian and, except for an 
elderly Tatar lady who lived upstairs, she did not really know any of them, even though 
she lived in that building for almost a decade. That did not matter, Zaure explained, as it 
was the act of feeding the aruakh with the smell of the cooking oil and then sharing the 
bread with others that was important.  
As Privratsky (2000) describes in his study of religious belief and practice in 
Southern Kazakhstan, through distributing the loaves among neighborhood families, “the 
commemoration of the family’s ancestors thus becomes a community event, even when 
they do not invite anyone into the home to share the meal with them” (132). In Zaure's 
case, the distribution of zheti shelpek (seven loaves) to her neighbors might not have 
formed any lasting bonds of community, as she continued to have minimal contact with 
them. However, as she argued, this was not as important as the acts of offering, receiving, 
and acknowledging the commemoration. 
During my fieldwork, I came to recognize the act of frying zheti shelpek, also 
called kudaii nan ('sacred' or 'sacrificial' bread), as one of the most common household 
practices through which Kazakhs in Kazakhstan and Mongolia reconnect with their 
ancestors and fulfil their obligations as Kazakhs and Muslims. It is more often women 
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who are the dreamers and who fry the bread and distribute it in the memory of the 
deceased, but men are visited by aruakh as well, and both men and women often evoke 
the power of the aruakh and their blessings in many aspects of their lives.  
  In Kazakh, the word kudai (from Pers. “holy”) and the adjective form kudaii 
invokes notions of “holy,” “sacred,” and “sacrificial” in a variety of contexts.  Kudai is 
the word Kazakhs most commonly use to indicate God or Supreme Being in everyday 
conversations and in prayers and blessings (bata) invoked in Kazakh. For example, the 
term is used in a Kazakh version of the shahada (Muslim declaration of faith): “kudai bir, 
kuran shyn, Muhammed paighambar ras” - “God is one, Koran is the truth, Muhammad 
is the true prophet.” Kudaii is also used to designate a sacrifice of an animal at the 
mosque or a donation of money in lieu of charity (similar to Arabic qurban). While 
Kazakhs do not “sacrifice” to ancestors, both kudaii nan and these other kinds of “holy” 
sacrifices could be seen as forms of offering, connecting the realm of the divine and the 
ancestors with the world of the living, through acts of communal commemoration and 
distribution of bread, meat, or money.  
Kudaii tamakh (literally “sacred meal”) is another ritual occurrence, which along 
with baking kudaii nan, visiting family graves, and pilgrimages to holy sites, is the most 
common (in a sense of most frequent and also most habitual) ways to be Kazakh and 
Muslim. Generally, as Privratsky explains, kudaii tamaq is “food associated with Islam 
and distributed to others in acts of hospitality” (ibid: 134-135). As with the distribution of 
the seven loaves, both the dedication of the ritual meal to the ancestors and sharing the 
food as part of communal event are necessary. In Kazakhstan and Mongolia, such 
relatively small kudaii tamaq gatherings, which usually included extended family, 
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perhaps some close friends and neighbors, and a local mullah (Kaz. molda), were the 
most frequent kinds of ritual meals I have attended.12 Kudaii tamaq is always held for a 
specific purpose, to celebrate a happy occasion or to secure blessings for future 
endeavors.  I have attended kudaii tamaq that were given to celebrate a job promotion of 
the head of the household, a successful return of a wife from a trip abroad,  a son's 
acceptance to a university, and after a daughter survived a car crash uninjured. (On that 
occasion, the men of the family also attended mosque on the day of kudaii tamaq and 
sacrificed a sheep.) It is also common to hold kudaii tamaq when one is about to depart 
on a long or risky trip, leaving for military service, or start a new business venture. On 
such occasions, it is said that the ritual is held “to open a way” (jol ashu). 
  The language of “opening a way” or “opening a door” is also used when talking 
about interactions with ancestral spirits and Muslim saints. One has to open a door to 
communicate with aruakh and have their khasiet (spiritual power, divine grace) flow into 
the person. Dreams and visions provide such doorways into the ancestral world and allow 
ancestors and their living descendants to interact. Sacred places, such as a shrines, or 
graves of local saints, are also doorways into the spiritual ancestral world which allow for 
communication to happen and blessings to flow. Some people on pilgrimages spend the 
night at the shrine or sacred place in the hope of seeing a dream vision. Such “initiation 
dreams” are also common experiences among people who become healers 
(emshi/bakhshi) or those who begin to urge people to go on a spiritual path. The gift of 
healing, either spiritual or physical, or seeing the future, is bestowed by one’s aruakh, and 
                                                 
12 Although, this does vary quite widely, depending on the occasion, the status, and available resources of 
the family or kin group organizing the event.  
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is said to be passed along genealogical lines of descent (both male and female).  
Rejecting such a calling, seen as a gift and a responsibility given directly by one’s 
aruakh, can lead to sickness and even death. The relationship between the ancestors and 
descendants is active and mutual: if the descendants offer respect, commemoration, and 
proper care, the aruakh reciprocate with flow of material and spiritual blessings (bata). 
The same kind of language of respect and reciprocal care is used for explaining proper 
conduct toward elders in the community: if proper respect and care is offered to the 
elders (who by virtue of their age are closer to aruakh and to the realm of the divine), 
their bata will benefit their kin and others around them.   
The image of an “open door” is also central to the idea of hospitality as a core 
value of kazakhshylykh (Kazakhness). In Kazakhstan, references to hospitality are so 
widespread as to be ubiquitous, a national brand, closely connected to Kazakhs’ unique 
nomadic past and the traditions of the ancestors (see also Shryock 2004). For Kazakhs, 
hospitality is the hallmark of their nomadic heritage and it is through the rhetoric, rituals, 
and practices of hospitality that kazakhshylykh is objectified and embodied (Michaels 
2007). Kazakhs themselves clearly articulate the connections between ancestral 
veneration and hospitality, proper relations among kin and between hosts and guests. 
Drawing on the notion of the sacred, as in “kudaii nan” and “kudaii tamaq,” Kazakhs also 
call an unexpected guest “kudaii konakh,” or “sacred guest.” 
Besides kudaii tamaq, Kazakhs hold many other kinds of toi (feasts/celebrations), 
where meals are consumed, blessings are pronounced by the elders, and gifts are 
distributed from the host to the guests. One of the main reasons I was invited to so many 
toi and kudaii tamaq was because I was a guest from far away and this on many 
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occasions overrode my relatively low status as an unmarried and fairly young woman. I 
was often seated at an honored place, sometimes even above respected elders and male 
relatives, close to the tore which is the most honored seat at the head of the table, usually 
occupied by the eldest male or the head of the household (although when a mullah was 
present, he was always seated at the tore). As I was once told by a host, who seated me 
near the head of the table, the status of guests among Kazakhs depends on how far away 
they came from and, given that I was from America, noone else present was going to beat 
me on that score. Importantly, having such a guest brought honor and increased the status 
of the host and, if I was invited by another guest, of the people who brought me with 
them.  
Describing similar practices of hosting and feasting in Uzbekistan, Rasanayagam 
(2010) states that “events like the …toy [toi] take place within a mesh of mutual 
obligation and reciprocity wherein economic, affective, and kinship ties, the social and 
the sacred, cannot be untangled” (117). He argues that, in this context, sociality itself is a 
moral source (in Charles Taylor’s sense) and the social can be invested with significance 
of the sacred. At the same time, in examining notions of hospitality tied to food in 
Uzbekistan, Zanca (2007) shows how they can serve to highlight a kind of “us-not us” 
awareness, tied to notions of community self-awareness, morality, cultural notions of 
value, and religious piety.  For example, I often heard from Kazakhs that Russians are 
cold and unfriendly, they lock their doors and live behind tall fences. Americans, as one 
Mongolian Kazakh acquaintance who lived in the US for a year put it, “are always 
looking at their watch and never have time for their friends.” Kazakhs say that Uzbeks 
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are cheap and stingy in feeding their guests and they pinch two fingers together to 
indicate the meagre amount of meat that Uzbeks put on top of their plov (palau).   
Mongolian Kazakhs also often highlight the differences between them and the 
“Russified” Kazakhstani Kazakhs through describing the latter’s lack of hospitality. The 
image of the “open door” becomes a symbol of Kazakhness tied to the nomadic lifestyle 
of the ancestors, preserved by Kazakhs in Mongolia but lost in Kazakhstan. As Shankhar-
agha who returned to Bayan Ulgii after five years in Northern Kazakhstan described:  
 Kazakhs in Kazakhstan are shala Orys-shala Kazakh [half-Russian – half-
Kazakh], they do not even speak their own language. There, when you 
come to visit people, you have to knock on a door. Here, you can see, our 
door is always open [points toward the open door of the yurt]. They have 
not kept their salt-destur [customs-traditions], they do not know how to 
serve tea properly. They don’t live in kiiz ui [yurt], no one knows how to 
make them anymore. They just put sticks together. 
  
This highlights the “tension between hospitality as a kind of politics, and 
hospitality as a morality that transcends and governs the political” (Shryock: 524). It is 
the “scalar elasticity of hospitality” (ibid.)  that allows it to be a powerful concept, 
moving between levels of “family”, “state” and transborder national community The 
inherent hospitality of the Kazakh people is frequently cited as the reason for the 
harmonious interethnic relations in Kazakhstan, as it also serves to reiterate the position 
of all non-Kazakhs who live in Kazakhstan as “guests” and Kazakhs as “hosts.”  The 
following passage, appearing in a third-grade history textbook highlights this “guest” and 
“host” relationship in the context of Kazakhstan’s Soviet history: 
The earth of Kazakhstan has been copiously watered by the sweat, blood, 
and tears of forcibly deported peoples. People were brought to our country 
by sorrow, misery, and injustice. They were coming here most often by 
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force, suffering various deprivations: hunger, cold, humiliation. But not a 
single person who came to Kazakhstan as a special settler, a deportee, or 
an evacuee was left alone with his sorrow, because the Kazakh people are 
distinguished by exceptional hospitality and responsiveness both in sorrow 
and in happiness. Hospitality is an intrinsic and most prominent 
characteristic of the steppe dwellers. The Kazakhs strive to carry out the 
five basic precepts of the ancestors, one of which is to welcome a visitor 
as an emissary of god. This is confirmed by a saying: ‘One out of forty 
visitors is Khidr; one out of a thousand is [a] Wali.’13  
 
For Mongolian Kazakhs, discourse of hospitality as a moral source can also be a 
potent form of critique of the Kazakhstani state and the failures of its repatriation 
policies. Thus, unlike many government officials and other locals, who often talk about 
quotas as an undeserved government handout, Mongolian Kazakhs see government 
assistance in terms of a practice of hospitality that affirms the bonds of kinship and 
maintains traditional relations of reciprocity among neighbors and kin. For example, 
pointing out the relatively small amount of money given through the government 
migration quota, Mongolian Kazakhs argued that the quotas were significant largely for 
“moral and psychological rather than material reasons, to show that Kazakhstan helps 
us.”  One Mongolian Kazakh man explained that “our Kazakhs understand the quota as 
erulik. It means a meal or a feast organized in honor of the neighbors who arrived late to 
                                                 
13  Khidr is a mystical figure mentioned in the Quran who encounters and journeys with Prophet Moses.  
For Sufi Muslims in particular, Khidr is considered an “immortal guide possessing wisdom and powers 
beyond human understanding” (Bowker 1997: 545).  There are numerous accounts of pious figures meeting 
Khidr in real life; as one 15th century Sufi Shaykh, Ubayd Allah al-Ahrar mentions, “I have learned that one 
must give respect to every person one meets:  he may be Khidr. . .” (qtd. in Kabbani 2004: 234).  Here, the 
term wali (plural, awliya) refers to a “friend of God” and is “the title of one particularly devoted to God” 
(Bowker 1997: 1032).  The term is often translated into English as “saint.” Hence, Khidr and “friends of 
God” are figures that demand respect and hospitality. 
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the jailau (summer pasture). When everyone has already setup their yurts (ui) the people 
who get there late get erulik.”  
 
Dreams, wolves, and ancestor spirits 
 In the spring of 2007, just a few weeks after I moved in with Omirzhan-
agha and Nara-apa’s family in Shamalghan, Nurlan, an old school friend from Mongolia 
who was in Almaty on business, drove out to visit them and to spend the night. As the 
children were sent away to finish their homework and prepare for bed, the men cracked 
open a couple of bottles of beer, Nara and I drank tea, and the conversation soon turned 
to comparisons between Mongolia and Kazakhstan. Nurlan, it turned out, was a great 
Mongolian patriot. According to him, everything was better in Mongolia because, unlike 
in Kazakhstan, there was real democracy in Mongolia. At one point, he addressed me 
directly: 
Here, in Kazakhstan there is no democracy. But in Mongolia we have 
democracy. In twenty years, Mongolia, not America, will be the center of 
democracy in the world. We have two million people and twenty eight 
political parties, every party putting up their candidates, and there are 
independent candidates too. Every old woman knows everything that goes 
on, talks about politics. First, after communism fell, people voted 
communists back into office. Then they didn’t like what they were doing, 
so they voted them out and put in someone else. Then they didn’t like 
what they were doing and voted them out and put communists in power 
again, then voted them out again. Now people will vote for new young 
people, they do not want old leaders anymore. And if they do not like the 
government they all go out onto the main square in Ulaanbaatar and throw 
eggs. Every old man and woman is out throwing eggs. Also people are on 
the internet. Every person in the country is on the internet, reading the 
news, expressing their opinions. 
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Nurlan explained that he grew up in Khovd province, where Kazakhs were only 
25% of the population. So, unlike the Kazakhs in neighboring Bayan Ulgii, he grew up in 
the midst of Mongolian people, went to school with Mongolians, and considered 
Mongolian and Kazakh “our two languages.” Then he confided that he himself planned to 
run for parliament in the upcoming general elections: “There are 25,000 Kazakhs in 
Khovd, and every Kazakh has one good Mongolian friend, and he will tell his friend to 
vote for me too.” “What if that good Mongolian friend will persuade the Kazakh to vote 
for his Mongolian candidate instead?” - I asked. “No!” Nurlan was emphatic: “Kazakhs 
know their strength. They would never give their vote to anyone else. And when I get 
elected I will stop Kazakhs from moving to Kazakhstan. There is no reason for them to 
move. They should stay in Mongolia. I will stop this migration.” “And what about 
democracy? You were just talking about that,” I said. “How can you stop people from 
doing what they want?” He responded, “People elect me because they respect me. And I 
work for the people, so I do what is best for them.”  
 Then he continued (somewhat elliptically, I thought at the time):  “We 
Kazakhs believe in aruakh. And that is why Kazakhs are strong and Kazakhstan has 
become an independent country, because we respect our aruakh." About a year 
previously, he had a dream, in which a face of an elderly woman appeared to him, “like a 
grandmother” in a white kimeshek (traditional head covering of a married Kazakh 
woman). She just looked silently at him and then disappeared. As he woke up in a 
morning, he recalled his dream in vivid detail and knew that it was his "great-
grandmother" that visited him. Throughout the telling of the story, Omirzhan seemed 
somewhat skeptical of his friend’s account, and, at the end, asked:  “How do you know 
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this was your great-grandmother? Do you even know what she looked like?”  In 
response, Nurlan simply shrugged: “Who else could it be?”  
He turned to me again: “Kazakhs never say that a dream is a bad one,” he told me, 
“all dreams are good.” He then told another story, which at the time I heard for the first 
time, but later saw again in several different collections of Kazakh stories and folklore. 
The versions vary slightly, but there is one basic narrative. (As I was not recording at the 
time, I am recollecting from the fieldnotes I took later).  
A recently married daughter misses her parents and decides to ride out to 
her parents' yurt for a visit. The mother is home and welcomes her gladly, 
while the father is out with the animals. As the night is getting closer, the 
young woman gets restless and decides to return home to her husband. 
“Stay for the night,” begs her mother. “You can see your father tonight 
and go home in the morning. Don't leave now. It is getting dark and the 
wolves will be out on the steppe.” But the daughter does not want to stay.  
Finally, the mother confides the real reason for her fears: last night, in a 
dream, she saw two wolf cubs nursing at her daughter's breasts. She is 
afraid the dream means that the daughter is going to be eaten by the 
wolves. The daughter laughs, promises to be careful, and rides off home 
before she can be stopped. At dusk, the father returns with the sheep. “Our 
daughter was here but she has already left,” the mother tells him and 
shares her fear about the dream and the wolves. “You foolish woman! You 
should have never told her that!” exclaims the father, as he leaps on his 
horse and gallops after the daughter. But, alas! It is too late.  Eaten by the 
wolves, all he finds are her remains. When he returns home, the father tells 
his wife: “You said the wrong thing and that is why the wolves ate her. 
The dream did not mean that she would be eaten. It meant that our 
daughter was pregnant. It was a lucky dream, a happy one, but you ruined 
it all!” 
 
I was puzzled by the stories and the connections between them. What does 
democracy and independence have to do with ancestor spirits and dreams of wolves?  
These connections became clearer when I noticed ways in which moral judgments and 
values were elaborated through notions of kinship, hospitality, and ancestral veneration. I 
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saw how important it was for people to maintain connections and “to be present” for the 
communal rituals that brought together the living and the dead. It is both the living and 
the dead they left behind in Mongolia that call to them and help maintain the ties of 
transborder community. As Amira Mittermaier argues in her discussion of the power of 
dreams in Egypt,  
the seeing, telling, interpreting, and enacting of dreams is an unfamiliar 
form of ethical-political engagement…The kinds of imagined 
communities that figure in my interlocutors' stories exceed the secular 
imagined community of the nation-state. They draw on a very different 
understanding of the imagination, and they enable much broader 
communities. It is through dreams that such larger communities become 
imaginable and inhabitable. (2011: 4-5).  
 
Kazakhs with excellent job prospects abroad often returned to Bayan-Ulgii for 
reasons that were not related to their professional development but because they were 
expected to care for their parents in old age, because their parents had found suitable 
(local) marriage partners for them, and because they were expected and wanted to 
contribute to the social and economic lives of their relatives.  It is incumbent on family 
members to be present at weddings. Additionally,  being present and supportive is 
particularly important at funerals. If a close relative is absent at the time of a funeral, they 
must attempt to attend the 40th-day “wake,” and if that is not possible, then the one-year 
“memorial.” People belong to extensive networks of kin and are expected to contribute, 
not necessarily with money, but practically and morally, by being present.  
     Cash remittances do not comprise a significant portion of reciprocal exchanges 
between kin living in Mongolia and Kazakhstan (Werner and Barcus 2012). However, 
other forms of support operate within what Michaels  describes as Kazakh “economy of 
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hospitality.”  Those who now live in Kazakhstan continue to go back every summer for 
weddings, funerals, and commemorative feasts. They rely on their relatives in Mongolia 
to host them, provide them with housing (usually a yurt) to stay in, and slaughter sheep to 
welcome them. When I was in Bayan Ulgii in the summer of 2009, my Kazakh hosts and 
their friends frequently joked and grumbled about the many sheep they have to slaughter 
every summer for their relatives from Kazakhstan.   
All the inside furnishings of kiiz ui (“felt house,” yurt) are made by women and 
are considered their property. These include carpets for the floor, wall hangings, 
decorations, beddings, pillows for sitting, blankets, and all other felt house furnishings.  
Knowledge of making these objects and traditional Kerei Kazakhs motifs used for their 
decoration are passed down in the family, through mothers and grandmothers. These are 
objects that are highly visible when visitors enter the kiiz ui and are considered an 
embodiment of a woman's craft, her virtues, and household skills. In Bayan Ulgii, most 
Kazakh women never buy or sell such familial objects as every woman is expected to 
know how to make them. There are some wall hangings and carpets now imported from 
Xinjiang made by Chinese Kazakhs.  They can be occasionally seen in large kiiz ui 
intended for community events, like annual festivals, but I have never seen them in 
family kiiz ui, where people actually live. Several women mentioned to me that it would 
be a “shame” (uiat) for any woman to buy carpets and wall coverings, especially factory 
made ones, for her home. Sometimes carpets, wall hangings, or pillow covers circulate as 
gifts, but usually only among related women, such as daughters, sisters, or sisters-in-law. 
Thus such objects are highly valued within the economy of hospitality, but are being 
deliberately kept separate from market-type exchanges of commodities. However, over 
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the last twenty years, many women in Bayan Ulgii have begun to make these house 
objects for the tourist market, along with Kazakh-themed jewelry, purses, and 
accessories. These are made by women in two small cooperatives and sold at the shop in 
Ulgii.  This is providing an additional, albeit small, income for rural women who 
otherwise have no sources of earning cash in a largely subsistence economy. Similarly, in 
Kazakhstan, such crafts constitute a large portion of family income for Mongolian 
Kazakh oralman. As one woman who sold carpets and blankets at the local bazaar told 
me: “Now, we count how much things cost by how many korpe (blankets) they are 
worth. Recently, I sold two korpe and we bought this satellite dish. So, we just say, ‘yes, 
that costs two korpe.’”  Mongolian Kazakh women discovered that there is significant 
demand for such “traditionally authentic” handicrafts, as knowledge of making these 
items has been largely lost. Thus, while these objects are valued as family heirlooms in 
Mongolia, in Kazakhstan, on the other hand, they have become an ultimate commodity. 
Iman, democracy, and patriotism 
‘He who is without shame is also without faith.’ [Hadith]14 Similarly, our folk 
saying declares: He who has shame also has iman…Shame is an integral part of 
iman.  …Shame is a feeling of human dignity that compels a man to admit his 
guilt to himself and mete out his own punishment. …The people I see around me 
nowadays are ashamed of nothing and incapable of blushing…Now, have such 
people iman or have they not?  
(Abai 171-73).  
  
                                                 
14 There is another hadith (found in the authoritative hadith collection known as Sahih al-Bukhari) in which 
the Prophet Muhammad said, “Faith (Belief) consists of more than sixty branches.  And Haya [modesty] is 
a part of faith” (See: http://sunnah.com/bukhari/2/2).   
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The word iman in its original Arabic has multiple meanings: religious faith, 
belief, and religious conviction (the words iman and mumin, or believer, have the same 
root).  In one hadith found in the collection Sunan Ibn Majah, iman is defined as: “Faith 
(iman) is knowledge in the heart, words on the tongue and action with the physical 
faculties (limbs of the body).” (See http://sunnah.com/urn/1250650). Kazakhs also use 
the term iman for the declaration of Muslim faith, or shahada ("There is no God but God 
and Muhammad is His Messenger.”) Therefore, the concept of iman encompasses belief 
and action, declaration of faith, conviction, righteous deeds, urging others to do good, and 
(as in Abai’s words above) shame, for oneself and others. As I discuss below, for 
Kazakhs, the term iman also refers to notions of morality, ethics, or moral behavior.   
In the rest of the chapter, I discuss a conversation I recorded with Makhum-agha, 
a Mongolian Kazakh man in his early sixties. My research assistant Zhake was also 
present and I focus on the part of the interview when the two of them became involved in 
a discussion of morality, power, justice, and democracy. Like Nurlan who I quoted earlier 
in the chapter, Makhum-agha also connected notions of moral community, patriotism, 
and democracy to Kazakh values of care, respect, and responsibility that includes the 
living and the dead.  
 
Мakhum: For example, it is not permitted to eat the meat of pig.  
      
Zhake  : That came from the Arabs though! [emph] 
 
M. : Alright, but why is it said that it is haram [forbidden]? Right now in 
religion? Like, for example, there are people of “easy” behavior 
[promiscuous]. And with “easy” behavior, there is a spiritual end. I don't 
even want to talk about that. For example, AIDS, different illnesses, are 
from promiscuous behavior, but God told us how to protect from that. But 
why is the pig talked about as an example? It is said that we cannot eat pig 
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meat, why is it so? Because a person who has eaten the meat of pig has no 
patriotic feelings. Why? A pig is the only one among all the animals that 
will stand silently by if one of them bothers another. Among people, and 
even among dogs, if one of them bites, the male protects his female. But 
the pig never does so. Alright, so the Creator himself said that people who 
eat that meat will not have patriotic feelings, there will be no patriotism 
among them. And the second problem is vodka [alcohol] problems. Vodka 
is the foundation of everything bad. I don't even want to talk about that. 
 
Makhum-agha begins his conversation about morality with an example of a pig 
and explains that the reason this animal is considered haram (forbidden) to eat is because 
it does not take care of others; it has no “patriotic feelings.” Eating pork, along with 
drinking vodka, engaging in “promiscuous behavior,” and eating carrion are practices and 
substances that affect both physical and spiritual health. As he continues:  
 
And, next, why can’t we also eat the meat of dead animals? The meat of 
dead animals is a bacteriological weapon. All the different parasites that 
are in it grow in geometrical progression and become bacteriological 
weapons. So, the Creator sees it all and forbids it. This is so in Muslim 
religion, but other religions say differently. In Hindu religion, they burn 
their dead. And in Buddhism, there are five or six different ways to do it. 
For example in Mongolia and in China, there is a custom where they do 
such terrible things. After death, people cannot be buried. If their meat and 
bones are eaten by the dogs, then it is said that the person was good.   
 
Zh: So, they just leave them out [lit.in the steppe]?   
 
M: Yes, just leave them outside….  
 
By talking about how we treat others, both dead and alive, he includes them as a 
part of a moral community of belonging, constituted through iman. He links these 
discussions of consuming alcohol and other haram substances with larger considerations 
of both personal morality and just governance: 
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M: Myself, I am just a simple Kazakh old man. But these Kazakhs now, 
their morality [iman] is rotten. Our ancestors were strong, but these new 
Kazakhs are rotten. They forget, that is said: do not kill, do not lie, do not 
be promiscuous, do not drink vodka. If you look, this is all done among 
Kazakhs, there is not one Russian among them.   
And also, I want to say, there are people who are like jackals. Why is the 
government like this; why are citizens like this? Why are some people 
willing to kill their father for power, to kill their child? But some people, 
even when dying from hunger, will not take what is someone else’s? It is 
from immorality [“imansyzdyk,” absence of iman].  
 
Zh: Yes, exactly, immorality like you said. The difference between people 
and animals is not in reason [аqyl], but   
 
М: In iman.   
 
Zh: Yes, you are right.  
 
Here, Makhum-agha ties notions of personal immorality to ideas of corrupt governance:  
“Why is the government like this; why are citizens like this?” Zhake returns to the 
discussion of just forms of power and authority at the end of their conversation: 
Zh: Yes, there needs to be authority [bilik], but what kind should it be? 
Could our authority be called just (adil) authority? 
 
M: They say that there has never been democracy among our Kazakh 
people. Our Kazakh people are democrats from birth; democracy is rooted 
among the people. Our ancestors have all been democrats. Among us, it is 
not allowed to steal from others, not allowed to hurt others. Because, from 
the beginning, good order has been kept among people. It is not labor that 
made humans human; human was made human by one thing – iman.  
 
Although born in different countries, the two interlocutors in this conversation, 
Makhum-agha and Zhake, shared much in common: they belonged to the same age 
cohort (referred to as kurdas in Kazakh) and both had similar educational experience 
having gone to university in Soviet Russia. While there, both had lessons in Marxist 
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ideology and the “theory of Leninism,” which they laughed about together at the 
beginning of the interview. Makhum-agha said: “It did not matter if you were an engineer 
or whoever, you had to study it all, scientific this and that, scientific atheism.” “Yes, that 
was a pseudoscience,” Zhake interjected laughing. He continued on the theme of socialist 
ideology later in the conversation, switching at that moment to Russian: 
Capitalism is the most perfect (sovershennaya) system of making wealth 
and money. When I worked at the sovkhoz (collective farm), no one 
wanted to work; everyone stole and no one worked. But, when the 
sovkohoz fell apart and the land was divided up and given to the people, 
then everyone worked hard on their own plot. So, capitalism is a very 
good system for making money, but not how to distribute it justly among 
people. And when there is no just distribution, this is what happens when 
we have people who are very rich and very poor. But in itself, socialism 
was a good idea. It was not a new socialist idea, it is very old, wanting a 
just society for everyone. It is only the incarnation (voploschenie) of this 
idea that was bad. But there are countries now that live by socialist idea. In 
Europe, like Denmark, they have implemented socialist ideas in their 
society and they live well.  
 
Makhum-agha is an observant Muslim who prays five times a day, abstains from 
alcohol and attends prayers at the mosque. Zhake, from what I knew of him, was 
indifferent at best to explicitly religious worldview and practice. However, in this 
conversation, they seemed to find common ground in their understanding of iman, just 
society, and the organization of power.  
The idea of human nature as malleable and improvable was at the center of Soviet 
attempts to create a socialist society. For Marx (via Fromm), a “productive life” involves 
the relationship between man and nature and man and man. As Soviet Marxism, studied 
by Makhum-agha and Zhake, proclaimed: “Man creates his own destiny.” Friedrich 
Engels states this defining role of labor in distinguishing humans from animals: 
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Labour is the source of all wealth, the political economists assert. And it 
really is the source – next to nature, which supplies it with the material 
that it converts into wealth. But it is even infinitely more than this. It is the 
prime basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent 
that, in a sense, we have to say that labour created man himself.  In short, 
the animal merely uses its environment, and brings about changes in it 
simply by its presence; man by his changes makes it serve his 
ends, masters it. This is the final, essential distinction between man and 
other animals, and once again it is labour that brings about this distinction. 
 
 Zhake asserts that neither labor nor reason is what makes a person human. 
Although, not religious, for him as for Makhum-agha, it is iman or morality. In his 
discussion of western views of Islam as “illiberal,” Faisal Devji contrasts Islamic-based 
morality with Kantian view that ethics begins with reason and is objectified through 
language. In this Kantian framework, liberalism and democracy become "fundamental 
categories of interest, representation, and contract, the whole legitimated and guaranteed 
by a nation-state."( 22) What Makhum-agha and Zhake mean when they talk about 
democracy seems to be something quite different from that. Describing Kazakhs 
ancestors as “democrats” he defines democracy as rather an ethical framework: “Among 
us, it is not allowed to steal from others, not allowed to hurt others. Because, from the 
beginning, good order has been kept among people.”  
As I have discussed throughout this chapter, for Mongolian Kazakhs, notions of 
community and nation include ancestors and are predicated upon a reciprocal relationship 
between ancestors and their descendants. As I Nurlan-agha stated, “that is why Kazakhs 
are strong, and Kazakhstan has become an independent country, because we respect our 
aruakh.” The communal ties that stretch across the borders are maintained through 
practices of ancestral veneration, return visitations, and pilgrimages to sacred sites. These 
ties are also maintained through reciprocal relationships of hospitality among kin – a 
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hospitality that transgresses borders as it also reinforces practices of inclusion and 
exclusion.  
In contrast to President Nazerbayev’s assertion of Kazakh culture as supporting a 
form of authoritarian rule, the Kazakhs with whom I spoke describe their culture as 
intrinsically democratic, including their ancestors within that legacy of democracy. As 
Makhum-agja and Zhake discuss above, the Kazakh tradition of democracy is based on 
moral values of help, reciprocity and care among the dead and the living. Such a view of 
democracy presents an alternative framework for imagining a just and democratic society 
based on Islamic understandings of iman as both an internal faith as well as a social 
practice.  
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Conclusion 
 
When I began my fieldwork in Kazakhstan in 2006, my initial research questions were 
guided by the kinds of discussions that were prominent in scholarly literature about Central Asia 
and post-Soviet states that I was familiar with at the time. Therefore, as I went to the field, I 
framed my questions about processes of Mongolian Kazakh migration in terms of notions of 
citizenship, state-relations, and nation building. After a few months in Kazakhstan, I began to 
realize that how I was asking these questions did not resonate in any meaningful way for 
individuals with whom I spoke. For the Mongolian Kazakhs I interacted with, ideas of homeland, 
place, belonging, and national community were articulated not in terms of political membership 
or territorial belonging, but rather in ways that spoke to notions of hospitality, moral obligations 
to kin and ancestors, and genealogical ties. However, after my time in Mongolia in the summer 
of 2009, I also realized the significance of issues of labor and ecology and the kinds of mobility 
that they allow or preclude for Mongolian Kazakhs, many of whom are still engaged in a pastoral 
semi-nomadic way of life. 
The government of Kazakhstan decided to terminate the repatriation program in 2012, 
which did not lead to the cessation of movement of people across borders. On one hand, the 
repatriation policies of the Kazakhstani state between 1991 and 2011 made it possible for many 
returnees to imagine and act upon the conflation of the recently emerged political entity called 
Kazakhstan with the ancestral homeland. As in other cases of ethnic-based migration policies, by 
identifying the migrants as “repatriates,” the government claims them as unquestioned members 
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of the nation, constructing the political, social, and moral parameters and interpretations of their 
“return” (see Darieva 2005; Lubkemann 2003). On the other hand for Mongolian Kazakhs, what 
it means to be Kazakh is not reducible simply to their relation to the state.  Mongolian Kazakh 
notions of community and belonging are anchored in alternative ways of thinking about 
peoplehood: through practices of commemoration, pilgrimages, funerals, and other occasions 
when ancients are called on to bless the living, as I described in chapter four. As people engage 
in these practices, they create viable communities, bridging the past and present, the deceased 
and the living. This allows them to move back and forth across the boundaries between the 
physical world and the spiritual world of the ancestors, and migrate across state boundaries 
without losing the essential links to their histories, genealogies, and sacred places. The state’s 
attempt to curtail such cross-border mobility has been failing in the face of human activities that 
have endured to maintain communal structures and relationships and continue to defy 
governmental policies and international boundaries.  
Although Kazakhstan’s policy of ethnic repatriation has usually been interpreted through 
the lens of nation-building, one of the arguments I make in my dissertation is that the repatriation 
program began with labor issues. In Chapter one, I described how Mongolian Kazakhs made 
decisions to migrate to Kazakhstan in the early 1990s because of economic hardships, 
unemployment, as well as patriotic feelings toward the new Kazakhstani state. At the same time, 
Kazakhstan was experiencing acute labor shortages due to the emigration of two million 
Russians, Poles, Germans and others who had left the country for their own ethnic homelands. 
The conversion of labor needs and nation building projects in Kazakhstan, and economic 
problems in Mongolia, made Mongolian Kazakh migration to Kazakhstan at that time both 
possible and desirable. However, the political and economic considerations on both sides of the 
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border changed considerably over the two decades of this migration. By the end of the 1990s, 
emigration of non-Kazakhs and the immigration of approximately one million Kazakh return 
migrants, tipped the demographic balance in favor of ethnic Kazakhs for the first time in at least 
a hundred years.  
What was described as the “demographic crisis” of the 1990s therefore became less 
urgent just as labor needs also became less acute.  Rather than being an industrial and mining 
powerhouse, requiring a large labor force, by the beginning of the 2000s, Kazakhstan’s economy 
was relying largely on oil revenue: an industry that does not require a large labor force of 
unskilled workers. In this way, return migrants, already marginalized socially, economically, and 
politically in Kazakhstan, turned from desired bodies, to expendable and internal strangers.   
This shift in attitude toward the oralmandar was clearly articulated by President 
Nazarbayev himself in 2010 during his visit to the village of Kyzylaghash, in the Almaty region. 
Five months earlier, the village had been completely destroyed by a flood that also left forty-four 
people dead. At the memorial speech, the President said the following:  
 
As far as I know, almost half of the people left underwater are our compatriots 
who came from abroad. Kazakhstan is the only state that is engaged in the 
repatriation of its compatriots. I do a lot - allocate the money of the state in order 
to invite, to gather together the Kazakhs, who are scattered worldwide. Certainly, 
these citizens have not yet made their contributions to Kazakhstan. In today's 
prosperity and development of Kazakhstan, there is none of their merit… 
 
I heard about this speech from my Kazakh friends after I had already completed the 
fieldwork for this dissertation, and was living in the United States. My friends were outraged by 
the words and sentiments pronounced in the context of a memorial speech for many “compatriots 
from abroad.” President Nazarbayev’s words point to a way of understanding the value of people 
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as part of the national community in economic terms: their contribution to the “prosperity and 
development of Kazakhstan.” As I argue in chapter four, Mongolian Kazakhs understand their 
migration to Kazakhstan as an invitation: they are guests in Kazakhstan. In relationships between 
hosts and guests, the expectations of social reciprocity oblige hosts to be generous, and to always 
leave their doors open for visitors. These social obligations do not end at the threshold of the 
house, but also extend to other fields of social interaction, informing the ways Kazakhs relate to 
other ethnic groups in their country and understand their relationship to the state. 
President Nazarbayev’s speech illustrates a shift in the attitudes toward return migration 
since the 1990s, which privileges “quality over quantity.” While prior to 2005, return migrants 
were officially provided money and housing by the government, starting in 2006, the 
government instead offered bank loans, mortgages, and credits. This new program, known as 
Nurly kosh (Blessed migration),15 promoted self-reliance and entrepreneurial spirit instead of 
reliance on “charity.” The language of blood, history, and patriotism that initially informed the 
diasporic migration thus turned into a neoliberal discourse of “qualitative migration” based on 
“economic potential.”  
At the same time, governmental rhetoric couched the Nurly kosh program in the language 
of essential values, such as the practice of “asar,” which I discussed in Chapter 2. For Kazakhs, 
the practice of asar reinforces the values of cooperation, and reciprocity among kin and 
neighbors, specifically in the construction of houses and settlements. Yet, the practice of asar, a 
kinship practice of obligation and cooperation, was reinterpreted through the neoliberal lens the 
government was promoting. For example, in an article in the newspaper Liter, the writer 
                                                 
15 See:  Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 2 Dekabria 2008 goda #1126 "Ob Utverzhdenii 
Programy 'Nurly kosh' na 2009-2011 gody (The Law of Republic of Kazakhstan from December 2, 2008 #1126 
“Concerning the founding of the Program Nurly kosh for 2009-2011”). 
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describes an oralman settlement called Asar, built through Nurly kosh program, by saying, "The 
building of the microdistrict "Asar" for oralman is a symbol of initiative and independence, a 
symbol of how much the people themselves can do, without waiting for someone else's charity.” 
(Liter, June 27, 2012).  
The new governmental attitude toward oralman came to a head in 2011 during a series of 
labor protests of strikes by oil workers in the western Mangistau region. Labor unrest and 
intermittent strikes had been going on in Mangistau since at least 2009, culminating in a general 
strike of approximately ten thousand workers employed by the government subsidiary company, 
KazMunaiGas. The workers demanded fair wages and working conditions, but were ignored by 
the company and the government until they began a series of hunger strikes and around the clock 
protests in the regional center town of Zhanaozen (Human Rights Watch 2012).  
 On September 29, 2011, during a public meeting attended by journalists and policy 
experts, Timur Kulibayev,16 President of the National Fund “Samruk-Kazyna” (which controls 
KazMunaiGas) made the following statement: “Leaders of the oil workers striking in Zhanaozen 
are repatriates…They have their own informal leaders that came together from Karakalpakiia 
[Karakalpakistan Autonomous Region, Uzbekistan]. A long time ago, we should have limited 
migration of people there [Zhanaozen]. Because the social infrastructure of this city is not ready 
to take on such a number of people” (Tengrinews, 29 September 2011). He finished his speech 
by stating that the labor strikes in Zhanaozen are, “the result of an ill-considered migration 
policy.”  
Such language is a direct contrast to the celebratory rhetoric of the Kazakhstani 
government in support of return migration throughout the 1990s. It foreshadows the final 
                                                 
16 Timur Kulibayev is also the son-in-law of President Nazarbayev. 
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suspension of the repatriation program following the tragic events in Zhanaozen on December 
16, 2011, to which I now turn.  
*** 
 
The Mangistau region, and the town of Zhanaozen specifically, are known as the 
“informal capital of oralman." According to official Kazakhstani statistics, out of almost one 
million return migrants in the last twenty years, one out of every ten, or close to one hundred 
thousand people, eventually ended up in the Mangistau region and the population of Zhanaozen 
doubled from 60,000 in 1989 to 120,000-130,000 by 2011 (Kubeev 2011).  
Though the Mangistau region along the Caspian Sea holds Kazakhstan’s largest deposits 
of oil and natural gas, in 2010, the region’s poverty rate was the highest in Kazakhstan, reaching 
21.2 percent (Human Rights Watch 2012). Because over ninety percent of the regional economy 
relies on the oil industry, single-industry towns, such as Zhanaozen have a very high cost of 
living and very high rates of unemployment.  
The oil corporations are the largest employer as well as the largest contributor to local 
taxes. The oil companies in include KazMunaiGas, as well Chevron, and other foreign (e.g. 
Chinese, Russian) corporations. There are conflicting accounts of what happened on December 
16, 2011, but it seems that the striking workers became angered when celebrations for the 
twentieth anniversary of Kazakhstan’s independence were being set up in the square where they 
held their protests. Violence escalated quickly when the police was called in to deal with the 
protesters and opened live fire at the crowd, killing eighteen people and injuring hundreds in 
three subsequent days of violence. While many people in Kazakhstan and abroad accused the 
government and the police of brutality and deadly violence against innocent people, when 
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President Nazarbayev visited Zhanaozen three days later, he declared that the “riots” were 
instigated by “hooligans and drunks” (Kubeev 2011). At the same time, Presidential Advisor 
Ermuhamet Ertisbayev stated to the regional newspaper, Lada, that 26% of striking workers were 
oralman (December 21, 2011). In the subsequent trials of oil workers accused of instigating what 
became known as the “Zhanaozen affair," it was revealed that out of thirty seven people on trial, 
twenty were return migrants. 
In the same newspaper paper, Ermuhamet Ertisbayev stated: 
What is going on in Zhanaozen is absolutely not characteristic of Kazakh 
mentality. Kazakhs never protested against the central authority, never. The main 
organizers in Zhanaozen were people who recently received Kazakhstani 
citizenship. They came from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and they have not yet 
integrated fully into the Kazakhstani mentality. 
   
In addition, government officials also publicly accused oralmandar as a group of being 
responsible for fomenting political turmoil, compromising the security of the state, and engaging 
in "religious extremism" and "terrorist acts," all claimed to be on the rise in Kazakhstan since 
2010, in what I would argue is an atmosphere of rising authoritarianism and further curtailing of 
political and religious freedoms in the country. The situation in Zhanaozen made starkly visible 
the rifts and problems that return migrants faced in Kazakhstan. These events and the association 
of return migrants with anti-government activity and violence, led to the official suspension of 
the return program.  
Though the program existed for two decades, and had begun with celebration and wide 
government support, its suspension came and went without much fanfare. A parliamentary 
decree in January 2012 officially ended the repatriation program, though this was not made 
public until months later.    
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During the eight months after the program ended, thirty thousand Kazakh moved to 
Kazakhstan, continuing trans-border migration practices outside the official boundaries of state 
quotas and the return migration program (Tengrinews, April 23, 2012). Even before the 
suspension of the program, most Kazakhs from abroad were establishing themselves in 
Kazakhstan by relying on kin networks for housing and support, and did not form part of the 
government quotas that aimed to regulate the program and provide migrants financial assistance. 
Just as there were economic factors that played a role in migration in the 1990s, economic 
factors still continue to influence migration patterns more than any government policy. For 
example, a recent mining boom in Mongolia presents many new opportunities for Mongolian 
Kazakhs to find employment outside of their already declining pastoral lifestyle (High 2008; 
Bulag 2009). Such employment opportunities in Mongolia as well as additional educational 
opportunities in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, offer Kazakhs alternative 
migration prospects.   
This dissertation is merely an opening for considering the ways in which people create 
community through movement and the circulation across borders. Alaina Lemon (2000) argues 
that the crossing of a threshold is a “moment far from the liminal or the inchoate; often precisely 
such moments demand the most strict declarations of identity. At some thresholds – doorways 
just as state borders – identity must be verified, whether engraved in a passport, on the face, or in 
bodily demeanor. All is not in flux – there are recognized ways to cross” (205). For Kazakhs, the 
return program was an official invitation to be a guest and have their ethnicity recognized and 
declared in Kazakhstan. Though Kazakhs are no longer official guests of the state, the trans-
border community that was established will not disappear anytime soon. For Kazaks, it is not the 
citizenship they hold or the passports they have that keep their attachments to place, but their live 
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relatives on both sides of the border, and their obligations to attain life-cycle ceremonies, and 
religious ceremonies for ancestral spirits. As Ryzbek-agha told me in Bayan Ulgii in 2009: “We 
are living in our own land, we are moving around in our own land. We are moving around in our 
land, just as we always used to: winter, summer, autumn. It’s just now we are crossing borders.” 
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